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Abstract
This thesis collects three di¤erent contributions to monetary macroeconomics,
covering both theoretical and empirical aspects.
First chapter builds on the DSGE models of New Keynesian tradition, and
studies monetary policy around a non e¢cient steady state. Using a two-stage
approach developed by Levine, McAdam, and Pearlman (2007), I show that in the
presence of backward looking rms, the central planner improves social welfare
when it allows for a steady state rate of ination marginally above zero.
In the second chapter, I estimate a simple two-country DSGE model to study
the behaviour of the Eastern European central banks, obtaining some innovative
important results. First, a simple monetary policy rule mimicking an optimal rule
together with the assumption about the existence of non-zero steady state rate of
ination deliver a signicantly better t to the data. Furthermore, the empirical
hypothesis that central banks systematically target CPI ination rather than PPI
ination is rejected for all the investigated Eastern European countries (EEC).
In the third chapter, I use a Bayesian VAR with economically interpretable
structural restrictions and zero restrictions on lags, to analyse the transmission
channels of external shocks to an extended set of EEC. I study to what extent
monetary policy shocks originating from the US and from Germany can explain
uctuations on Eastern European markets. To carry out the Bayesian inference, I
use a Gibbs sampling approach. I nd that the US monetary policy inuences the
EEC macroeconomic variables at least as much as its German counterpart.
Preliminary Denitions
Actual level of a variable: The nominal value that the generic variable Dt
takes when both stochasticity and (real and nominal) market imperfections are
considered. Written in relative/real terms, the variable is denoted by ~Dt = Dt=Pt.
Stationary level of a variable: The value that the variable takes when only
(real and nominal) market imperfections are considered. It is denoted by D if in
nominal value and by D if in real/relative terms.
Natural level of a variable: The value that the variable takes when only
real market imperfections are considered. It is denoted by Dn.
Deviation of the actual level of a variable from its stationary level:
The ratio between the actual and the stationary level of a variable. It is denoted
by D^t  Dt=D.
Log-transformation of a variable: The value that obtains by applying
logarithms to the value of the variable. It is denoted by dt  logDt. Likewise,
~dt  log ~Dt, d
n  logDn, d^t  log D^t.
Introduction
My research interest focuses on the analysis of monetary policy issues, and covers
both theoretical aspects, which I study through Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) modelling, and empirical aspects, which I study using Bayesian
estimation techniques. My theoretical work, developed in Chapter 1, aims at in-
vestigating whether real and nominal frictions may represent a source of trend
ination. My empirical work consists of two exercises. The rst one, illustrated
in Chapter 2, aims at bringing to the data the theoretical predictions delivered
by my theoretical analysis. In particular, I investigate whether a DSGE model
with non-zero ination performs empirically better than an analogous model ab-
stracting from trend ination. This exercise consists a set of three estimations
performed in a context with a large economy (represented by Germany) and a
small open economy (represented, in turn, by the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland). The second exercise, described in Chapter 3, extends that performed in
Chapter 2 and aims at assessing whether the transmission channel studied there is
the most relevant when looking at Eastern European countries (to the three listed
above, here I also consider Slovakia), or international transmission of monetary
shocks from the US, either directly or indirectly through its e¤ect of the German
economy, may also play a signicant role.
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In order to achieve my theoretical goal, I build on the literature of New Key-
nesian DSGE models containing real and nominal frictions. The debate regarding
economic rigidities has a long history. Phillips (1958) can be considered as a
cornerstone for this debate. In the monetary economics literature, many argu-
ments suggesting that monetary authorities should take into account the trade-o¤
between ination and output were built upon his empirical ndings. Monetarist
economists criticised this line of reasoning, considering them somehow too static.
In their view, the crux of the matter was the assumption that individuals are only
able to form inationary expectations based on past ination. This controversy led
to the traditional acceleration Phillips curve, characterised by backward looking
components. After the famous critique by Robert E. Lucas in 1976, macroeco-
nomics was micro-founded, and the resulting theory had individuals making their
choices on fully rational decisions. In fact, it was in response to Lucas critique of
ad-hoc modelling that Kydland and Prescott (1982) formulated a theory of micro-
founded business cycle models, known as the Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory.
This is a general equilibrium models in which the economy responds e¢ciently to
shocks to the total factor productivity that generate uctuations. It is because of
the e¢ciency of these responses that monetary policy has no real e¤ects on the
economy. Their model became an important building block for the New Keyne-
sian models (NKM), which represent the class of models that central banks most
commonly rely upon at present.
NKMs postulate the existence of a Phillips curve, essentially generated by
market frictions, also in the presence of fully rational rms that maximize the dis-
counted value of prots in the form of Calvos contracts. Roberts (2001), Eichen-
baum and Fisher (2003) and Dupuis (2004), show that the standard NewKeynesian
13
Phillips curve (NKPC) with a simple forward looking component does not corre-
spond well with empirical results, as it is unable to capture ination persistence.
Having recognised the importance of the ination inertia, economists have been
looking for a way to create a Phillips curve that could simultaneously have both
forward and backward looking elements. One of the rst attempts to develop a
two-sided Phillips curve was Fuhrer and Moore (1995), which used two-period
Taylor contracts.
Another approach proposes an indexation of ination. This is possible by using
either the method of static indexation, as suggested by e.g., Yun (1996), or the
dynamic one as in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005). Yun (1996) uses the idea that rms that cannot re-optimise in a
given period, may increase prices in the attempt to anticipate potential inationary
phenomena, which they take statically into account at a xed rate. Static ination
can be seen as the long term average rate of ination and, therefore, long term
ination inertia is introduced into the model. Similarly, in the model of dynamic
indexation from Christiano et al. (2005), rms that are not allowed to re-optimise
may raise prices by adding a fraction of the last observed rate of ination. Both
approaches are nevertheless criticised in the literature because they assume that
rms adjust prices every period, which contradicts the evidence on price stickiness.
Galí and Gertler (1999) introduce a variation to this approach by assuming that
only a fraction of rms change their prices, and provide also empirical support
to their approach. In their model, one part of the rms allowed to adjust prices
behave rationally, while the complementary part indexes their prices according to
a rule of thumb.
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Nonetheless, the empirical evidence about the importance of the backward
looking component in the NKPC delivers ambiguous results. Most of the estimates
suggest a hybrid NKPC with a backward looking component. A value of lagged
ination should be around 0.3 to 0.5, in line with other empirical ndings such
as Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001). Benigno
and Lopez-Salido (2002) test the Galí-Gertler model on ve countries in the Euro
Area, showing that German rms behave rationally and, therefore, ination is
strongly forward looking. By contrast, in France, Spain and Italy, the opposite is
true. In these countries, rms are characterized by backward looking price setting
behaviour, strongly linking their prices to past conditions. These asymmetries
are important as they complicate the determination of unique monetary policy
within the Euro Area. Using Bayesian estimation for euro area data and model
with NKPC based on Christiano et al. (2005) approach, Smets and Wouters
(2003) show, that the forward looking component clearly dominates, however, the
backward looking one is also important. Values for both parameters are in line with
the ndings above. Conversely, some authors, e.g., Levine, Pearlman, Perendia,
and Yang (2012), show that including habit formation improves the performance
of the model more than a backward looking component of the Phillips curve. For
comparison, the estimates for habit formation are usually large: the literature
refers to a value around 0.8.
In my theoretical analysis, developed in Chapter 1, I build on the study by
Levine et al. (2012) and study optimal monetary policy around a non e¢cient
steady state, using a two-stage approach developed by Levine, McAdam, and
Pearlman (2007). The goal is to show that in the presence of backward looking
rms (as in Galí and Gertler, 1999; and Steinsson, 2003), the central planner can
15
improve social welfare by allowing a steady state rate of ination marginally above
zero. In such an environment, there are two forces in the steady state that tend to
balance out. On the one hand, given a positive rate of ination, a non-zero price
dispersion arises in steady state, decreasing welfare. On the other hand, positive
ination causes leisure to decline, and thereby includes a rise in output, bringing
it closer to its e¢cient level. This means that the steady state output gap is lower
than it would be in the absence of ination and welfare rises. There is no obvious
analytical solution to the central planner problem, so I solve the model numerically
using the Levine-Pearlman Dynare-based system, known as ACES (Analysis and
Control of Economic Systems).
My empirical work, developed in Chapters 2 and 3, is based on the Bayesian
estimation approach, which I apply to two questions. I estimate a simple two-
country DSGE model, similar to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), with a non-zero
steady state ination, to study the behaviour of the Eastern European central
banks. The Bayesian analysis, which I carry out using a Metropolis-Hastings al-
gorithm, suggests that my model performs better than the benchmark in several
aspects. First, I can show that assuming the existence of trend ination, i.e.,
modelling the log-linearised Phillips curve similarly to Ascari and Ropele (2007),
delivers a signicantly better t to the data. Second, although a number of the-
oretical contributions, e.g., Galí and Monacelli (2005), argue that PPI ination
targeting performs better than CPI ination targeting in terms of welfare loss, the
empirical literature mainly concentrates on simple rules with CPI ination target-
ing. Using a posterior odds test, I show that the empirical hypothesis that central
banks systematically target CPI ination rather than PPI ination is rejected
for all the investigated Eastern European countries (EEC), i.e., Czech Republic,
16
Hungary, and Poland.
Second, I use a Bayesian VAR with economically interpretable structural re-
strictions and zero restrictions on lags to analyse the transmission channels of
external shocks to an extended set of EEC, which also includes Slovakia (along
with Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Following Mackowiak (2006), I study
to what extent monetary policy shocks originating from the US and from Germany
can explain uctuations on Eastern European markets. To carry out the Bayesian
inference, I use a Gibbs sampling approach. I nd that the US monetary policy
inuences the EEC macroeconomic variables at least as much as its German (later
ECBs) counterpart.
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Chapter 1
Welfare Analysis in a Model with
Ination Persistence and
Non-Zero Steady State Ination
1.1 Introduction
In the New Keynesian literature, the long run equilibrium is typically dened as a
steady state with zero ination. Casual observations however suggest that ination
exhibits a non-zero trend, and several recent empirical contributions point out that
trend ination plays an important role in shaping many macroeconomic features.
In particular, a signicant deal of this literature seems to focus on the e¤ects of the
existence of trend ination on monetary policy conduct. This chapter attempts
to complement these studies, and investigates whether monetary policy may be
a possible cause of trend ination. Specically, I seek to nd an answer to the
question: "Might non-zero steady state ination be welfare improving?"
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In order to explore this idea, I develop a New Keynesian model where a social
planner seeking to maximise welfare optimally chooses the level of steady state
ination. My model features two key aspects. First, I consider a hybrid Phillips
curve, containing both a forward-looking and a backward-looking component, as in
Galí and Gertler (1999) and Steinsson (2003). Second, I depart from studying the
equilibrium around the e¢cient steady state of the model and, following Levine,
McAdam, and Pearlman (2007), I use the Hamiltonian approach rather than the
traditional linear-quadratic approximation to derive the welfare loss function. As I
show and discuss in the next sections of this chapters, both aspects are key in that
overlooking either of them would result in the social planner trivially choosing zero
steady state ination. That is, the traditional New Keynesian prediction about
trend ination results as a particular case of the more general model that I develop
in this chapter.
My analysis shows that, around a non e¢cient steady state, the magnitude of
the share of backward looking rms inuences the optimal level of the steady state
ination. In particular, the social planner chooses zero ination if just the forward-
looking component of the Phillips curve exists. More generally, the presence of a
backward looking component leads instead to an equilibrium with positive steady
state ination, which also generates higher steady state output. The reason is
that, although non-zero steady state ination generates greater price dispersion
and thereby a fall in aggregate output, positive ination also leads to an increase in
real marginal labour cost. This has a positive e¤ect on output via the substitution
e¤ect set in motion by the change in real wage. For su¢ciently low levels of
ination, the latter e¤ect dominates, the net impact of trend ination on output
is positive.
19
A natural question that arises in this context is how the welfare loss resulting
from the Hamiltonian approach relates to the one obtained by the traditional
linear-quadratic approximation. To this aim, I investigate the e¤ect on welfare of
the intervention of a central bank (acting as a social planner), introduced using a
number of simple and optimal policy rules. In particular, I analyse the individual
performance of these rules and their impact on the social welfare in the presence of
a TFP shock. I nd that the presence backward looking component is paramount in
determining the di¤erence in the welfare losses computed using the traditional and
the Hamiltonian approach. Such a di¤erence is best observed when simple rules
are adopted. In line with the literature, I also nd that, using either approach and
under a common calibration, the pure ination targeting rule performs best, as
it lowers signicantly more the volatility of ination relative to the other simple
rules.
1.2 Literature Review
Despite being a relatively recent feature in monetary economics, trend ination has
already been studied in conjunction with a number of issues in this literature. For
instance, Ascari (2004) log-linearises the baseline New Keynesian Model (NKM)
around an exogenously determined positive steady state ination to argue that
this signicantly changes the dynamics of the model relative to the framework
with zero ination; Ireland (2007) studies the relationship between trend ination
and the Taylor rule against US data, and nd that the Federal Reserves ination
target changed many times during the last four decades of the last century. My
contribution departs from these by endogenising trend ination and investigating
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its e¤ects on a variety of di¤erent monetary policy rules.
The material discussed in this chapter relates to a number of articles studying
social welfare in the presence of trend ination. For example, Ascari and Ropele
(2007) study the optimal monetary policy in a NKM with non-zero steady state
ination to point out that the level of trend ination has a strong impact on social
welfare. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) show that, when one considers positive
steady state ination, exogenously given and calibrated to match US data, price
dispersion is a rst order source of social welfare ine¢ciency. My work di¤ers from
these contributions as the e¤ects on social welfare are investigated with references
to a level of ination optimally chosen by a benevolent.
Another branch of the literature that is linked to the analysis developed in this
chapter studies trend ination in relation to specic aspects on the behaviour of
ination itself. In particular, building on the literature modelling trend ination
as a random walk without drift (e.g., Cogley and Sargent, 2005Cogley and Sargent
(2005); Stock and Watson, 2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008) nd that a purely
forward looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) with a trend ination is
empirically capable to explain a great deal of the observed ination persistence in
the US data. As such, trend ination contributes a highly persistent component
to actual ination, from a source that is quite di¤erent from any intrinsic persis-
tence implied by the dynamics of price adjustment. My research complements this
contribution by investigating whether ination persistence may be an endogenous
source, as well as a consequence, of non-zero steady state ination.
Regarding the impact of di¤erent monetary policy rules on social welfare, most
contributions in the literature compute the welfare loss function using a traditional
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linear-quadratic approach. In the benchmark model (see, e.g., Clarida, Galí and
Gertler, 1999), welfare loss is a function of ination and output gap. Although, as
Steinsson (2003) shows, this traditional method can be applied to a model with
built-in ination persistence (with the welfare loss function simply featuring an
additional term), the standard linear-quadratic approximation can only be used
if small deviations from the e¢cient steady state are considered. In the e¢cient
steady state, nominal and real frictions are neutralised, hence output is at its
e¢cient level and, more importantly, ination displays a zero trend. As a result,
the traditional approach is unsuitable to deal with my analysis. For this reason, I
depart from this literature and use the approach developed by Levine et al. (2007).
These authors develop a linear-quadratic approximation around a non e¢cient
steady state, known as the Hamiltonian approach, which I adapt to the analysis
of monetary policy with endogenous trend ination and ination persistence. The
advantages of this alternative method are that nominal and real frictions need not
be eliminated in the steady state (in particular, ination need not display a zero
trend), and that the welfare loss function can be derived also for bigger deviations
from the steady state.
1.3 The Model: Demand Side
The demand side of my model economy is represented by the traditional aggregate
demand curve, in the New Keynesian version of the DSGE models, known as the
expectational IS curve. It serves as an intertemporal tool to characterise the house-
holds optimal choice. Often, it is represented by a log-linearized approximation
of the forward looking Euler equation, which is the solution of the representative
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consumers dynamic optimisation problem.
1.3.1 The Household Optimisation Problem
The economy consists of a continuum of innitely lived households, which all
have identical preferences. The representative household maximises the discounted
stream of instantaneous utility functions over current and future periods
U = Et
1X
t=0
t [U (Ct; Nt)] , (1.1)
by optimally choosing, at each date t 2 [0;1), Ct consumption units and Nt
working hours. The preference parameter  2 (0; 1] is the subjective household
discount factor. I assume that UC > 0, UN < 0, UCC < 0, UNN > 0 and UC;N = 0.
In solving this problem, the household is subject to the budget constraint
Bt +WtNt + Tt +Dt  CtPt + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] , (1.2)
where Et [Qt;t+1] represents the price of the riskless bond held in Bt+1 units, CtPt
are consumption expenditures, Wt is the nominal wage, Tt is a lump sum trans-
ferand Dt is the net prot that the rms pay to the shareholders (households),
which does not a¤ect any other variables in the model.
The Lagrangian that corresponds to the representative agents optimisation
takes the following form
L = Et
1X
t=0
t [U (Ct; Nt)] + t (Bt +WtNt + Tt +Dt   CtPt  Qt;t+1Bt+1) .
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Solving the maximization problem, I obtain the rst order conditions
@U
@Ct
= UC;t   tPt = 0, (1.3)
@U
@Nt
= UN;t + tWt = 0, (1.4)
@U
@Bt+1
=  t+1 + tQt;t+1 = 0, (1.5)
@U
@t
= Bt +WtNt + Tt +Dt   CtPt  Qt;t+1Bt+1 = 0, (1.6)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier and can be interpreted as the shadow price
of consumption.
Euler Equation
The gross return of a one year riskless bond Rt equals the reciprocal of its price
Rt =
1
Et [Qt;t+1]
,
where Et [Qt;t+1] is also known as the dynamic stochastic discount factor. Note
that Rt = (1 + it), where it is the nominal interest rate. From the condition (1.3)
I obtain the conventional stochastic Euler equation
Et

UC;t+1
UC;t
Pt
Pt+1

= Et [Qt;t+1] ; (1.7)
which represents the intertemporal optimality conditions linking current and future
consumption choices.
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Labour Supply
From condition (1.4), I obtain the equation that determines households labour
supply
~Wt =  
UN;t
UC;t
; (1.8)
according to which the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consump-
tion equals the real wage ~Wt = Wt=Pt.
1.3.2 Consumption Index and Consumer Price index
I assume there exists a unit continuum of di¤erentiated goods available in the goods
market. I abstract from government spending so that all goods are consumed by
domestic households. Ct is a composite consumption good, which takes the familiar
Dixit-Stiglitz form
Ct =
0@ 1Z
0
[Ct(i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
; (1.9)
where the parameter " > 1 represents the (constant) consumption elasticity of
substitution, and Ct (i) represents the consumption level of good i. As I show in
Appendix 1.A, I obtain the demand for an individual consumption good
Ct(i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 "
Ct; (1.10)
as a function of its price Pt (i) relative to the price index Pt, of the composite
consumption level Ct, and of the elasticity of substitution parameter "t.
Using the market clearing conditions Ct(i) = Yt(i), for all i and t, and Ct = Yt,
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for all t, I can rewrite (1.10) to measure production of rm i
Yt(i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 "
Yt; (1.11)
which represents the relationship linking individual output to aggregate output
and the relative price. Price dispersion in (1.11) is an important source of poten-
tial welfare losses in a closed economy. Using equation (1.10), I also obtain an
expression for the consumer price index in a closed economy as a function of each
goods price, formally
Pt =
24 1Z
0
(Pt(i))
1 " di
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1
1 "
: (1.12)
It is worth mentioning that, in this closed economy model, the consumer price
index and the producer price index are identical.
1.4 The Model: Supply Side
In order to obtain the Phillips curve, it is convenient to look at the behaviour of
each rm in the goods markets. The reason is that I assume that only some rms
will set the optimal price as they would under perfect price exibility, while the
others will not. Moreover, rms supply di¤erentiated goods to the markets, and
this allow them to have a certain degree of market power. As a result, rms are
not price-takers, but rather incorporate the demand function into their decision
regarding how much they should produce.
I closely follow the price setting mechanism in Calvo (1983) and Galí and
Gertler (1999). There are two types of rms. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, a rst
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Figure 1.1: Prot tree: A share of 1   rms are allowed to change their prices,
from which ! rms choose a price according rule of thumb.
group of rms, with measure 1   !, set the price optimally. The complementary
measure ! set the price according to a rule of thumb. Firms may face two di¤erent
situations: i) they are allowed to set their price (with probability 1  ); ii) they
are not allowed to do so (with probability ). Hence, at each time t, a measure
(1  !) (1  ) set the price optimally, and are labelled f ; a measure ! (1  ) set
the price according to a rule of thumb, and are labelled b; nally, a measure 
leave the price unchanged, and are labelled s.
Optimal Prices
Consider rst one of the (1  !) (1  ) rms, labelled f , that at time t are al-
lowed to change the price and do so optimally. Each rm in this group sets price
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P ft (i) to maximise its expected stream of prots Gt (i) subject to the technological
constraint (represented by its production function)
max
P ft (i)
1X
j=0
jEt
h
Qt;t+j

P ft (i)Yt+j (i) Wt+jNt+j (i)
i
;
subject to: Yt (i) = AtNt (i) ; and Yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
Yt;
(1.13)
where At is total factor productivity, which is common to all rms. As already
mentioned above, assume that the stock of capital is xed, so labour is the only
variable input in the production function, and its demand function given by equa-
tion (1.11). Hence, the rst order condition for this problem is
1X
j=0
jEt
"
Qt;t+j
 
(1  ")Yt+j
 
P ft (i)
Pt+j
! "
+ "
Wt+j
P ft (i)
Yt+j
At+j
 
P ft (i)
Pt+j
! "!#
= 0.
Dening the nominal marginal cost as
MCt (i) = Wt=At =MCt; (1.14)
and using (1.7) together with the fact that, at time t, j = 0 and so j = 1 and
Q1;1 = 1, I can rewrite this expression to obtain
P ft (i)Et
"
1X
j=0
jj
UC;t+j
UC;t
Pt
Pt+j

1
Pt+j
 "
Yt+j
#
=
"
"  1
Et
"
1X
j=0
jj
UC;t+j
UC;t
Yt+jMCt+j
Pt
Pt+j

1
Pt+j
 "#
:
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Multiplying both sides by (1=Pt)
" and UC;t yields
~P ft (i)Et
"
1X
j=0
jjUC;t+jYt+j

Pt+j
Pt
" 1#
=
"
"  1
Et
"
1X
j=0
jjUC;t+jYt+jgMCt+j Pt+j
Pt
"#
;
(1.15)
where ~P ft (i) = P
f
t (i) =Pt is the relative forward looking price and gMCt =MCt=Pt
is the real marginal cost. This equation can be written in terms of forward looking
price and ination, using Pt+j=Pt = t+j  t+j 1  :::  t+1 =
jY
k=1
t+k, where
t = Pt=Pt 1 is ination in period t. It therefore holds that
~P ft (i) =
Jt
Ht
: (1.16)
The variables Jt and Ht are respectively given by
Jt = UC;tYtgMCt + Et [(t+1)" Jt+1] (1.17)
and
Ht = UC;tYt + Et

(t+1)
" 1Ht+1

: (1.18)
The expression  = "= ("  1) is the constant markup that the rm charges by
exploiting its monopolistic power. Recall that if the rm faced perfect competition,
this markup would disappear and rms would set their (relative) prices equal to
their real marginal costs, which by symmetry would be identical to all rms.
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Rule of Thumb and Staggered Prices
Consider now the ! (1  ) rms, labelled b, that set their price at time t. These
rms do so according to a rule of thumb, i.e., by indexing the price to the last
observed rate of ination, t 1, yielding
P bt (i) = t 1Xt 1 = P
b
t ; (1.19)
where Xt 1 denotes the index of the prices set at date t   1. The rule of thumb
in relative terms, using the denition of relative prices ~P bt  P
b
t =Pt and
~Xt 1 
Xt 1=Pt 1, is given by
~P bt =
t 1
t
~Xt 1: (1.20)
The new average price set in period t is then dened by
Xt 
h
(1  !)P f
(1 ")
t + !P
b(1 ")
t
i 1
1 "
. (1.21)
and equivalently in relative terms by
~Xt 
h
(1  !) ~P f
(1 ")
t + ! ~P
b(1 ")
t
i 1
1 "
. (1.22)
1.4.1 Derivation of the Phillips Curve
Aside from the rms that set their prices optimally and are forward looking, and
those that set their prices according to the ination index and are backward look-
ing, there is a third group of rms at each period t of measure  that do not change
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their prices at all so that for them
P st (i) = Pt 1; (1.23)
which in relative terms is
~P st (i) =
1
t
. (1.24)
I obtain the Phillips curve representing the supply side of the model by ag-
gregating the prices chosen by the di¤erent types of rms. Hence, from equation
(1.12), it follows that
1 =
1Z
0

Pt (i)
Pt
1 "
di
=
264 (1 )(1 !)Z
0
h
~P ft (i)
i1 "
di+
1 Z
(1 )(1 !)
h
~P bt (i)
i1 "
di+
1Z
1 
h
~P st (i)
i1 "
di
375
1
1 "
:
To simplify, I assume that all rms face the same shock and share the same tech-
nology. Therefore, all rms of the same type will set the same price when allowed
to change it. Therefore ~P ft (i) = ~P
f
t and ~P
b
t (i) =
~P bt and the Phillips curve is
1 = (1  ) (1  !)

~P ft
1 "
+ (1  )!

~P bt
1 "
+  (t)
" 1 : (1.25)
The Phillips curve is therefore function of both the forward looking price in-
dex and the backward looking price index. A more tractable version of (1.25) is
obtained by log-linearising the model 1.B.
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1.4.2 Price Dispersion
The dispersion between the rms price and the aggregate price level is an impor-
tant source of social ine¢ciencies. Given that some of the individual prices are
staggered and that the aggregate price level changes, the relative prices of individ-
ual goods change. Dispersion in relative prices Zt leads to output dispersion that
in turn leads to an ine¢cient level of aggregate production.
Aggregating the individual output across the rms by using individual produc-
tion function (1.13) yields
Z 1
0
Yt (i) di = At
Z 1
0
Nt (i) di:
From the denition of aggregate labour: Nt =
R 1
0
Nt (i) di, this means that
Nt =
Z 1
0
Yt (i)
At
di:
Multiplying and dividing by Yt, and using equation (1.11)
Nt =
Yt
At
Zt; (1.26)
where Zt is a measure of relative price dispersion, given by
Zt =
Z 1
0
Yt(i)
Yt
di =
Z 1
0

Pt (i)
Pt
 "
di:
Together with equation (1.25), the measure of price dispersion can be rewritten
as
Zt = (1  )

~Xt
 "
+ Zt 1
"
t : (1.27)
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Note that Yt 6=
R 1
0
Yt (i) di; using a composite consumption together with the
market cleaning condition for closed economy, I get the composed expression for
output
Yt =
0@ 1Z
0
[Yt(i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
:
As Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) demonstrate, relative price dispersion is bound-
ed below by Zt  1. Additionally, price dispersion can be disregarded in the rst
order approximation of the model. Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007) also show that, given a steady state with zero ination ( = 1), price dis-
persion is deterministic and follows a AR(1) process, and as such does not have
any real e¤ect.
1.5 Non Policy Equilibrium and Steady state
After a brief discussion about a non-policy equilibrium of this model, in this sec-
tion I introduce a deterministic environment around a steady state with non-zero
ination, and I compare it to a steady state with zero ination, illustrating the
similarities and pointing out the di¤erences.
1.5.1 Non Policy Equilibrium
Assume that the instantaneous utility function is time-separable and takes the
form
U (Ct; Nt) =
C1 t
1  
 
N1+t
1 + 
, (1.28)
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where  and  are positive parameters, interpretable as constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) coe¢cients, which determine the elasticities of substitution of
consumption and labour supply. The marginal utility of consumption and marginal
disutility of labour are given respectively by
UC;t = C
 
t
and
UN;t =  N

t :
For a closed economy, the equilibrium is specied by Ct = Yt and Bt = 0, so
that the Euler equation takes the form
Et
"
Yt+1
Yt
 
Pt
Pt+1
#
= Et [Qt;t+1] . (1.29)
1.5.2 The Steady State
In the literature, it is common to assume that ination in steady state equals zero
(i.e., the gross rate of ination is  = 1). However, as I demonstrate in this
section, a moderate long run ination, that is, a steady state non-zero ination,
can improve social welfare. This fact is exploited by the central planner in the case
that ! > 0, i.e., in a model with (some) backward looking agents, as described
in more details in Section 1.6.1. Prior to this, it is necessary to dene the non-
stochastic steady state of the model, in which exogenous disturbances are absent
and it holds that A = 1. Real variables and variables written in relative terms are
constant and only nominal variables increase, following the steady state ination
process .
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In short, I can summarise the overall e¤ect of a non-zero steady state ination
as follows. On the one hand, positive ination generates greater price dispersion
Z, so the aggregate output tends to decrease. On the other hand, as I show below,
positive (small) ination leads to an increase in real marginal labour cost. Since
wages are exible, marginal cost equals real wage, thus positive (small) steady
state ination leads to a higher real wage. Higher real wage has both income
and substitution e¤ects. The income e¤ect that follows from an increase in real
wages will cause an increase in both leisure and consumption. Therefore, labour
supply decreases. However, because of the higher wage, workers also substitute
their leisure with labour. A rise in the labour input induces an increase in aggre-
gate output. Hence, as I will demonstrate below the e¤ect of ination on output
is determined by two countervailing forces, a positive e¤ect generated by induc-
ing higher real wages and a negative e¤ect generated by inducing greater price
dispersion.
From the Euler equation in the steady state, using equation (1.29), it follows
that the market discount factor equals its subjective counterpart


= Q; (1.30)
where  is steady state ination. Therefore, it holds that if ination in steady
state is non-zero, the discount factor Q is lower than the subjective households
discount factor .
Using equation (1.8), the steady state labour supply can be determined by
equating the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption to the
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steady state real wage
W =  
UN
UC
: (1.31)
From the supply side, using equations (1.20), (1.22) and (1.25), all rms allowed
to change the prices set them equally, as a function of the level of steady state
ination, formally
P b = X
and
P f = X;
where:
X =
 
1   ()" 1
1  
! 1
1 "
: (1.32)
Note that, if  = 1, then also the new and old prices equal the CPI, and
therefore the model delivers unit relative prices. In the case that the steady state
ination is positive, the nominal prices increase steadily. It follows from the de-
nition of the price index that this aggregator averages new and unchanged prices,
so it holds that P < X = P f = P b. Thus, the new nominal price grows more
than the price index, which is pulled down by the lower prices chosen in the last
periods, making the new relative price larger than one, formally
P f =
P f
P
> 1:
The fact that zero ination implies that all relative and nominal prices equal one
also implies unit price dispersion, i.e., Z = 1. It can be shown that, when  > 1,
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Figure 1.2: The relationship between steady state ination
(horizontal axis) and price dispersion (vertical axis).
the price dispersion is above one. Using equation (1.27) in steady state, price
dispersion is a function of the new price and ination, formally
Z =
(1  ) X "
1  "
: (1.33)
Price dispersion is directly related to ination as long as the gross rate of ination
is close to one. Figure 1.2 shows that a higher ination generates larger steady
state price dispersion. Solving (1.16) for marginal costs in terms of the rate of
ination yields
MC =
1


1  "
1  " 1

P f : (1.34)
If  = 1, marginal costs are the reciprocal of the forward looking price over
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markup, otherwise the real marginal costs also depend on the level of the steady
state ination. On one hand, if  is close enough to one, the marginal costs are
directly related to the rate of ination. On the other hand, with higher steady
state ination, real marginal costs decrease.A small increase in the steady state
ination leads to higher real marginal costs. Given that the real marginal costs
are proportional to the real wage, gross ination slightly higher than 1 leads to an
increase in the real wage.
Inserting the equality MC = W into equation (1.34) together with (1.32) and
rearranging, I get
W =
1


1  "
1  " 1

X: (1.35)
At the rm-level, for the production function and for the aggregate production
function in steady state
Y (i) = N (i)
and
Y =
N
Z
:
The wedge between aggregate output and labour is the reciprocal of the price
dispersion.
Finally, the level of output in steady state can be expressed as a function of
steady state ination
Y =

1

 1
+
241  " 1
1  
 "(+1)
" 1

(1  )1+ (1  " 1)
(1  ") (1  " 1) (1  ")
#  1
+
:
(1.36)
38
The steady state level of output (1.36) di¤ers from the natural level of output
Y n. The natural level of output arises when all prices are exible (i.e.,  = 0), so
all rms set their prices equal. For this reason, at the natural level of output all
prices are equal to the consumer price index, i.e., Pt (i) = Pt, and it follows that
X = P f = P b = 1. The natural level of output itself can be expressed as
Y n =  
1
+ :
Note that, in the case of zero ination, steady state output equals its natural
level, because any e¤ects from the presence of nominal distortions are neutralised
by the equality of nominal and real prices for all rms. Therefore, the output gap,
dened as the ratio between actual and natural level of output ~Y = Y = Y n, equals
one.
In the case of non-zero ination, the output gap is instead given by
~Y =
24 1   ()" 1
1  
! "
" 1
(+1)
(1  )1+ (1  " 1)
(1  ") (1  " 1) (1  ")
35  1+ :
Figure 1.3 shows that a small level of ination can increase steady state output
over its natural level. However, higher ination is distortionary and leads to a
negative output gap, i.e., ~Y < 1.
Additionally, it can be shown that the aggregate output produced in the steady
state di¤ers from the e¢cient level of output, dened as the output in an economy
without any nominal and real distortions, such that the marginal product of labour
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Figure 1.3: The relationship between steady state ination
(horizontal axis) and steady state output gap (vertical axis).
MPN equals the marginal rate of substitution MRSC;N .
The wedge between steady state output and its e¢cient level therefore reects
the wedge between the marginal product of labourMPN = Y=N and the marginal
rate of substitution MRSC;N =  UN=UC , which can be illustrated using (1.35) in
conjunction with (1.36)
Y
N
=  
UN
UC
(1  " 1) (1  ")
(1  ") (1  " 1)
: (1.37)
Note that without any nominal distortions, i.e., in the case that  = 0, or in the
standard case of zero steady state ination, i.e.,  = 1, the fraction disappears
and the wedge between output and labour is generated only by real distortions,
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 1:5 inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution
 1 inverse elasticity of labour supply
 0:99 subjective discount factor
 2=3 parameter of price stickiness
" 4 elasticity of substitution between goods
Table 1.1: Calibration of the model parameters
captured by the mark-up . Note that assuming perfect competition, "!1 leads
to a zero mark-up, where  = 1.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) emphasise that the aim of the policy maker is
to stabilise the economy around the e¢cient level of output Y et . To this aim, they
approximate the welfare of the representative household around the e¢cient level
of output. As mentioned above, nominal distortions in steady state disappear
if ination equals one. Real distortions generated by monopolistic competition
can be o¤set by introducing employment subsidies that increase the output up to
the desired e¢cient level. Using equation (1.37), it follows that it is su¢cient to
introduce an output subsidy with rate  such that (1  ) = 1. In other words,
the subsidies can be expressed as  = " 1 > 0, and the higher the elasticity of
substitution, i.e., the lower the markup, the lower the subsidies required to obtain
the e¢cient level of output.
The introduction of employment subsidies lowers theMPN , directly leading to
increases in employment and output to their e¢cient levels. Therefore the natural
level and the e¢cient level of output are identical, i.e., Y n = Y e, and the output
gap equals the welfare relevant output gap.
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1.5.3 Innovations and Calibration of the model
In the last section, I described my model in its deterministic, perfect foresight,
steady state. In what follows I study the behaviour of the model in a stochastic
environment where the source of uncertainty is represented by shocks to total factor
productivity (TFP). The TFP innovation At measures the aggregate technology
process, which (log-linearised) follows the stochastic AR(1) process
a^t = aa^t 1 + a;t;
where a^t  (logAt   logA) denotes the deviation, in log terms, of TFP from its
steady state value, a 2 [0; 1) is the autocorrelation parameter, and
a  i:i:d: (0; 
2
a) is a white noise shock.
In assigning numerical values to the structural parameters, I closely follow the
literature. Table 1.1 reports the calibrated values for the parameters of the model.
The parameter  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES),
and the elasticity is usually assumed to take values between 0.5 and 1. I choose
 = 1:5 so that the IES equals 0:67. The labour disutility parameter  is set equal
to one, in accordance with the estimates from Smets and Wouters (2003).
Each time period in this model corresponds to a quarter of a year, hence
 = 0:99 corresponds to just over an annual subjective discount rate of 4 per
cent. The price stickiness parameter,  = 2=3, means that on average a given rm
changes its price every three periods, computed as 1=(1 ). This corresponds to
the usual value estimated for the US market. Finally, setting " = 4 implies that
the average markup over the marginal costs is set to 33 percent.
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1.6 Welfare Loss Function andWelfare Loss Mea-
sure
There are several linear-quadratic approaches in the literature to approximating
the welfare loss function. Generally, a linear-quadratic approach uses the rst order
approximation of the structural equations to obtain a second order approximation
of the utility function to represent the social welfare function. There is an extensive
literature devoted to the analytical derivation of the welfare loss function. This
paper provides a welfare based analysis to measure the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent
monetary policy rules comparing two di¤erent approaches: the traditional linear-
quadratic approach and the Hamiltonian approach.
The rst approach is based on Levine, McAdam, and Pearlman (2007) and
their Hamiltonian two-stage linear-quadratic approach. I show that, for a Ramsey
planner and in the presence of backward looking rms, it is desirable to impose a
non-zero steady state rate of ination.
In their work, Levine et al. (2007) develop a two-stage Ramsey policy, where
in the rst stage a steady state in line with a social planner allocation is found
and corresponds to a best possible deterministic outcome. In the second stage, a
monetary policy rule for a stochastic environment is determined, which leads to
the lowest possible welfare loss (and therefore the closest to the steady state value
derived in the rst stage). In this case, however, it is not possible to derive an
analytical solution for the welfare loss function, so the model is solved numerically
using Dynare/ACES software.
The second approach, which has an analytical solution, is based on Steins-
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son (2003) and similar to Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and enables me to
compare my results with the numerical solution. Following Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1999), the second order approximation of the welfare loss function is derived
together with the rst order approximation of the equilibrium conditions. Two
conditions are necessary to derive an accurate second order approximation of the
welfare using this method. First, the real distortions following from monopolistic
competition have to be eliminated by assuming labour subsidies, thus allowing
only for small distortions. Therefore, in the steady state, the output gap is zero
and the model is log-linearised around its e¢cient level. Second, the approxima-
tion has to be calculated in a closed neighborhood of zero steady state ination,
so that in the steady state the price distortions are eliminated.
1.6.1 Welfare Loss Function using the Hamiltonian Ap-
proach
In this section, I explain how the welfare loss is calculated using the two-stage
approach by Levine et al. (2007). In the rst stage, the social planner chooses a
steady state ination level, which maximises steady state welfare. In the second
stage, welfare in a stochastic environment around the rst-stage steady state is
maximised.
Generally, the goal of the central banks monetary policy is to maximise a social
welfare function 
, which consists of the discounted stream of the households
utility over the current and the future periods

 =
1X
t=0
tUt; (1.38)
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where Ut is the instantaneous utility function of the representative household.
Using (1.28), the nonlinear optimisation problem for the Ramsey planner is dened
by

 = E0
1X
t=0
t
24Cj1 t
1  
 
 Z 1
0
N jt (i)
1 + 
di
!1+35 ;
where Cjt = Ct for all households j, given the assumption that all household have
identical preferences and resources. An individual j supplies N jt labour in total,
assuming that to each rm i it supplies equal amount of labour N jt (i). Given
(1.26), the Ramsey planner problem can be rewritten as

 = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
Cj1 t
1  
 
1
1 + 

Yt
At
Zt
1+#
and is maximised subject to the structural conditions (1.25), (1.16), (1.17), (1.18),
(1.20), (1.22) and (1.27). In this rst stage, it is only necessary to nd the rst
order conditions in a deterministic steady state. Thus, only the optimal steady
state is identied.
Using a Dynare based MATLAB software package called ACES (Analysis and
Control of Economic Systems), and assuming that ination is the instrument con-
trolled by the central bank, the steady state of this problem is identied as a
non-zero steady state ination when ! > 0. As illustrated in Figure 1.3, a mod-
erate steady state rate of ination leads to output rising above its natural level
(e.g., Y > Y n) and it can be shown that the social planner chooses a positive
rate of steady state ination whenever ! > 0. Recall from Section 1.5.2 that, for
 > 1, price dispersion is higher than one in steady state but, at the same time,
if ination is su¢ciently small, then the equilibrium in the labour market implies
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!  W N C = Y 

0 1 0:75 0:891299 0:891299  251:5670
0:3 1:00006 0:750002 0:8913 0:8913  251:5657
0:5 1:00013 0:750006 0:891302 0:891302  251:5656
0:8 1:00052 0:750021 0:891311 0:891308  251:5657
Table 1.2: Hamiltonian steady state outcomes for di¤erent
shares of backward looking rms.
that output may rise above its natural level. Therefore, there is a certain trade o¤
between these two e¤ects, where the positive e¤ects outweigh the negative ones if
ination is positive but very small.
Given (1.38), social welfare in the steady state is measured as

 =
1
1  
U (C;N) : (1.39)
As it is shown in Table 1.2, the social welfare rises as the value of the backward
looking parameter ! is increased.1 The higher the share of backward looking com-
panies, the higher the trend ination chosen by the social planner. Higher ination
leads to a higher real wage and an increase in labour because the substitution e¤ect
dominates the income e¤ect. Although output increases with the level of steady
state ination, its rise is lower than that of labour, due to the additional price
dispersion that higher ination generates.
From the equations in Section 1.5.2, it is straightforward to notice that the
1For reference, note that the level of welfare generated in an e¢cient level of output is

 =  250, with  = W = N = C = Y eff = 1.
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steady state outcomes are not directly inuenced by the parameter !. As a result,
one might be tempted to conclude that the social planner may choose steady
state ination independent of this parameter. However, Table 1.2 clearly points
towards the opposite direction: the optimal social planner decision is a¤ected by
the magnitude of the fraction of backward looking rms. Zero ination is optimally
chosen only when all rms are forward looking, and this also represents the steady
state with the lowest level of output and welfare. As the fraction of backward
looking rms increases, both ination and welfare grow. This is suggestive of a
positive ! being benecial for the economy.
One possible rationale for this nding relies on the price dispersion being, under
certain conditions and o¤ steady state, a negative function of !.2 In the presence
of backward looking rms, in fact, the social planner would exploit this negative
link by letting ination reach an optimal positive level in the steady state. In
particular, the larger !, the higher the optimal steady state ination. As explained
above, a positive ination increases welfare through the marginal costs channel,
and decreases it by raising price dispersion. For any given ! > 0, it is then possible
to nd a level of positive ination that would result in better outcomes than a zero
ination (both in transition and, eventually, in the steady state). Suppose that
the social planner attempted to impose the same level of steady state ination
2More precisely, I can rewrite (1.27) as
Zt = (1  )

(1  !)

P ft =Pt
 "
+ !
 
P bt =Pt
 "
+ Zt 1
"
t ;
from which it follows that P ft > P
b
t entails dZt=d! < 0. This means that, whenever forward
looking rms (f) set a higher price than their backward looking counterparts (b), price dispersion
is inversely related with the fraction of b rms. The condition P ft > P
b
t seems natural to assume
in the case of an unanticipated ination rise, given that while f rms are fully rational in their
reaction to a rise in ination, b rms reaction is lagged one period, and always considers only
the last period ination (which is in turn the average outcome of the choices made by f and b).
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with a lower !. Then, the fraction of forward looking rms would possibly be
su¢ciently large to command a high price dispersion, whose negative e¤ects may
overcome the positive ones due to the rise in labour supply. Of course, the social
planner could not possibly exploit this channel to improve welfare when ! = 0, as
the forward looking NKPC would lack any ination inertia.
The aim of the second stage of the Hamiltonian approach is to derive an accu-
rate linear-quadratic approximation in a stochastic environment around a steady
state level identied in the rst stage. Calculating the rst order Taylor approx-
imation (log-linearisation) of the rst order conditions and the constraints, to-
gether with the second order Taylor approximation of the Hamiltonian with the
Lagrangian problem, delivers a quadratic approximation of the utility expressed
in terms of the state variables. In the presence of non-zero ination, an analytical
derivation of this function is not possible. Thus, at this point, I merely compare the
welfare loss function obtained from analytical solution of simple linear-quadratic
approach with the numerical results obtained directly using ACES.
1.6.2 Analytical Approximation of the Welfare Loss Func-
tion
Because the analytical derivation of the welfare function around a steady state with
non-zero ination is not possible, I compare my numerical result, obtained using
the Hamiltonian approach described in previous section, with the result derived
from the traditional approach, analogous to the one implemented by Steinsson
(2003). This method is based on a linear-quadratic approach using the rst order
approximation of the structural equations and the second order approximation of
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the welfare function. The approximation of the second order of the welfare function
is detailed in the appendix. The analytical welfare loss function also proves useful
for a derivation of the optimal monetary policy under commitment.
I study the model in the neighborhood of its non-stochastic perfect-foresight
steady state. There are two points worth mentioning. First, without any further
assumptions, this steady state does not achieve the long run e¢cient level of output
because of the presence of nominal and real distortions. In particular, non-zero
ination in the steady state generates a degree of price dispersion that, together
with the rms monopolistic power, implies lower output. This causes problems
when calculating the second order approximation of the welfare, and therefore
these distortions have to be neutralised, as discussed in Section 1.5.2.
Log-Linearisation
To derive analytically the loss function around the steady state with zero ina-
tion, it is necessary to approximate the structural equations of the model in a
close neighborhood of the models steady state. The log-linearisation of a generic
variable Dt around its steady state value D can be generally expressed as
Dt = De
logDt=D = DelogDt logD = De(dt d) = Ded^  D

1 + d^t

:
However, some of the structural equations are linear in their logs so I can
write directly logDt = dt. This holds for the Euler equation (1.29), whose log-
linearisation is
yt = Et

yt+1 +
1

(t+1   it   %)

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with % =   log  and where pt+1   pt  t+1 and it =   log (Qt;t+1). Assuming
that the variables do not deviate much from their steady state values, the Euler
equation can be written as a deviation from its steady state level as
y^t = Et

y^t+1 +
1

(t+1   {^t)

, (1.40)
where I employ the denitions p^t+1  p^t  t+1 and {^t    [log (Qt;t+1)  log (Q)].
3
It is clear from (1.40) that, in a closed economy, the real interest rate, it  t+1, is
pinned down by the real output growth rate. Hence, if prices are fully exible and
rms are fully rational, central bank intervention modies the nominal interest
rate, it. This change is fully anticipated by rms that, by setting their prices
accordingly, induce a proportional shift in the ination rate t+1. If prices are
not fully exible and/or rms are not fully rational, then changes in the nominal
interest rate induced by the central bank may have real e¤ects, as prices do not
respond proportionally to variations in the nominal interest rate. As a result,
ination only partially responds to the central bank intervention, and real output
growth, yt   yt 1, also changes. The nal result is that the Euler equation holds
with a modied real rate of interest and a modied degree of output growth.
For this reason, it is important to introduce the concept of natural equilibrium,
where all rms are fully rational and may adjust their prices every period. Denote
the log-linearisation of the generic variable Dt in its natural level as d
n
t  logD
n
t .
Following the denition of the natural level of a variable, I can also rewrite the
log-linearised Euler equation in terms of the output gap (the deviation of the real
variables from their natural levels), in turn dened as the log of the ratio between
3Note that since the steady state level of ination is set to be zero, we can write ^t = t.
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actual output and natural output, and denoted by ~yt = yt y
n
t . Using (1.40) yields
~yt = Et [~yt+1] 
1

Et [it   t+1   r
n
t ] ; (1.41)
where rnt is the Wicksellian natural rate of interest and it holds that r
n
t = % +
Et
 
ynt+1

. For future reference, I also express (1.41) as a deviation from the
steady state level, formally
~yt = Et [~yt+1] 
1

Et [^{t   t+1   r^
n
t ] : (1.42)
In this case, r^nt is the deviation of the Wicksellian natural rate of interest from its
steady state level, and it holds that r^nt = Et

ynt+1

.
Additionally, the log-linearisation of the labour supply delivers the relationship
between the real wage, labour supply and output
w^t = n^t + y^t: (1.43)
Furthermore, as I describe in Appendix 1.B in more detail, the supply curve
shows how ination reacts to variations in real marginal costs as well as future and
past ination. I rewrite this as
t = 
fEt [t+1] + 
bt 1 + mccmct (1.44)
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with the parameters
	 =  + ! (1   (1  ))
f = =	; b = !=	
mc = (1  !) (1  ) (1  ) =	;
where 0 <

f ; b; mc
	
< 1 and 	 > 1. Notice that, when  ! 1, f + b = 1.
Hence, ination is a function of the convex combination of future and past ination.
The measure of price dispersion in (1.27), log-linearised around the zero ina-
tion steady state, delivers the AR(1) process
zt = zt 1;
which, as discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), is purely deterministic up
to the rst order, and does not have any real e¤ect on the rest of the model.
Similar to the Euler equation, the Phillips curve can also be rewritten in terms
of the output gap. As mentioned earlier, in the natural state of the economy rms
can reset their prices in each period. Since I assume that all rms are identical, they
will all choose the same price, which equals the aggregate price level. Therefore,
all relative prices in the natural level of output equal one.
Formally, it is straightforward to see that the natural level of the relative price
(in logarithms) equals the real marginal cost in the natural level mcnt plus the
markup , where the latter can be disregarded when considering the deviation
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from its steady state level
cmcnt = 0: (1.45)
This is because the real marginal cost always equals the mark up, which does not
deviate from its steady state level. Log-linearisation of equation (1.14), together
with (1.8), yields
cmct = n^t + y^t   at: (1.46)
Additionally, log-linearisation of (1.26), together with the fact that z^t can be dis-
regarded, delivers
n^t = y^t   at:
Inserting this back into (1.46), yields the real marginal cost
cmct = ( + ) y^t   (1 + ) at:
Combining the last expression with (1.45) delivers the natural level of output
y^nt =
(1 + )
( + )
at; (1.47)
and I can therefore express the the relationship between the marginal cost and
output gap as
cmct   cmcnt = ( + ) (y^t   y^nt )  (1 + ) at + (1 + ) at:
Rearranging, and employing the denition of the output gap ~yt = y^t   y^
n
t , yields
cmct = ( + ) ~yt: (1.48)
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Plugging this equation into (1.44) delivers a hybrid NKPC in terms of the
output gap, that is log-linearised around a steady state equilibrium with zero
ination
t = 
fEt [t+1] + 
bt 1 + ~yt. (1.49)
The parameter  = mc ( + ) > 0 is the slope of the Phillips curve expressed
in terms of the output gap, and reects the relationship between ination and
output.
Following Steinsson (2003), I consider four di¤erent values of the backward
looking parameter !. The values for the composed parameters under these values
of ! are shown in Table 1.3. The rst row corresponds to the standard NKPC with
a purely forward looking component, as postulated by most contributions to the
literature (e.g., Woodford, 2003). The second row corresponds to the values in the
Galí-Gertler estimation for a rule of thumb model.4 As in Steinsson (2003), I refer
to the third row as a midway case, where half of the rms are rational, and half of
them follow a rule of thumb. The fourth row correspond to a model with a large
share of backward looking rms and is a good proxy for the Fuhrer-Moore (1995)
model. Even when omega is set this high, the Phillips curve is both forward and
backward looking, with a slightly higher weight on the latter component. However,
the curve becomes very inelastic to changes in the output gap.
Assuming that all rms are purely backward looking, i.e., ! ! 1, does not
directly reduce the Phillips curve to an acceleration Phillips curve, since f !
=(1 + ). However, Steinsson (2003) shows that taking the limit ! ! 1,
4Galí and Gertler (1999) test empirically this hybrid NKPC and argue that, depending on
the conditions, the estimates for ! are between 0.26 and 0.49, which correspond to estimates for
b between 0:25 and 0:38 and for f between 0:59 and 0:68.
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! f b 
0 0:99 0 0:43
0:3 0:68 0:31 0:21
0:5 0:57 0:43 0:12
0:8 0:45 0:55 0:04
Table 1.3: Structural parameters of the hybrid
NKPC for di¤erent shares of backward looking rms.
the equation (1.49) has a unique bounded solution in which t = t 1. Hence, if
all rms are backward looking, the price index in period t simply equals the price
index in period t   1, and it holds that

f ; b; 
	
! f0; 1; 0g. In this case, the
Phillips curve is vertical, which implies the absence of a trade-o¤ between output
and ination.
Welfare Loss Function for a Model with Zero Steady State Ination
Using the technique described in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Steinsson
(2003), and assuming that output is on its e¢cient level in steady state, the an-
alytical derivation of the second order approximation of the objective function is
straightforward and is described in more technical details in Appendix 1.C.
Ignoring terms higher than the second order and those independent of policy,
the welfare loss function can be approximated by

0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
 
2t + 
2
t + y~y
2
t

;
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where , y and  are functions of the structural parameters of the model.
In contrast to the traditional loss function derived by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) for a model with purely forward looking NKPC, this expression contains
the relative weight on the ination growth uctuation term  = 
 1!= (1  !),
which is positively related to the parameter !. That is, the larger the fraction of
backward looking rms, the higher the welfare loss caused by a uctuation in the
rate of ination (relative to the level of ination), since the share of prices based
on past information is relatively larger. However, this e¤ect is twofold, because a
higher share of backward looking rms also leads to higher ination persistence,
and therefore to smaller changes in ination growth.
The relative weight on output gap uctuations is increasing in  and , and
given by y = (1=  ) (1  ) ( + ) =". These two parameters govern the
wedge between marginal rate of substitution and marginal product of labour, which
measures the level of ine¢ciency in the economy. The value of y is also decreasing
in  and ", which in turn govern the weight of output gap uctuations relative
to ination uctuations. With the calibration given in Section 1.5.3, the term 
varies positively with the parameter !. The relative weight on ination growth
strengthens as the value of ! is raised, since @2=@!
2 > 0, although it should
be noted that increasing ination persistence also implies a decreasing value of
squared ination growth deviation.
As long as  approaches 1, the average welfare loss can be written as the
unconditional expected average welfare loss

0 =  [var fg+ var fg+ yvar f~yg] : (1.50)
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The traditional loss function can be found as a special case of (1.50) by imposing
! = 0, which leads to  = 0. This loss function corresponds the one derived by
Woodford (2003) or Galí (2008), formally

0 =  [var fg+ yvar f~yg] : (1.51)
In the literature, most contributions opt for this more conservative loss func-
tion, even when (1.50) would possibly be the most suitable one, i.e., when the
model actually presents backward looking components (see, e.g., Clarida, Galí
and Gertler, 1999).
In the next section, I compare the social welfare loss obtained using the Hamil-
tonian approach from Section 1.6.1 with that resulting from the generalised loss
function (1.50).
1.6.3 Welfare Measure
The welfare loss can be rewritten in terms of a compensating di¤erential, a mea-
sure of how much households should be compensated in order to neutralise the
welfare loss. To calculate the compensating di¤erential between two regimes, I use
the denition of welfare given in (1.38). In this paper, the compensating di¤eren-
tial is calculated as a di¤erence between the welfare obtained using the analysed
monetary policy rule and the steady state value.
Generally it holds that the analysed rule generates welfare

 =
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Nt) ;
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which is compared with the benchmark welfare

 =
1X
t=0
tU (Ct ; N

t ) :
I am looking for a consumption compensating di¤erential  that equates welfare

 to its analogous 
. Formally
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Nt) =
1X
t=0
tU ((1  )Ct ; N

t ) :
Putting the specic utility function (1.28), welfare reads

 =
1X
t=0
t
"
((1  )Ct )
1 
1  
 
N1+t
1 + 
#
;
which can be expressed as

 = 
 +
 
(1  )1    1
 1X
t=0
t
C1 t
1  
:
Solving for the compensating di¤erential, and using the term 
C =
P1
t=0 
t C
1 
t
1 
as the welfare following directly from consumption, I obtain
 = 1 


  


C
+ 1
 1
1 
When compared to the steady state value, welfare is given by

 =
1
1  
U
 
C; N

so that the compensating di¤erential can be expressed similarly to the one obtained
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by Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2012)
 = 1 


  


C
+ 1
 1
1 
;
with 
C =
1
1 
C1 
1 
.
1.7 Analysis of Monetary Policy
The preceding sections outlined the demand side and the supply side of a model
for a closed economy without any central bank intervention. In this section, I
introduce four interest rate targeting rules in simple and optimal form: the Taylor
rule and the forward looking Taylor rule, which targets both output and ination
in current and forward looking form, respectively. Furthermore, I analyse the pure
ination targeting rule, which neglects output and concentrates only on ination,
and nally the Taylor rule with an interest smoothing component. First, I assume
the unique calibration for all rules given in Section 1.5.3, and focus only on di¤erent
values for the parameter !, since the goal of this exercise is to show the relevance
of this parameter is for the model economy. Second, I examine the optimal form of
all these rules. In the next section, I analyse the individual performance of these
rules and their impact on social welfare in the presence of a TFP shock.
Taylor Rule
Generally, a short interest rate such as the federal funds rate in the US serves
as the instrument in a Taylor rule (TR). According to this rule, the central bank
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adjusts the instrument in response to variations in ination and output
{^t = %+ t + yy^t: (1.52)
The parameter % is described by McCallum (2002) as the equilibrium interest rate
or equivalently, by Galí (2008), as the households discount rate. The coe¢cients
and y are non-negative and determined by the central bank. They describe
the strength of the interest rate {^t response to changes in ination t and output
y^t, respectively. According to this rule, if ination or output increase, the interest
rate should increase as well, resulting in a contractionary monetary policy. For the
calibration, I let  = 1:5 and y = 0:125, which correspond to the values given
by Taylor (1993).
Assuming that % = r^nt , the interest rate set by the central bank moves one to one
with the natural rate of interest. The idea of having the natural rate of interest
as part of the Taylor rule can be traced directly to Taylor (1999), who shows
that the intercept in the model should equal the equilibrium real interest rate if
targeted ination is zero. This is desirable for all shocks which cause movements
in natural rate of the economy, as in fact a TFP shock does. The TFP shock
a¤ects r^nt directly, and it is desirable that the interest rate follows the same path.
Since a positive TFP shock increases the natural level of output, it follows that, if
the policy maker aims at stabilising prices, aggregate output must be allowed to
uctuate. Under this assumption, the interest rate must decrease in response to
temporary increases in productivity.5
5See Woodford (2003, p. 263) for a discussion on monetary policy in the presence of demand
shocks.
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Pure Ination Targeting Rule
Consider the special case where y = 0 in (1.52). This is the pure ination targeting
rule (PITR)
{^t = %+ t: (1.53)
PITR di¤ers from a strict ination targeting rule insofar as ination is kept con-
stant at its steady state level over time. It is worth noting that a strict rule can
also target output, and the di¤erence between strict and exible targeting is sim-
ply reected in the weights placed on the endogenous variables. Pure ination
targeting should then be understood as a rule where ination is the only variable
that the central bank targets (see, e.g., Svensson (2010)).
Rule with Interest Rate Smoothing Component
Another version of a Taylor rule often used in the literature is interest rate smooth-
ing rule (ISR), which takes the form
{^t = i{^t 1 + t + yy^t: (1.54)
The parameter i is the interest rate smoothing parameter, which prevents the
interest rate from becoming a jump variable, and reects the relative weight placed
on interest rate smoothing. If i > 1, this rule is known in the literature as the
superinertial rule, and Woodford (2003, ch. 4) shows that a unique equilibrium
fullling the Blanchard-Kahn conditions simply requires that one of the remaining
coe¢cients is positive. The calibrated value of this parameter, usually lies between
zero and one in the literature. I calibrate the rule using i = 0:5.
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Forward Looking Taylor Rule
The rule that most central banks follow, e.g., the Bank of England or Bank of Swe-
den, is the forward looking Taylor rule (FLTR), which targets both the expected
future ination and the expected output gap
{^t = %+ Et [t+1] + yEt [y^t+1] : (1.55)
As shown in the Section 1.8, rule (1.55) delivers higher welfare losses in response
to a TFP shock than the Taylor Rule.
Optimal Simple Targeting Rules
Rather than calibration, the parameters of the monetary policy rules can be cho-
sen in such a way that the welfare loss function is minimised. In the context of
this paper, a simple rule is considered to be optimal if it delivers a locally unique
equilibrium. Overall, there are many values of the parameters available, which can
be considered as locally optimal. Since I use two di¤erent software packages to
analyse the two approaches (i.e., I use Dynare for the traditional linear-quadratic
approach, and ACES for the Hamiltonian approach), the results may di¤er de-
pending on the starting values. Therefore, it is necessary to x the starting points
in a way that the local area for both programmes is identical, and the resulting
optimised parameters are comparable with each other. Additionally, similar to
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I restrict the monetary rule parameters for out-
put and ination to the interval [ 5; 5], and the interest rate smooth parameter
to the interval [0; 1].6
6In fact, I extend the interval from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, who restrict their analysed
policy rules to the interval [ 3; 3].
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1.8 Results
In this section, I study the di¤erences resulting from the welfare loss analysis of
the traditional linear-quadratic approach and the Hamiltonian approach. In par-
ticular, I compare the welfare loss and the volatility of the endogenous variables
included in the welfare loss function (1.50). The actual welfare loss is then mea-
sured in the form of a compensating di¤erential from the steady state welfare. As
discussed in Section 1.5.2, steady state welfare is independent of monetary policy.
As the traditional linear-quadratic approach disregards any real or nominal distor-
tion when computing the steady state, welfare always equals its maximum level,
regardless of the share of backward looking rms !. Conversely, the Hamiltonian
approach entails that welfare varies with the parameter !, since distortions are
taken into account when looking at the steady state.
As Levine et al. (2007) emphasise, the welfare loss function resulting from the
Hamiltonian approach is comparable with the one resulting from the traditional
approach if certain conditions are fullled. In particular, they argue that it should
be stressed that this is only welfare based under the extreme restrictions that NKM
has no capital, no habit, no indexing, has only one shock At and uses a separable
utility [function] (p. 24).
The model considered in this chapter fullls all the above conditions, except
for the assumption regarding price indexing. It is therefore appropriate to assume
that the di¤erence between these two approaches results from the di¤erent values
of !. As a matter of fact, when ! = 0, the two approaches deliver identical dy-
namics for all endogenous variables. Table 1.4 reports the variances of ination,
change in ination and output gap, and summarises the welfare losses obtained
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Table 1.4: Variances and welfare loss under simple policy rules.
using the calibrated model with simple monetary policy rules. The table shows
that, when ! = 0, the volatilities are equal for both approaches across all analysed
rules. Furthermore, the welfare loss delivered by each simple monetary policy
rule is always higher using the Hamiltonian approach. The reason is that the
approximation of the welfare loss function in the traditional approach disregards
some terms, including the terms independent of the policy.7 The Hamiltonian
numerical approximation in this case is more precise. A closer look on the welfare
loss also suggests that the di¤erence between the traditional and the Hamiltonian
welfare loss decreases with the value of !.
7For a detailed discussion, see Appendix 1.C.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse response functions under simple policy rules.
Using the Taylor rule, the welfare loss di¤erence is more than 0:3 for ! = 0. As
the level of ! rise, the di¤erence lowers, reaching a mere 0:05 when ! = 0:8. The
reason is that, although the ination volatility increases marginally, the output
gap variance is signicantly lower using the Hamiltonian approach. Similar trends
can be observed when using every simple rule.
Despite of the horizontal di¤erences generated at di¤erent levels of the para-
meter !, the welfare losses generated by the two approaches exhibit a clear pattern
across the di¤erent rules. In the case of a TFP shock and under a common cal-
ibration, PITR performs best, closely followed by ISR. The Taylor rule and its
forward looking equivalent perform alike, though producing a higher welfare loss.
This corresponds to the results often discussed in the literature, according to which
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pure ination targeting is the most appropriate simple rule.8
A visual representation of the impulse responses is given in Figure 1.4. Because
of the similarities in the dynamic behavior generated by the two approaches, I only
report the responses resulting from the traditional linear-quadratic approach.
The gure shows that a higher ! leads to a higher output gap volatility and
lower ination volatility, which require a weaker reaction from the central bank,
in turn resulting in a lower volatility of the interest rate.
Using the optimal simple rules instead, the di¤erence between the results gen-
erated by the two approaches is larger. Although variances are negligible and very
close to zero for all the variables, and therefore the welfare loss generated by the
traditional linear-quadratic approach converges zero, the Hamiltonian welfare loss
is around 0:9 percent. Table 1.5 reports the variances and welfare losses for the
optimal simple rules. For both approaches, welfare loss is very low and stable
across the values of !. The only exception is the optimised PITR that performs
very badly in comparison to the other rules. This is due to the restricted value
of parameter  which is not high enough to achieve zero ination volatility, sim-
ilar to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). In the case of no restrictions on , the
optimal policy calls for setting the ination coe¢cient  to be very high. With
a high enough value for this parameter, this rule performs similarly to the others
resulting in negligible welfare losses.
Under the stated restrictions on , the optimal rules that target aggregate
output perform better than PITR. For all these rules, the optimised parameter y
8See, e.g., Galí and Monacelli (2005).
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Table 1.5: Variances and welfare loss under optimal policy rules.
is slightly negative. In the presence of a TFP shock, output increases one to
one with its natural level so that the output gap is low and ination decreases.
When the central bank targets ination, it decreases the interest rate in order
to push ination back to its equilibrium. A decrease in ination causes a further
increase in output. A positive and high coe¢cient on ination ensures that ination
volatility is minimised. Therefore, should the ination coe¢cient be allowed to take
(unreasonably) high values, the PITR would perform better than any other rule.
It should be emphasised that targeting output with a positive coe¢cient y
pushes output back to its equilibrium and increases the output gap. As a result,
output gap volatility in Table 1.4 and Figure 1.4 increases. Conversely, a negative
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coe¢cient on output implies that the output deviates less from its natural level,
leading to a lower welfare loss. From the variance analysis, it follows that, as
the share of backward looking rms increases, ination variance decreases and
output gap variance increases. Increasing the parameter ! causes higher ination
persistence, hence the central bank nd it easier to control ination volatility.
However, this fact is o¤set by the higher volatility of output gap.
The optimised simple rule coe¢cients for both the linearised approach, using
Dynare, and the Hamiltonian approach, using ACES, are shown in Table 1.6 of
Appendix 1.D. The two software packages allow for di¤erent magnitude of devia-
tions from the steady state (ACES allowing for the largest) and Dynare does not
allow for parameter restriction (while ACES does). For these reasons, I chose for
the linearised approach to use ACES results as the starting values. From Table
1.6, it follows that the two approaches deliver similar values for the optimal pa-
rameters. Because the TFP shock belongs to the group of e¢cient shocks, which
can be o¤set by an appropriate policy of the social planner, the welfare loss values
by optimal rules are practically zero if the coe¢cients are close to the reported
values.9
1.9 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has investigated whether trend ination might be the endogenous
outcome of a deliberate choice by a social planner, who aims at minimising welfare
losses around a non e¢cient steady state. In particular, I have founded my analysis
9Similarly, a preference shock can be considered an e¢cient shock. Conversely, the cost push
shock belongs to the group of ine¢cient shocks and cannot be fully accommodated by the social
planner. For further detail, see, e.g.,
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on a model that considers backward looking as well as forward looking agents, and
investigated the issue under a number of di¤erent monetary policy rules. I have
rst characterised the steady state of the economy in a deterministic environment,
and then I have extended the model to consider a stochastic environment, where
the source of uncertainty has been represented by a shock hitting rms TFP. I have
derived the welfare loss function around the steady state following two approaches:
the traditional linear-quadratic approach and the Hamiltonian approach. The two
approaches di¤er in that, while the former assumes an e¢cient steady state with
zero ination, the latter relaxes these assumptions allowing for nominal and real
distortions in the steady state. Finally, I have compared the predictions of the
resulting models, using a number of simple and optimal monetary policy rules.
Two innovative outcomes are worth noting. First, the welfare loss that a Hamil-
tonian social planner obtains in the steady state depends on the level of ination.
In particular, a positive (and su¢ciently low) ination may be benecial for the
economy, as the negative e¤ect due to a rise in the price dispersion may be more
than o¤set by the positive e¤ect that nominal rigidities generate on labour sup-
ply. Second, the share of backward looking rms has an impact on the di¤erential
in welfare losses that obtains using the two approaches (with social welfare, by
construction, always higher under the traditional approach). In particular, the
higher this share, the narrower the di¤erence between the predicted welfare levels.
The reason is that the Hamiltonian planner is able to exploit the behaviour of the
backward looking agents, and can thus increase ination to improve welfare. This
is an option that is not available under the traditional linear-quadratic approach.
The analysis has been conducted with reference to a stochastic environment
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associated with a single shock to TFP. This is chosen to allow for a direct compari-
son between the welfare losses generated by a generalised version of the traditional
linear-quadratic approach and by the alternative Hamiltonian approach, which is
not feasible when more sources of uncertainty are considered. An obvious ex-
tension of the model would consider a cost push shock as an alternative to the
stochastic TFP, as suggested by a strand of the literature (see, e.g., Clarida, Galí
and Gertler, 1999; and Steinsson, 2003). Another interesting extension, particu-
larly when considering the ndings by Bhattarai, Eggertsson and Schoenle (2014),
would consider a demand shock. A preliminary study of this case, however, leads
to results very similar to those discussed in this chapter, with the exception that
ination inertia appears to have a relatively higher impact on the dynamics of
the endogenous variables. More generally, I believe that investigating monetary
policy under di¤erent sources of uncertainty in the presence of a non-zero steady
state ination in presence of ination inertia might represent a promising topic for
further research.
Finally, the study conducted in this chapter has only considered a closed econ-
omy. Being a closed economy model, my framework mainly lends itself to the
analysis of any country that could be considered as a large economy (in isolation
or with trading partners regarded as small economies) in some particular context.
One example of this models application is featured in Chapter 2, where I consider
Germany as a large economy and a number of Eastern European countries as small
economies. My contribution there focuses on the empirical performance of the dif-
ferent rules. I leave the theoretical study of these issues to future investigation.
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1.A Consumer Price Index
This appendix describes the derivation of household demand for individual goods,
and the derivation of the price index. Firstly, I assume that the index of consump-
tion goods takes the familiar DixitStiglitz form
Ct =
0@ 1Z
0
[Ct(i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
: (1.56)
The representative household maximises the composite consumption Ct by choos-
ing Ct (i), subject to the budget constraint
1Z
0
Pt (i)Ct(i)di = Zt; (1.57)
taking the available amount of resources Zt, which equals PtCt in (1.57), as given.
I can write the Lagrangian
LC =
0@ 1Z
0
[Ct(i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
  t
0@ 1Z
0
Pt (i)Ct(i)di  Zt
1A : (1.58)
The rst-order conditions are
@L
@Ct (i)
=
"
"  1
0@ 1Z
0
[Ct(i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
 1
"  1
"
[Ct(i)]
" 1
"
 1   tPt (i) = 0 (1.59)
@L
@t
=
1Z
0
Pt (i)Ct(i)di  Zt = 0: (1.60)
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I can eliminate the Lagrangian multiplier. From condition (1.59) I obtain
tPt (i) =
0@ 1Z
0
[Ct(i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
 1
[Ct(i)]
" 1
"
 1 : (1.61)
To get the value of t, multiply both sides by Ct (i) and integrate over goods
tPt (i)Ct(i) =
24 1Z
0
(Ct(i))
" 1
" di
35
"
" 1
 1
(Ct(i))
" 1
" ;
resulting in
t =
24 1Z
0
(Ct(i))
" 1
" di
35
"
" 1
1Z
0
Pt (i)Ct(i)di
=
Ct
Zt

1
Pt
:
Demand for Consumption Goods From (1.61), I also get the demand
function for each good i
Pt (i)
Pt
=
24 1Z
0
(Ct(i))
" 1
" di
35
1
" 1
(Ct(i))
  1
" = (CtCt(i))
  1
" ;
which results to the demand for an individual consumption good (1.10)
Ct(i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 "
Ct:
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Price Index By replacing Ct(i) with the last expression in (1.56), I obtain
an expression for the price index as a function of each goods price
C
" 1
"
t = C
" 1
"
t

1
Pt
1 " 1Z
0
Pt (i)
1 " di;
which rearranging leads to a price index
Pt =
24 1Z
0
(Pt(i))
1 " di
35
1
1 "
: (1.62)
1.B Phillips Curve
The log-linearisation of the equations (1.16), (1.17) and (1.18) straightforwardly
leads to
p^ft = |^t   h^t
with
|^t = (1  ) ((1  ) y^t + cmct) +  ("t+1 + |^t+1)
and
h^t = (1  ) ((1  ) y^t) + 

("  1) t+1 + h^t+1

;
from which I can obtain the forward looking price in log-linear terms
p^ft = (1  ) cmct + t+1 + p^ft+1: (1.63)
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The log-linearisation of (1.20), (1.22) and (1.25) yields
p^bt = x^t 1 + t 1   t; (1.64)
together with
x^t = (1  !) p^
f
t + !p^
b
t ; (1.65)
and
x^t =

1  
t: (1.66)
Using last equation with (1.65) together with (1.64) and (1.63) and simplifying
delivers the hybrid NKPC
t =

 + ! (1   (1  ))
t+1 +
!
 + ! (1   (1  ))
t 1
+
(1  !) (1  ) (1  )
 + ! (1   (1  ))
cmct:
1.C Central Bank Loss Function
In this appendix I derive the central banks objective function. The welfare crite-
rion is the stream of expected representative households utility, which the central
bank is willing to maximise

 = E0
"
1X
t=0
tUt
#
with
Ut =
Y 1 t
1  
 
N1+t
1 + 
;
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where in the second expression I use the fact that Yt = Ct. The second-order
Taylor series approximation of utility function yields10
U (Ct; Nt) 
Y 1 
1  
 
N1+
1 + 
+ Y 1 
Yt   Y
Y
  N1+
Nt   N
N
+
1
2
"
  Y 1 

Yt   Y
Y
2
   N1+

Nt   N
N
2#
:
So that the previous expression takes the following form
U (Ct; Nt) 
Y 1 
1  
 
N1+
1 + 
+ Y 1 

~yt +
1
2
~y2t

  N1+

~nt +
1
2
~n2t

 

2
Y 1 ~y2t  

2
N1+~n2t
and thus
Ut   U  Y
1 

~yt +
1
2
~y2t

  N1+

~nt +
1
2
~n2t

+ o
 a3 ;
where U =
Y 1 
1 
 
N1+
1+
and o (kank) represents terms of order n or higher.
Recall from Section (1.4.2), equation (1.26) that
Nt =
Yt
At
Zt;
10The formula for second-order Taylor approximation is given by
f (xt; yt)  f (X;Y ) + fx (X;Y ) (xt  X) + fy (X;Y ) (yt   Y )+
+ fxy (X;Y ) (xt  X) (yt   Y )
+
1
2

fxx (X;Y ) (xt  X)
2
+
+fyy (X;Y ) (yt   Y )
2

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log-linearised as
n^t = y^t + zt;
where zt  log
R 1
0
(Pt (i) =Pt)
 " di, ~at = zt = 0. Hence, isolating the terms inde-
pendent of policy
Ut   U  Y
1 

~yt +
1  
2
~y2t

  N1+

~yt + zt +
1 + 
2
~y2t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 a3 ;
where t:i:p: abbreviates "terms independent of policy". Using the facts that, in a
fully e¢cient equilibrium, the marginal product of labour MPN = Y
N
equals the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour, e.g., MRSC;N =
UN
UC
= N

Y  
, I can write
Ut   U  Y
1 

1  
2
y^2t   zt  
1 + 
2
y^2t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 a3
=   Y 1 

zt +
 + 
2
y^2t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 a3 :
Recall that I have used the fact that z2t is higher than second order, which is shown
in what follows.
Let _pt (i)  logPt (i) =Pt, _p (i)  log P (i) = P = 0. Consider that
(Pt (i) =Pt)
1 " = exp [(1  ") _pt (i)]
than
(Pt (i) =Pt)
1 " = exp [(1  ") _p (i)] + (1  ") exp [(1  ") _p (i)] [ _pt (i)  _p (i)]
+ (1  ")2 exp [(1  ") _p (i)] [ _pt (i)  _p (i)]
2 =2 + o
 a3
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(Pt (i) =Pt)
1 " = 1 + (1  ") _pt (i) + (1  ")
2 [ _pt (i)]
2 =2 + o
 a3 :
Integrate over i delivers
1
(Pt)
1 "
1Z
0
(Pt (i))
1 " di = 1 + (1  ")
1Z
0
_pt (i) di+
(1  ")2
2
1Z
0
[ _pt (i)]
2 di:
Notice that, from the denition of price index, the LHS equals one, e.g.,
1
(Pt)
1 "
1Z
0
(Pt (i))
1 " di = 1. Thus it holds
1Z
0
_pt (i) di =
"  1
2
1Z
0
[ _pt (i)]
2 di:
Furthermore, notice that, as rms are uniformly distributed between zero and one,
I can write
Ei [ _pt (i)] =
"  1
2
Ei

( _pt (i))
2 :
Given that
Ei

( _pt (i))
2 = Ei (pt (i)  pt)2
= Ei

(pt (i)  Ei (pt (i)))
2
= vari fpt (i)g : (1.67)
I obtain
Ei
"
Pt (i)
(Pt)
1 "#
= 1;
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which implies that
Ei

(pt (i))
1 " = p1 "t :
Note also that
(Pt (i) =Pt)
 " = 1  " _pt (i) + "
2 [ _pt (i)]
2 =2 + o
 a3 :
Integrating over i and using the result of equation (1.67)
Z 1
0
(Pt (i) =Pt)
 " di = 1  "
Z 1
0
_pt (i) di+
"2
2
Z 1
0
[ _pt (i)]
2 di+ o
 a3
= 1  "Ei [ _pt (i)] +
"2
2
Ei

[ _pt (i)]
2	+ o  a3
= 1  "
"  1
2
Ei

[ _pt (i)]
2	+ "2
2
Ei

[ _pt (i)]
2	+ o  a3
= 1 +
"
2
Ei

[ _pt (i)]
2	+ o  a3
= 1 +
"
2
vari [pt (i)] + o
 a3 ;
which nally results in
zt = log
Z 1
0
(Pt (i) =Pt)
 " di =
"
2
vari [pt (i)] + o
 a3 :
I have assumed that a fraction 1  of the households in the economy are able
to change their prices in each period. Consequently, the distribution of prices,
fpt (i)g, at time t consists of  times the distribution of prices at time t  1; plus
two atoms of size (1  ) (1  !) and (1  )! at the two new prices, pf and pb,
respectively. Dene
pt  Ei [pt (i)] and t  vari [pt (i)] ;
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than using the recursive characterisation of the distribution of prices, I can write
pt = Ei [pt 1 (i)] + (1  ) (1  !)Eip
f
t + (1  )!Eip
b
t :
Taking the one-lag time di¤erence yields
pt   pt 1 = Ei [pt 1 (i)  pt 1] + (1  ) (1  !)

pft   pt 1

+(1  )!
 
pbt   pt 1

= (1  ) (1  !)

pft   pt 1

+ (1  )!
 
pbt   pt 1

= (1  ) (xt   pt 1)
and
xt   pt 1 =
pt   pt 1
1  
=
t
1  
:
Similarly
t  vari [pt (i)] = vari

pt (i)  t 1

= Ei
n
pt (i)  t 1
2o
 

Eipt (i)  t 1
2
:
Again, using the recursive characterisation of the distribution of prices I can write
Ei

[pt (i)  pt 1]
2	 = Ei [pt 1 (i)  pt 1]2	
+(1  ) (1  !)

pft   pt 1
2
+ (1  )!
 
pbt   pt 1
2
:
Noting that
xt = (1  !) p
f
t + !p
b
t
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and
pbt = xt 1 + t 1;
I can further state that
pbt   pt 1 = xt 1 + t 1   pt 1
= xt 1 + t 1   pt 2   (pt 1   pt 2)
= xt 1 + t 1   pt 2   t 1
= xt 1   pt 2
and that
pft   pt 1 =
xt
1  !
 
!pbt
1  !
  pt 1
=
xt   pt 1
1  !
 
!
 
pbt   pt 1

1  !
=
xt   pt 1
1  !
 
! (xt 1   pt 2)
1  !
:
Hence
t = Ei

[pt 1 (i)  pt 1]
2	+ (1  ) (1  !)xt   pt 1
1  !
 
! (xt 1   pt 2)
1  !
2
+ (1  )! (xt 1   pt 2)
2   [Eipt (i)  pt 1]
2
t = t 1 + (1  )
 
(xt   pt 1)
2
1  !
+
!2 (xt 1   pt 2)
2
1  !
 
2! (xt   pt 1) (xt 1   pt 2)
1  !

+ (1  )! (xt 1   pt 2)
2   [pt   pt 1]
2
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t = t 1 + (1  )

2t
(1  )2 (1  !)
+
!22t 1
(1  )2 (1  !)
 
2!tt 1
(1  )2 (1  !)

+
(1  )!2t 1
(1  )2
  2t
t = t 1 +
2t
(1  ) (1  !)
 
2!tt 1
(1  ) (1  !)
+
!22t 1
(1  ) (1  !)
+
!2t 1
1  
  2t
t = t 1 +
2t
(1  ) (1  !)
 
2!tt 1
(1  ) (1  !)
+
!22t 1 + (1  !)!
2
t 1
(1  ) (1  !)
  2t
Note that
!22t 1 + (1  !)!
2
t 1 = !
22t 1 + !
2
t 1   !
22t 1 = !
2
t 1;
thus
t = t 1 +
2t
(1  ) (1  !)
 
2!tt 1
(1  ) (1  !)
+
!2t 1
(1  ) (1  !)
  2t :
Notice that
2t
(1  ) (1  !)
=
2t
1  
+
!2t
(1  ) (1  !)
:
81
Hence
t = t 1 +
2t
1  
+
!
 
2t   2tt 1 + 
2
t 1

(1  ) (1  !)
  2t
and
t = t 1 +

1  
2t +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t :
Solving this expression forward
t 1 = t 2 +

(1  )
2t 1 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t 1
t 2 = t 3 +

(1  )
2t 2 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t 2
and replacing into the rst expression delivers
t = 
2

t 3 +

(1  )
2t 2 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t 2

+ 


(1  )
2t 1 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t 1

+

(1  )
2t +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t
and
t = 
3t 3 +

(1  )

2t + 
2
t 1 + 
22t 2

+
!
(1  ) (1  !)

2t + 
2
t 1 + 
22t 2

:
Generalising to period t =  1
t = 
t+1 1 +

(1  )
tX
s=0
s2t s +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
tX
s=0
s2t s:
82
Simplifying, and reverting the index
t = 
t+1 1 +
tX
s=0
t s


(1  )
2s +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2s

;
thus
t = 
t
"
 1 +
tX
s=0
 s


(1  )
2s +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2s
#
:
Therefore, I have
zt =
"
2
vari [pt (i)] + o
 a3
=
"
2
t + o
 a3
=
"
2
t
"
 1 +
tX
s=0
 s


(1  )
2s +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2s
#
+ o
 a3
and
Ut   U =  
Y 1 
2

"t

 1 +
Pt
s=0 
 s


(1  )
2s
+
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2s

+ ( + ) ~y2t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 a3 :
Finally, I get

0 =  "
Y 1 
2
E
1X
t=0
()t
"
 1 +
tX
s=0
 s


(1  )
2s +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2s
#
 
Y 1 
2
E
1X
t=0
t ( + ) ~y2t + t:i:p:+ o
 a3 :
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The rst present value on the RHS of this equation is
1X
t=0
tt =
1X
t=0
()t
"
 1 +
tX
s=0
 s


(1  )
2s +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2s
#
:
Following Steinsson, assume that  1 is a term independent on policy
1X
t=0
tt =
1X
t=0
"
()t
tX
s=0
 s


(1  )
2s +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2s
#
+ t:i:p:
The rst the on the RHS of this equation is, for t = 0

(1  )
20 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
20;
for t = 1
(1 + )


(1  )
20 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
20

+ 


(1  )
21 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
21

;
for t = 2
 
1 +  + 22
 
(1  )
20 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
20

+
 
 + 2
 
(1  )
21 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
21

+ 2


(1  )
22 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
22

;
84
for t = 3
 
1 +  + 22 + 33
 
(1  )
20 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
20

+
 
 + 2 + 23
 
(1  )
21 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
21

+
 
2 + 3
 
(1  )
22 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
22

+ 3


(1  )
23 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
23

:
Generalising
TX
t=0
()t


(1  )
20 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
20

+
T 1X
t=0
()t 


(1  )
21 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
21

+
T 2X
t=0
()t 2


(1  )
22 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
22

+
T 3X
t=0
()t 3


(1  )
23 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
23

+ :::
For T !1 (and taking out from the sums the terms constant with respect to the
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index t)


(1  )
20 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
20
 1X
t=0
()t
+ 


(1  )
21 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
21
 1X
t=0
()t
+ 2


(1  )
22 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
22
 1X
t=0
()t
+ 3


(1  )
23 +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
23
 1X
t=0
()t + :::
Considering that
P1
t=0 ()
t = (1  ) 1, and generalising
1X
t=0
tt =
1
1  
1X
t=0
t


(1  )
2t +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t

+ t:i:p:
Plugging this back into the welfare loss function yields

0 =  
Y 1 
2
1X
t=0
t
"
1  


(1  )
2t +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t

 
Y 1 
2
1X
t=0
t ( + ) ~y2t + t:i:p:+ o
 a3
which can be rewritten as

0 =  
Y 1 
2
1X
t=0
t

"
1  


(1  )
2t +
!
(1  ) (1  !)
2t

+ ( + ) ~y2t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 a3 :
Assuming that all rms are forward looking only, e.g., ! = 0, I get a policy
makers objective function without backward looking component, which is identical
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with those from Woodford (2003). More generally it holds that

0 =  E0
1X
t=0
t
 
2t + 
2
t + y~y
2
t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 a3 ; (1.68)
where  =
Y 1 
2
"
1 

(1 )
, y =
1 
"
1 

( + ) and  =
!
(1 !)
are functions of
the structural parameters of the model.
1.D Optimal Rules Coe¢cients
This appendix compares the optimised simple rules coe¢cients resulting from the
traditional linearised approach and Hamiltonian approach, given various monetary
policy rules and levels of parameter omega. The estimated optimal coe¢cients
di¤er for two reasons: di¤erent methodologies and di¤erent algorithms.
The results in Table 1.6 for the linearised approach are obtained using the
ACES results as the starting values. The reason is that the two software packages
allow for di¤erent magnitude of deviations from the steady state (ACES allow-
ing for the largest) and Dynare does not allow for parameter restriction (while
ACES does), hence using the ACES results are stating values provides parameters
estimates for the linearised approach that are comparable to those obtained by
the Hamiltonian approach. In other words, using Dynare for the linear approach
leads to very small (nearly zero) welfare losses in many local minima, with the end
values always looking very close to the starting ones.
As Table 1.6 illustrates, there is virtually no di¤erence between the two ap-
proaches when one considers optimal rules, at least as far as TFP shocks are
concerned. Even when di¤erences seem to arise (i.e., when ! = 0:8, in the optimal
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Table 1.6: Optimal rules coe¢cients for linearised and Hamiltonian approach.
Taylor rule and in the forward-looking Taylor rule), welfare that would obtain from
one approach using the optimal coe¢cient of the other approach is only marginally
di¤erent from the one reported in Table 1.6. Therefore, comparing the Hamiltonian
approach with its traditional counterpart appears to make much more sense when
simple rather than optimal rules are involved.
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Chapter 2
Estimation of a Small New
Keynesian Model with Trend
Ination for Eastern European
Countries
2.1 Introduction
The Bayesian estimation of the DSGE models has recently attracted the attention
of an increasing number of economists investigating whether the predictions of the
DSGE models match the statistical properties of the empirical data, which are
the transmission channels for the exogenous shocks, and what is the behaviour of
the central bank. In this paper, I study the performance of a simple small open
economy (SOE) model, and investigate the conduct of monetary policy in Eastern
European countries.
There are two innovative aspects that I consider in this chapter. First, my
analysis assesses to what extent the assumption of a zero steady state ination
inuences the models empirical t, in order to sheds new light on the importance
of introducing trend ination into these type of models. Previous contributions
mainly point out the importance of the trend ination on theoretical grounds (e.g.,
Ascari and Ropelle, 2007). Empirical estimations of models with trade ination
are rare in the literature. One of the few exceptions is by Cogley and Sbordone,
2008, who estimate the NKPC as a single equation with a time varying trend
ination. Unlike these authors, I focus on a more structured DSGE model in which
the NKPC is embedded. I estimate the model using the Bayesian methodology.
Second, in order to estimate the Phillips curve more accurately, I do not treat the
marginal cost as a latent variable, as it is common in the Bayesian literature, but
I use real unit labour cost data as a proxy for it. Using the resulting framework,
I show that the backward looking component in the Phillips curve is important,
and the model performs signicantly better when accounting for non-zero steady
state ination.
Beside analysing how important the innovations on the supply side of the model
are, my interest lies in estimation of a suitable monetary policy rule for both a
large and a small economy. When considering SOE monetary policy, a number
of theoretical contributions argue that PPI ination targeting performs better
than CPI ination targeting in terms of welfare loss. Nonetheless, the empirical
literature mainly concentrates on simple rules with CPI ination targeting. Using
a posterior odds test, I analyse whether the central banks of some selected Eastern
European countries (EEC) systematically target CPI ination rather than PPI
ination. My results suggest that this hypothesis is empirically rejected for all the
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investigated Eastern European countries.
Lastly, I analyse to what extent the central bank of a small Eastern European
country, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, responds to variations
in the exchange rate. This question, originally posed by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) with regard to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK, is particularly
interesting in the context of the emerging EEC, since these countries are potential
candidates to join the Eurozone. The decision on whether to join the Eurozone
may well be determined at least in part by the gains and losses these countries
may face when abandoning a exible exchange rate regime. I identify Germany as
the large economy, since this country represents the largest trading partner of all
of the selected EEC.1 The results are mixed. I show that the Czech central bank
is likely to target exchange rates, whereas its Hungarian and Polish counterparts
are not.
The paper includes two large sections. Section 2.3 describes the theoretical
model, which builds on the New Keynesian literature with non zero ination trend
such as Ascari and Ropele (2007). I generalise the model for a SOE and I introduce
an incomplete pass-through and a home bias in the representation of consumer
preferences. The reason is that, although it is still common in the New Keynesian
literature to assume that the law of one price and the PPP hold, both assumptions
strongly contradict the well-estiblished empirical evidence.
My results are discussed in Section 2.4, where I describe the Bayesian method-
ology adopted to estimate the structural parameters of the model, particularly
1Germany attracts between 25 and 30 percent of the total exports from each of the EEC.
The fact that this trade partnership is not reciprocal (less than 4 percent) allows me to conclude
that Germany behaves as a large economy relative to the EEC.
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those specifying the Phillips curve. This approach also allows me to analyse the
implications of modifying the Phillips curve to account for a non-zero steady state
ination. For robustness, my ndings are derived using di¤erent monetary policy
rules. Among them, however, I show that a simple monetary policy rule captur-
ing the essential features of the optimal one, as derived by, e.g., Steinsson (2003),
signicantly improves the t to the data.
2.2 Literature Review
The structure of the model closely relates to Galí and Monacelli (2005), Tuesta
and Rabanal (2006) and De Paoli (2009). Furthermore, I add some assumptions
to the model that are motivated by the empirical evidence. I assume incomplete
pass-through following Monacelli (2003).2 I also assume home bias in consumption,
which leads to deviation from power purchasing parity. The intratemporal elastic-
ity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods di¤ers from unity, allowing
the SOE central bank to manipulate the terms of trade, which now relates to the
relative domestic price. The reason for introducing these variations to the bench-
mark model is twofold. On the one hand, Devereux and Engel (2003) show that
optimal monetary policy, in case of less than perfect (incomplete) pass-through of
the exchange rate to the local currency prices, should involve some consideration of
exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, although it is typically assumed in the
literature that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is
one (as in, e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Devereux and Engel (2003), and Ob-
2We refer to this article for a discussion about the di¤erent strategies regarding the modeling
of incomplete pass-through, and more generally about the di¤erences between producer currency
pricing and local currency pricing.
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stfeld and Rogo¤ (2002)), empirical estimations suggest larger elasticities. Using
this result, Sutherland (2006) argues that the central bank should add targeting
of the exchange rate to monetary policy.
The supply side is characterised by a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
which is derived using a rule of thumb following Galí and Gertler (1999). A similar
Phillips Curve specication is also used by Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002), who
analyse the e¤ect of asymmetric supply shocks across countries within a mone-
tary union. Additionally, I follow Ascari and Ropele (2007) and log-linearise this
Phillips curve around a non-zero steady state, and show that this assumption im-
proves the t of the model signicantly. The monetary policy is specied as by
using di¤erent Taylor type rules for both, the closed and the open economy. The
aim is twofold. First, di¤erent rules serve the robustness check for my results.
However, I can also identify the best suitable monetary policy rule.
There is a large literature using Bayesian techniques to estimate monetary
policy rules in DSGE models. The rst important work in this eld is Smets and
Wouters (2003), who estimate structural parameters of a closed economy model us-
ing Euro Area data. This work has since been extended for the SOE model. Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005) create a two symmetric country model and estimate it us-
ing U.S. and Euro Area data. Using a similar dataset, Tuesta and Rabanal (2006)
estimate and compare models with complete and incomplete nancial markets.
In their later paper, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) estimate how central banks
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and UK respond to exchange rate changes,
estimating composite structural parameters. Similarly, Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé,
and Villani (2008) and Liu (2006) investigate similar questions while assuming
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incomplete pass-through, using data for Sweden and New Zealand, respectively.
Justiniano and Preston (2010) identify the optimal policy rule within a generalized
class of Taylor-type rule, which they estimate using data from Australia, Canada
and New Zealand. They show that these rules do not respond to the nominal
exchange rates. Negro and Schorfheide (2009) also study the e¤ect of changes in
the monetary policy rule, using data for Chile.
The use of Bayesian techniques to estimate the NKPC have so far only yielded
mixed results. Schorfheide (2008) reviews the identication and the estimates
for the Phillips curve coe¢cients, obtained using U.S. data. He demonstrates
how estimates of marginal costs treated as latent variables or measured in terms
of an output gap vary widely with observable marginal costs, measured by unit
labour costs. He concludes that the estimated values are more robust if marginal
costs are explicitly included. Galí and Gertler (1999) estimate a NKPC with
unit labour costs as a proxy for marginal costs as well as output gap, using the
general method of moments (GMM). They show that using unit labor costs delivers
better estimates than using the output gap. Similarly, Sbordone (2002) argues that
estimating the NKPC with the output gap is successful as long as the output gap is
a good measure of marginal costs and Cogley and Sbordone (2008) use this proxy
to estimate the NKPC with time varying trend ination.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.3, I specify the model
assuming two countries that may or may not di¤er in size. After describing the
demand and supply side of the model in details, I specify the monetary policy
rules as nominal interest rate rules for each country, and log-linearise the model
around its non-zero ination steady state. In Section 2.4, I describe the estimation
methodology, the dataset, and the choice of prior. I also present the estimation
results and the model t following from the Bayesian estimation, and analyse the
impulse responses. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.3 The Model
I rst specify the model for two generic countries. The framework encapsulates
both the scenario where there are two symmetric countries or where there are
two countries that di¤er in size and openness. I then specify the model for a
SOE, which interacts with a large economy. Section 2.3.1 describes in detail the
household preferences, its optimisation problem as well as total and aggregate
demand for both domestic and foreign country. Section 2.3.2 describes the supply
side of the model. The whole model is log-linearised around its steady state in
Section 2.3.3, and monetary policy rules in simple form are described in more
detail in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Demand Side
I consider two countries; country H, also called home or domestic country, and
F , the foreign country. A continuum of agents of unit mass populate the world
economy, where the population in the segment [0; n) belongs to country H and
the population in the segment (n; 1] belongs to country F . Consumption C is a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of home and foreign goods. Home consumers preferences
are represented by
Ct =
h

1
 (CH;t)
 1
 + (1  )
1
 (CF;t)
 1

i 
 1
(2.1)
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with the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods, , not necessary equal to one. Sutherland (2006) surveys the empirical
literature and concludes that the majority of the empirical evidence suggests 
2 (5; 10).
The parameter  introduces a home bias in consumption, and its value is given
by
1   = (1  n) !  = 1  (1  n), (2.2)
where (1  n) is the relative size of country F and  2 [0; 1) is the degree of
openness of country H. If  = 0, the domestic economy is autarkic and only do-
mestic goods are consumed. Furthermore, as the size of the economy (n) increases,
consumers buy relatively more domestic goods and imports become less relevant.
Therefore, in a large economy, where n! 1, people mainly consume domestically
produced goods, whereas for a small open economy where n ! 0, international
trade is more important. A small economy is also more strongly inuenced by
foreign innovations.
Similar preferences are specied for the foreign consumer:
Ct =
h
()
1

 
CH;t
  1
 + (1  )
1

 
CF;t
  1

i 
 1
, (2.3)
where the parameter  is determined by the size and openness of the foreign
economy, that is
 = n. (2.4)
Note that the specications of  and  imply that the power purchasing parity
(PPP) does not hold in this model.
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The sub-indices for domestic consumption of domestic (respectively, imported)
goods CH;t (resp., CF;t) are
CH;t =
0@ 1
n
 1
"
nZ
0
[CH;t(i)]
" 1
" di
1A "" 1 (2.5)
CF;t =
0@ 1
1  n
 1
"
1Z
n
[CF;t(i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
(2.6)
Analogously, for foreign consumption CH;t (resp., C

F;t) it holds
CH;t =
0@ 1
n
 1
"
nZ
0

CH;t(i)
 " 1
" di
1A "" 1 (2.7)
CF;t =
0@ 1
1  n
 1
"
1Z
n

CF;t(i)
 " 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
, (2.8)
where CH;t is the home consumption of domestically produced goods and CF;t is the
home consumption of imported goods. Analogously, CH;t is foreign consumption
of domestic exports (goods produced in the home country) and CF;t is foreign
consumption of goods produced abroad. Finally, Ct(i) is the total consumption of
a generic good (i).3 The parameter " is the elasticity of substitution between the
di¤erentiated goods produced in one country and holds unchanged across countries.
I assume that the consumption choices of all households from one country
are identical. From the consumption maximisation problem of the representative
domestic household, I obtain the domestic demand function for a domestic good
3Generally, starred variables are expressed in foreign currency, unstarred in domestic cur-
rency. However, this rule does not apply to consumption, which is expressed in real terms: in
this case, it is only used to distinguish between consumption at home and abroad.
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CH;t (i) and foreign good CF;t(i) as follows
CH;t(i) =
1
n
CH;t

PH;t (i)
PH;t
 "
; CF;t(i) =
1
1  n
CF;t

PF;t (i)
PF;t
 "
. (2.9)
Analogously, it holds that the foreign demand for a domestic good CH;t(i) and
for a foreign good CF;t(i) are respectively given by
CH;t(i) =
1
n
CH;t
 
P H;t (i)
P H;t
! "
; CF;t(i) =
1
1  n
CF;t
 
P F;t (i)
P F;t
! "
. (2.10)
The aggregate domestic demand for domestic good and for foreign goods (im-
ports) can be written in terms of aggregate world consumption
CH;t = Ct

PH;t
Pt
 
; CF;t = (1  )Ct

PF;t
Pt
 
, (2.11)
and the aggregate foreign demand function for domestic goods (in other words,
exports from the point of view of the home country) and for goods produced
abroad can be written as
CH;t = 
Ct

P H;t
P t
 
; CF;t = (1  
)Ct

P F;t
P t
 
. (2.12)
By manipulation of the demand functions, the consumption-based price indices
for domestic and foreign country can be expressed respectively as
Pt =
h
 (PH;t)
1  + (1  ) (PF;t)
1 
i 1
1 
, (2.13)
P t =
h

 
P H;t
1 
+ (1  )
 
P F;t
1 i 11 
. (2.14)
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The price sub-index Pz;t (P

z;t) for goods produced in country z 2 fH;Fg can
be expressed in the domestic (foreign) currency as
PH;t =
0@ 1
n
nZ
0
[PH;t(i)]
1 " di
1A 11 " ; PF;t =
0@ 1
1  n
1Z
n
[PF;t(i)]
1 " di
1A
1
1 "
(2.15)
P H;t =
0@ 1
n
nZ
0

P H;t(i)
1 "
di
1A 11 " ; P F;t =
0@ 1
1  n
1Z
n

P F;t(i)
1 "
di
1A
1
1 "
(2.16)
with the producer price index of the domestically produced goods PH;t and the
importer price index for the goods from foreign country PF;t both expressed in the
domestic currency. Analogously, P F;t (P

H;t) is the producer price index in foreign
country (price of the imported goods from the point of view of consumers abroad)
in foreign currency.
The Law of one Price and the Real Exchange Rate
There is strong empirical evidence that the law of one price (LOP) does not hold,
which could be because of di¤erent producer pricing or because importers face mo-
nopolistic competition similar to producers and therefore charge a mark-up over
their price. Hence, it is very common in New Open Economy Macroeconomic
Models (NOEM) to assume incomplete pass-through. In this paper I follow Mona-
celli (2003) and assume that the law of one price holds when the goods arrive at
the dock, but setting the price in domestic currency causes a deviation from the
LOP. This is explained in more detail in Section 2.3.2, where it is shown that the
domestic retailers set the price of the imported good in monopolistic competition.
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The LOP gap is dened as
	t = St
P F;t
PF;t
; (2.17)
where the nominal exchange rate St denotes the price of the foreign currency in
terms of the domestic currency.4 Additionally, given the di¤erent degrees of home
bias in consumption between the two countries, i.e.  6= , it follows from equation
(2.13) that the PPP does not hold, and the CPI in each country di¤ers, formally
Pt 6= StP

t .
Hence, the real exchange rate di¤ers from one, and I can express it as the price
of foreign goods in term of domestic goods
RSt =
StP

t
Pt
. (2.18)
Note that a decrease in the nominal exchange rate St and analogously, ceteris
paribus, in the real exchange RSt implies an appreciation of the domestic currency.
The terms of trade, which is given by a ratio between importer and domestic
producer prices is also expressed in terms of relative prices
TOTt =
PF;t
PH;t
=
~PF;t
~PH;t
, (2.19)
where ~PF;t = PF;t=Pt and ~PH;t = PH;t=Pt. Combining the last equation with
equation (2.13) shows that the relative domestic price can be easily expressed as
4Note however that for the domestic price, from the point of view of domestic producer, the
law of one price holds, because he gets the price "at the dock".
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a function of the terms of trade
~PH;t =
h
 + (1  ) (TOTt)
1 
i  1
1 
:
The relationship between domestic and CPI ination is given by the relationship
between domestic relative prices of the current and past period
H;t
t
=
~PH;t
~PH;t 1
: (2.20)
and the relationship between imported and CPI ination can be expressed as the
relationship between relative prices of the imports in domestic currency of the
current and past period
F;t
t
=
~PF;t
~PF;t 1
: (2.21)
The Household Optimisation Problem
Both domestic and foreign economies consist of a continuum of identically innite-
lived agents. The preferences of the domestic representative agent is given by the
instantaneous utility function of the same form as in Chapter 1
Ut (C;N) =
"tC
1 
t
1  
 
N1+t
1 + 
, (2.22)
where the function (U) is separable in consumption (C) and working hours (N), so
that UC;N = 0, and where the preference shock "t a¤ects the rate of intertemporal
substitution in consumption for domestic households, similar to the one in Tuesta
and Rabanal (2006). The utility function is also time-separable and the parame-
ters  and  are both positive CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) parameters
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determining the elasticity of substitution.
The representative agent maximises its discounted stream of instantaneous
utility functions over current and future periods
U = Et
1X
t=0
t [Ut (C;N)] , (2.23)
where  2 (0; 1] is the subjective discount factor, by choosing fCt; Ntg
1
t=0. She also
holds international bonds Bt denominated in the national currency which yields a
gross return of Rt at the end of the period.
Her budget constraint, is given by
Bt +WtNt + Tt +Dt  PtCt + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] . (2.24)
Note that
PtCt =
Z n
0
PH (i)CH (i) di+
Z 1
n
PF (i)CF (i) di,
where CH (i) (CF (i)) is consumption of domestic (foreign) good i, given its price
PH (i) (PF (i)), and Pt is the overall consumer price index. Notice also that the
agent consumes all goods at any time t. The nominal bonds denominated in
domestic currency at the end of the period t are denoted by Bt.
5 Wt is the nominal
wage, and Tt and Dt are the lump sum transfer and the prots of the companies
held by the household, respectively. Et [Qt;t+1] is the dynamic stochastic discount
5It holds that Bt +B

t = 0, so the world-wide stock of international bonds equal zero for all
periods.
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factor between period t and t+ 1, for which it holds
Et [Qt;t+1] =
1
Rt
;
where Rt is the gross return on a riskless one year nominal bond, with a yield
assumed to be small. Furthermore, for su¢ciently small values of it, it holds that
log (Rt)  it, where it is the riskless short term nominal interest rate.
From the rst order condition of the maximisation problem of the domestic
representative household, I obtain the Euler equation for the domestic economy
Et
 
Ct
Ct+1
 
t+1
"t
"t+1
!
= Rt (2.25)
with domestic CPI ination given by t+1 = Pt+1=Pt. Following Steinbach et al.
(2009), the expression "t+1="t can be also interpreted as a risk premium on asset
holding, i.e., the wedge between the interest rate set by central bank and the actual
return on assets. The domestic households labour supply is given by
~Wt =
Nt
C t
; (2.26)
where ~Wt is the real domestic wage. I assume that labour is immobile across coun-
tries. Assuming that the foreign household faces the same maximisation problem,
the Euler equation and the labour supply for a foreign economy are derived anal-
ogously.
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The Asset Market Structure
In my model, I ignore the transaction costs and assume that nancial markets are
such that consumers from either country have access to both domestic and foreign
bonds. The market price of a domestic riskless bond equals the expected nominal
return of the bond, and is given by 1=Rt = Et [Qt;t+1]. Similarly for a foreign bond
expressed in domestic currency, it holds that St= (R

t ) = Et [St+1Qt;t+1]. With no
possibility of arbitrage, the expected returns of these two bonds must be equal,
and the two equations can be combined. Therefore, the uncovered interested parity
holds and is expressed as
Et

Qt;t+1

Rt  
RtSt+1
St

= 0;
where St is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the price of foreign currency
in terms of domestic currency. Using the last equation together with (2.18), the
uncovered interest parity equation can be written as the expected change in the
real exchange rate RSt and the ratio between domestic and foreign real interest
rate
Rt
Rt
Et

t+1
t+1

= Et

RSt+1
RSt

: (2.27)
Under the assumption of complete securities markets with no uncertainty, con-
sumption risk is perfectly shared and the stochastic discount factor, expressed in
the same currency, is equal across the countries. Using the Euler equation (2.25)
and its equivalent for the foreign country, and recalling that the constant subjective
discount factor  is shared by both countries, delivers
Et
"
"t
"t+1

Ct
Ct+1
 
St
St+1
t+1
#
= Et
"
"t
"t+1

Ct
Ct+1
 
t+1
#
. (2.28)
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Using again equation (2.18), (2.28) can be rewritten as a function of the real
exchange rate
Et

RSt+1
RSt

=
Et

Ct+1
Ct+1
  "t+1
"t+1


Ct
Ct
 
"t
"t
:
Given the fact that this equation holds in all periods t, including the steady
state condition of zero net foreign assets and the ex-ante identical environment, I
obtain the optimal risk sharing, under complete nancial markets
RSt = c

Ct
Ct
 
"t
"t
.
The constant c is determined by the initial market equilibrium for state-
contingent bonds, which reects the initial wealth di¤erences. Without loss of
generality, following Galí and Monacelli (2005), I can assume that the initial dis-
tribution of wealth is such that c = 1 and the risk sharing equation can be written
analogously to the one in Tuesta and Rabanal (2006)6
RSt =

Ct
Ct
 
"t
"t
: (2.29)
This equation reects the fact that if power purchasing parity (PPP) holds, e.g.,
RSt = 1, the marginal utility of consumption, i.e. the consumption level is equal
across the countries. However, deviations from PPP imply di¤erent consumption
levels across the two countries caused by the changes in the real exchange rate.
Hence, the ratio of marginal utilities across the two countries is equal to the ratio
of aggregate prices denote here by the real exchange rate.
6This result holds in the case of symmetric perfect foresight steady state and symmetric
initial relative net asset position. Further details in Section 1.5.2 .
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Aggregate Demand for Domestic and Foreign Goods
The total demand for a domestically produced good i consists of the weighted
average of n domestic and (1  n) foreign demand
Yt (i) = nCH;t(i) + (1  n)C

H;t(i).
Using (2.9) and (2.11) together with (2.10) and (2.12), it is possible to express
the demand for good i in terms of price dispersion and the real exchange rate,
where the prices are expressed in domestic currency
Yt (i) =

PH;t (i)
PH;t
 " 
~PH;t
  
Ct +
1  n
n
Ct (RSt)


. (2.30)
Thus, an appreciation of the currency leads to a decrease in output of domestic
good i, Yt (i). Furthermore, the aggregate demand for domestic output can be
written as a sum of the amounts produced domestically of good i
Yt =
0@ 1
n
 1
"
nZ
0
[Yt(i)]
" 1
" di
1A "" 1 .
Plugging this into equation (2.30) together with (2.15), the aggregate demand
in the domestic country yields
Yt =

~PH;t
  
Ct +
1  n
n
Ct (RSt)


; (2.31)
hence the demand for a home-produced good is inversely related to an appreci-
ation of the exchange rate. The reason is that foreign consumption decreases in
terms of the home currency. Therefore, the degree to which appreciation inuences
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the domestic production of good i depends on size of the foreign economy and its
(domestic) openness as much as of the price dispersion given by the elasticities of
substitutions. The higher the elasticity of substitution between domestic and for-
eign goods, the more sensitive the output of the domestic economy to the changes
in the currency.
Combining (2.30) and (2.31), the total demand for good i, written in terms of
domestic aggregate output is
Yt (i) =

PH;t (i)
PH;t
 "
Yt; (2.32)
which depends directly on the aggregate domestic output, the price of good i
relative to the overall domestic price level, as well as the elasticity of substitution
between domestic goods.
Analogously, the total demand for a foreign produced good i is
Y t (i) = nCF;t (i) + (1  n)C

F;t (i)
and can be rewritten as
Y t (i) =
 
P F;t (i)
P F;t
! " 
~P F;t
   n
1  n
(1  )Ct (RSt)
  + (1  )Ct

, (2.33)
where ~P F;t = P

F;t=P

t is the relative foreign producer price index expressed in
foreign currency.
The aggregate demand for foreign output can be written as a sum of the foreign
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production of all goods
Y t =
0@ 1
1  n
 1
"
1Z
n
[Y t (i)]
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
:
Using (2.33) together with (2.16), the aggregate demand for foreign output is given
by
Y t =

~P F;t
   n
1  n
(1  )Ct (RSt)
  + (1  )Ct

. (2.34)
Thus, combining (2.33) and (2.34), I obtain total demand for the foreign good i in
terms of foreign aggregate output
Y t (i) =

~P F;t
 "
Y t , (2.35)
Large Economy versus Small Open Economy
I can rewrite the key equations by assuming that the size of the foreign economy
(domestic) market is su¢ciently large that it is hardly inuenced by the SOE. In
this sense, analogous to Galí and Monacelli (2005), the large economy behaves as
if it is autarkic and its associated economic variables are exogenous from the point
of view of the SOE. Using the denition (2.2) and (2.4), and assuming that the
domestic economy is small, i.e., n ! 0, the aggregate consumption of domestic
and foreign goods given by (2.1) and (2.3) becomes
Ct =
h
(1  )
1
 (CH;t)
 1
 + 
1
 (CF;t)
 1

i 
 1
.
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For the foreign large economy, dened as the rest of the world, the quantity
of imports from the SOE are so marginal that I can assume
Ct = C

F;t.
Given (2.13), the relative domestic price index equation yields
Pt =
h
(1  ) (PH;t)
1  +  (PF;t)
1 
i 1
1 
. (2.36)
Note that for the foreign large economy there is no dispersion between producer
and consumer price index, formally
P t = P

F;t. (2.37)
and it follows from equation (2.34) that the aggregate demand for goods produced
in large foreign economy is given as Y t = C

t .
Thus, the LOP gap (2.17) can be written in terms of real exchange rate and
the terms of trade
	t =
RSt
~PF;t
: (2.38)
The total demand for a generic domestic good i given (2.30)
Yt (i) =

PH;t (i)
PH;t
 " 
~PH;t
 
Ct
h
1  + RS
  1

t
i
(2.39)
depends on the openness of the domestic economy , the price dispersion between
domestic producer and consumer price indexes and the real exchange rate. The
real depreciation of the exchange rate leads to an increase in production of good
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i, the domestic good is cheaper and therefore the consumption of the good abroad
increases. Analogous to the closed economy case, the higher the dispersion between
the price of a particular good i and the domestic price index caused by the price
stickiness, the lower the demand for good i. Additionally, for the SOE, there is
a wedge between producer and consumer price indexes, which lowers domestic
output.
The aggregate demand for domestic goods, assuming all the conditions associ-
ated with a SOE yields
Yt =

~PH;t
 
Ct
h
1  + RS
  1

t
i
: (2.40)
2.3.2 Firm Optimisation: The Phillips Curve
The supply side of the domestic economy consists of two parts. There are producers
and import retailers, both setting prices in the manner described by Calvo (1983)
and Galí and Gertler (1999). As described in Chapter 1, each producer (resp.,
retailer) belongs to one of two types of rms. A measure 1   ! (resp., 1   !F )
set the price optimally, and are labelled f . A measure ! (resp., !F ) set the price
according to a rule-of-thumb, and are labelled b. Firms may face two di¤erent
situations: i) either they are allowed to set their price with probability 1   
(resp., 1  F ); ii) or they are not allowed to do so with probability  (resp., F ).
Hence, at each time t, a measure (1  !) (1  ) (resp., [1  !F ] [1  F ]) sets the
price optimally; a measure ! (1  ) (resp., !F [1  F ]) sets the price according
to a rule-of-thumb; a measure  holds the price unchanged.
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Price Setting Mechanism for Final Goods Producers
First consider one of the (1  !) (1  ) rms in country H that, at time t, are
allowed to set their price optimally. Each producer in this group sets price P ft (i)
to maximise its expected stream of prots Gt (i)
max
P ft (i)
1X
j=0
jEt
h
Qt;t+j

P ft (i)Yt+j (i) Wt+jNt+j (i)
i
;
subject to: Yt+j (i) = At+jNt+j (i) ; and Yt+j (i) =

P ft (i)
PH;t+j
 "
Yt+j;
(2.41)
where At is total factor productivity, and the constraints respectively represent the
production technology, and the demand function (2.32). The rst order condition
for the SOE producers delivers the optimal choice of the forward looking price
P ft (i)
P ft (i)
Pt
1X
j=0
()j Et
"
(Ct+j)
  Yt+j
Pt
Pt+j

PH;t
PH;t+j
 "#
=
"
"  1
1X
j=0
()j Et
"
Yt+j
At+j
+1
PH;t
PH;t+j
 "#
.
Denoting by ~P ft (i) = P
f
t (i) =Pt the relative forward looking price of domestic
rm i, the last equation can be rewritten in terms of di¤erence equations
~P ft (i) =
Jt
Ht
(2.42)
with
Jt = Vt

Yt
At
+1
+ Et [(H;t+1)
" Jt+1] (2.43)
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and
Ht = C
 
t Yt + Et

(H;t+1)
" (t+1)
 1Ht+1

; (2.44)
where  = "= ("  1) is the domestic mark-up. I also introduce the mark-up shock
Vt
log
Vt
V
= v log
Vt 1
V
+ "v;t,
where V is the steady state value of the mark-up innovation and "v;t is an i.i.d.
shock. Given equilibrium on the labour market, the rst expression in (2.43) can
be written in terms of real marginal costs gMCt and the relative domestic price
~PH;t 
Yt
At
+1
= C t Yt
gMCt ~PH;t;
where gMCt =MCt=PH;t. The forward looking price therefore depends on domestic
and CPI ination, and the relative domestic price.
The remaining ! (1  ) domestic rms set prices at time t according to the
rule of thumb, indexing it to the last observed price index. In terms of the rate of
domestic producer ination H;t 1
P bt = H;t 1Xt 1, (2.45)
where Xt 1 denotes an index of the prices set at date t  1, given by
Xt 
h
(1  !)P f
(1 ")
t + !P
b(1 ")
t
i 1
1 "
. (2.46)
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The aggregate producer price level then follows the law of motion
PH;t =

(1  )X1 "t +  (PH;t 1)
1 " 11 " : (2.47)
The set of equations (2.42)-(2.47) constitute the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve, which characterises the producer side of country H. The set of equations
leading to the Phillips curve for country F is derived analogously. The hybrid
NKPC for country F has the same form as in Chapter 1. However, the hybrid
NKPC for country H, because of the dispersion between PPI and CPI, can be
written as a function of the consumer price index and the terms of trade, as shown
by, Benigno and Benigno (2003).
Price Setting Mechanism for Importing Retailers
Following Monacelli (2003), I assume that for retailers, who import di¤erentiated
goods into the domestic economy, the law of one price holds "at the dock". Similar
to the domestic producers, domestic importing retailers also face a downward
sloping demand curve. Under monopolistic competition, they set their prices, in
terms of domestic currency, accordingly. The deviation between the prices of the
imported good in domestic and foreign currency therefore generates a LOP gap.
Consider the F!F share of local retailers importing good j at a cost StP

F;t (i),
and setting the price of the imported good in a domestic currency to maximise
their prots
max
P ft (i)
1X
j=0
jFEt
h
Qt;t+j

P F;ft (i)  StP
F
t (i)

CF;t+j (i)
i
;
subject to: CF;t(i) =
1
1 n

PF;ft (i)
PF;t
 "
CF;t:
(2.48)
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P F;ft (i) is the price of the imported good in domestic currency set by a forward
looking retailer, P Ft (i) is the price of the same good in the currency of the pro-
ducer and F is the probability that this price holds unchanged the next period.
In generally, it is assumed that the parameter F can di¤er from those associated
with producers, denoted by . The problem is solved analogously to the one solved
by the domestic producer. The rst order condition delivers the optimal choice of
the relative forward looking price, ~P F;ft (i) = P
F;f
t (i) =Pt
~P F;ft (i) = Et
266664

1P
j=0
(F)j (Ct+j)
  CF;t+j	t+jV
F
t+j

jQ
k=1
F;t+k
"
~PF;t+j
1P
j=0
(F)j (Ct+j)
  CF;t+j

jQ
k=1
F:t+k
" jQ
k=1
t+k
 1
377775 ;
where I also use equation (2.38). In terms of di¤erence equation, the rst order
condition delivers
~P F;ft (i) =
JFt
HFt
(2.49)
with
JFt = V
F
t C
 
t CF;t	t
~PF;t + (F)Et

(F;t+1)
" JFt+1

; (2.50)
where V Ft is the importers mark up shock, with analogous characteristics as the
producers; and
HFt = C
 
t CF;t + (
F)Et

(F;t+1)
" (t+1)
 1HFt+1

: (2.51)
The remaining !F (1  F ) importers set their prices at time t according to
the rule of thumb by indexing them to the last observed rate of import ination
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F;t 1
P F;bt = F;t 1XF;t 1; (2.52)
where XF;t 1 denotes an index of the prices of imported goods set at date t   1,
given by
XF;t 

(1  !)P F;f
(1 ")
t + !

P F;bt
1 " 11 "
. (2.53)
Assuming that all rms face the same shock, I can write the aggregate importer
price level
PF;t =

(1  )X1 "F;t +  (PF;t 1)
1 " 11 " : (2.54)
Equations (2.49) to (2.54) characterise the import price ination hybrid NKPC.
2.3.3 Steady State and Log-linearised Form of the Model
Before the actual estimation, the equations characterising the non-policy part of
the model should be log-linearised around the steady state, assuming that n! 0.
Monetary policy is described in more details in the next section. In this section,
I assume a perfect-foresight steady state for both economies with zero income
growth and stable technology. Furthermore, I normalise the steady state nominal
exchange rate to unity, formally S = 1. One additional assumption about the
steady state: prices of imports increase at the same rate as prices of domestically
produced goods. Therefore, ination is the same across both countries, so that the
real exchange rate in steady state is stable. This restriction is reasonable because
any equilibrium with an explosive exchange rate would not be sustainable.
Since in the steady state all prices change at the same rate, and the price of
the imports increases at the same rate as the price of the domestically produced
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goods, I can normalise the price indices by imposing PH = PF .
7 Therefore, from
equation (2.13), it follows that the consumer and producer price index are equal,
formally, P = PH . Ination, as well as the relative prices, do not change and it
holds that
H = F =  = 
:
Furthermore, denoting growth factors byG, from the denition of real exchange
rate it follows that
GRS = 1,
which in conjunction with (2.27) leads to
R = R:
Together with (2.17), I can then write
GRS = GS = G	 = 1:
Note that, since in steady state production per capita is equal across countries,
and recalling that the nominal exchange rate equals one, then it must be that price
indices are also equal across countries. Hence, considering also the denition of
the real exchange rate, it follows that
RS = 	 = S = 1:
7This assumption follows De Paoli (2009), the price indices in steady state are normalised
such as PH = PF and P

H =
P F , so that the producer prices are in the steady state the same for
both countries.
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Using (2.29) in steady state, consumption is equalised across countries, and
given by C = C. Market clearing implies Y = C and Y  = C. Given the
previous results, it holds that Y = Y , so the domestic and foreign country have
the same per capita income. Therefore, as long as the production technology is
the same for both countries, N = N.
The structural equations characterising the non-policy part of the model can be
written in the (log-)linearised form around their steady state. Linearising equation
(2.36) denes the relationship between producer and importer relative price
1 = (1  ) ~pH;t + ~pF;t: (2.55)
The relationships between relative producer price and ination and relative
importer price and ination are given respectively by
~pH;t   ~pH;t 1 = ^H;t   ^t (2.56)
and
~pF;t   ~pF;t 1 = ^F;t   ^t: (2.57)
The LOP gap (2.38) and the real exchange rate (2.18), written in rst di¤erence,
are given respectively by
	^t = brst   ~pF;t (2.58)
and
 brst = s^t + ^t   ^t + "rs;t, (2.59)
where I add "rs;t, an unobservable shock, to capture possible measurement error in
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the data and to relax the potentially tight cross-equation restrictions in the model.
The domestic Euler equation (2.25) can be rewritten in terms of deviations
from the steady state as
c^t = Et [c^t+1] 
1

(^{t   Et [^t+1] + Et [t+1]) , (2.60)
where I have used again the approximation log (Rt)  {^t. The term t+1 =
log "t+1   log "t is the rst di¤erences of the structural preference shock. The
linearisation of the uncovered interest parity delivers (2.27)
(^{t   Et [^t+1]) 
 
{^t   Et

^t+1

= Et [ brst+1]  brst: (2.61)
The UIP equation describes the relationship between real interest rate and real
exchange rate.
The optimal risk sharing from equation (2.29) becomes
brst =  (c^t   c^t ) + t   t; (2.62)
where the di¤erence between the world and the domestic preference shock (t   t)
captures the deviations from optimal risk sharing. The risk sharing equation de-
scribes the link between real exchange rate and consumption. Assuming complete
markets, both equations hold, making Euler equation for the domestic country
redundant. The risk sharing equation ensures that the marginal utility is the same
in both countries. Assuming everyone in the world shares the same preferences,
the level of consumption is the same across the countries. Because the UIP holds,
the domestic real interest rate moves along with the interest rate abroad. The
118
UIP ensures that there is no arbitrage between the foreign and domestic nan-
cial markets, thereby determining a relationship that renders the Euler equation
redundant.
The good market clearing condition, represented by (2.40), yields
y^t =  ~pH;t + c^t + 

  
1

 brst: (2.63)
The log-linearisation of the supply side is given in more details in Appendix
2.B and leads to a hybrid NKPC with a non-zero steady state ination
^H;t = 
fEt [^H;t+1] + 
b^H;t 1 + mc (cmct + vt) +  h^t   (y^t   c^t) ; (2.64)
where the real marginal costs cmct = cmcnomt   p^H;t are expressed by
cmct = y^t + c^t   ( + 1) at   ~pH;t (2.65)
and
h^t =
 
1   " 1

(y^t   c^t) + () 
" 1Et
h
"^H;t+1   ^t+1 + h^t+1
i
: (2.66)
Analogously, the NKPC for imported prices can be log-linearised to obtain
^F;t = 
f
FEt [^F;t+1] + 
b
F ^F;t 1 + F
b	t + vFt + F h^Ft    c^Ft   c^t (2.67)
with
h^Ft =
 
1  F " 1
  
c^Ft   c^t

+
 
F

" 1Et
h
"^F;t+1   ^t+1 + h^
F
t+1
i
(2.68)
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and, from (2.11),
c^F;t = c^t   ~pF;t: (2.69)
For country F , the producers NKPC is log-linearised analogously to the pro-
ducers NKPC of the SOE. The large economy works as in autarky, (imports and
exports of this country can be seen as negligible,) so that this NKPC is identical to
the one derived in Chapter 1 (and are reported here for convenience). The market
clearing condition is
y^t = c^

t ; (2.70)
the Euler equation is
c^t = Et

c^t+1

 
1

 
{^t   Et

^t+1

+ Et

"t+1

; (2.71)
the Phillips curve with a backward looking and non-zero ination component is
^t = 

fEt

^t+1

+ b ^

t 1 + 

mc (cmct + vt ) +  hh^t + (   1) y^t i ; (2.72)
where
h^t =
 
1   " 1

(y^t   c^

t ) + ()
" 1Et
h
("  1) ^t+1 + h^t+1
i
(2.73)
and the marginal costs are
cmct = ( + ) y^t   (1 + ) at : (2.74)
To estimate this model all that is needed now is a monetary policy rule. In this
chapter, I use simple interest rate rules of a Taylor type with producer ination
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targeting and consumer ination targeting, and strict exchange rate targeting. The
monetary policy rules are described in more details below.
2.3.4 Monetary Policy Rules
To close the model, I need to specify the policy chosen by the monetary author-
ity. For estimation purposes, most of the recent papers, e.g., Smets and Wouters
(2003), use a generalised Taylor rule, where the central bank systematically re-
sponds to the changes in ination, output and, in the case of a SOE, to the
exchange rate. Analysing the e¤ect of simple rules has some advantages relative
to the optimal monetary policy, as they are more likely to be used in practice be-
cause they are more easily implemented. Additionally, their parameters are more
robust to the model specication than the structural parameters of the optimal
rule. The best known example of a simple nominal interest rate rule is the Taylor
rule, which uses the interest rate as the instrument to implement the policy.
This paper compares a number of di¤erent simple targeting rules of the Taylor
type for both economies. For the relatively large closed economy, three monetary
policy rules are analysed. The rst one is a common Taylor rule with an interest
rate smoothing component, i {^

t 1, which is typically used in the literature to
improve the t of the empirical estimation as it incorporates observed interest rate
persistence. The rule has the following form
{^t = 

i {^

t 1 + 

^

t + 

yy^

t + "

u;t, (2.75)
where "u;t is an exogenous monetary policy shock. Alternatively, following Smets
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and Wouters (2003), the central bank also responds to the speed of ination t
{^t = 

i {^

t 1 + 

^

t + 

yy^

t + 

^

t + "

u;t. (2.76)
The third analysed rule takes the form of the optimal monetary policy rule identi-
ed using a welfare loss function from Chapter 1, where I approximate the optimal
behaviour of the central bank
{^t = 

i {^

t 1 + 

^

t + 

yy^

t + 

1^

t + 

2^

t+1 + 

yy^

t + "

u;t: (2.77)
The aim of using three di¤erent rules is to nd out whether the European
central bank targets acting as the large economy in this model, conducts monetary
policy using a simple Taylor rule (2.75) or incorporates any of the additional terms
in (2.76) and (2.77). I choose the rule that best ts for each case, when modeling
the economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland.
For these small economies I again specify the three main monetary policy rules,
but modied for a SOE. The rst one is similar to (2.76), where in addition to the
traditional Taylor Rule, the central bank targets the change in ination and in the
exchange rate
{^t = i{^t 1 + ^t + yy^t + ^t + Ss^t + "u;t: (2.78)
The second rule is analogous to the rule of optimal type (2.77)
{^t = i{^t 1 + ^t + yy^t + 1^t + 2^t+1 + yy^t + Ss^t + "u;t: (2.79)
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Alternatively, I also assume that the central bank targets exchange rate strictly,
following Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani (2008)
{^t = i{^t 1 + Ss^t + "u;t: (2.80)
I am interested in answering two main questions regarding the monetary policy
rule for a SOE. First, there are many studies that modify the simple instrumental
rule to match the needs of a small open economy. Although the theoretical work
emphasises that a targeting PPI ination performs better in terms of welfare loss,
the empirical literature usually assumes a simple rule with consumer ination
targeting. In fact, by moving the interest rate, the central bank can either target
producer domestic ination or CPI ination. However, Galí and Monacelli (2005)
as well as Sutherland (2002) point out that if the economys non-stochastic steady
state is at its optimum and no (or only very small) cost push distortions are present,
the optimal monetary policy is pure domestic ination targeting (e.g., ^H;t = 0).
Strict producer-price targeting has a smoother e¤ect on domestic variables without
any distortion to the foreign economy. However, Sutherland also argues that when
cost push shocks have larger variance, CPI targeting may obtain better results.
To investigate whether the central bank targets domestic producer ination
instead of CPI ination, I compare (2.78) and (2.79) with the corresponding rules
in terms of PPI ination, simply obtained by replacing ^t with ^H;t, and reported
here for convenience
{^t = i{^t 1 + ^H;t + yy^t + ^H;t + Ss^t + "u;t (2.81)
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and
{^t = i{^t 1+^H;t+yy^t+^H;t+2^H;t+1+yy^t+Ss^t+"u;t: (2.82)
As I show later, in both cases, the di¤erence in the model t is signicant.
Second, following Lubik and Shorfheide (2007), I study to what extent the
central banks of the EEC countries respond not only to the changes in ination
and output, but also to the changes in ination and exchange rate, e.g., whether
the parameter S plays an important rule. I compare the simple rules (2.81) and
(2.82) with their equivalents by assuming that S = 0.
Summary of the model and exogenous disturbances
To summarise, the model consists of a non-policy part determined by equations
(2.55) to (2.74), a monetary policy rule specied above and a set of exogenous
shocks, which follow an autoregressive process given in a log-linearised form.
The country-specic TFP for domestic and foreign country are dened respec-
tively by
at = aat 1 + "a;t;
at = aa

t 1 + "

a;t;
the preference innovations are given for domestic and foreign consumers respec-
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tively by
t = et 1 + "e;t;
t = e

t 1 + "

e;t:
Finally, the cost push for domestic producers and for domestic retailers are ex-
pressed by
vt = vvt 1 + "v;t;
vFt = vF v
F
t 1 + "vF ;t;
whereas for foreign producers they are
vt = vv

t 1 + "

v;t:
The stochastic AR(1) processes are driven by exogenous shocks, of which seven
are white noise, "a;t, "

a;t, "e;t, "

e;t, "v;t, "vF ;t, "

v;t, plus two exogenous monetary
policy shocks, "u;t and "

u;t, and one measurement error, "rs;t.
2.4 Model Estimation and Estimation Results
This section illustrates the estimation of the model, and is divided into three parts.
First, I discuss the Bayesian methodology and estimation technique I use in detail.
Then, after a brief look at the data, I describe my choice of priors in the context
of the existing literature on this eld. Finally, I present the estimation results, in-
cluding the posterior distribution, impulse responses and variance decomposition.
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The estimated model consists of a set of equilibrium equations. All equations
are log-linearised, and the variables are expressed in terms of the deviation from
their respective steady state levels, both for the small and the large economy, as
described in a previous sections. The small open economy case is estimated on
data from the EEC countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
The large economy is represented by Germany.
2.4.1 Methodology
For the empirical analysis of my DSGE model, I adopt a Bayesian estimation ap-
proach, which has many advantages. First, the Bayesian approach allows me to
incorporate priors based on theoretical considerations or other research. Second,
the Bayesian approach is a full information method in contrast to a single equation
method such as GMM and therefore it is more likely to produce better estimates.8
Furthermore, using the estimated log data density of the model, facilitates com-
parisons of the goodness of t of di¤erent models. In comparison to the Gibbs
Sampling method, which I use in Chapter 3 to estimate a structural VAR model,
the estimation of a DSGE model requires a more general algorithm. The reason
is that the conditional posterior distributions are not available. Following most
of the literature, I use a random walk Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to approxi-
mate the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters that I briey describe
below.9
Suppose that the aim is to draw a sample from a target density  (). Note
that  is a (K  1) vector of parameters of interest. The target density is a
8See Linde (2005).
9For more details, see An and Schorfheide (2007) and Blake and Mumtaz (2012).
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posterior distribution, which is too complex to allow a direct sample. Therefore
an indirect method is needed. The steps describing a random walk Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm are the following:
1. Set a prior distribution for each parameter p ().
2. Find the mode of the posterior distribution  () via numerical maximisa-
tion. Denote the estimates of the parameters at the mode by max, and their
covariance matrix, which is the inverse Hessian matrix, by Hmax.
3. To approximate  (), the following algorithm is used:
(a) Specify a candidate density q
 
G+1=G

, where G is an index of draws.
(b) Set the initial estimates of the parameters G with G = 0.
(c) Generate a candidate value G+1 from the candidate density. I use
a random walk version of this algorithm with the candidate density
specied as a random walk, such as
G+1 = G + e;
where e is a K-vector random walk with a normal distribution
e  N (0;) :
(d) Compute the acceptance probability. The candidate G+1 is accepted
with probability , given by
 = min
 

 
G+1

=q
 
G+1=G

 (G) =q (G=G+1)
; 1
!
;
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where the numerator is the target density evaluated at the new draw
of the parameters 
 
G+1

relative to the candidate density evalu-
ated at the new draw parameters q
 
G+1=G

, and the denominator is
the same expression evaluated at the previous draw of the parameters.
Again, using a random walk version together with the fact that the
normal distribution is symmetric, the acceptance probability simplies
to
 = min
 

 
G+1

 (G)
; 1
!
:
Step 3 is repeatedM times. The rst (M J) iterations are discarded. The last
J draws are instead retained to estimate the posterior marginal distribution. For
the results, I use four chains of M = 200; 000 draws, each starting from a di¤erent
value. From each chain, the last J = 0:55M draws are used to approximate the
empirical distribution of the parameters.
Note that using Gibbs sampling, used in Chapter 3, the probability  is equal
to 1 for every draw, because the target density is known and identical for all draws.
However, using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, the acceptance rate depends
on the variance , which is set manually. It holds that the higher the variance,
the more volatile the drawings. Therefore, a lower acceptance is to be expected
in this case. On the other hand, if  is set too low, the volatility of the drawings
is low as well. Therefore, the estimation of the parameters is likely to be close to
the prior. Drawing a random number u from a uniform distribution u  U (0; 1),
it holds that the candidate G+1 is accepted if  > u, otherwise it is rejected.
The acceptance rate, given as the ratio between the accepted draws and the
total number of draws, should lie between 20% and 40%. Some researchers are more
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specic and suggest that, for multivariate estimations, the acceptance rate should
optimally be set to approximately 23%. The convergence of the chains is checked
according to a Brooks and Gelman (1998) convergence diagnostic. The visual
comparison between chains variance of the main results for selected estimations
are shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and described in more details in Section 2.4.3.
I use posterior odds test to compare the performance across models. Assume
the null hypothesis that a model M1 is preferred to a model M2. The marginal
data density is given for M1 by 0;T , and for M2 by 1;T . The posterior odds test
is computed as the ratio of the marginal data density of M1 to M2. Following
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), the posterior odds can be interpreted as follows:

0;T
1;T
> 1, the null hypothesis is supported;
 1 >
0;T
1;T
> 10 1=2, there is only indecisive evidence against the null hypoth-
esis;
 10 1=2 >
0;T
1;T
> 10 1, there is substantial evidence against the null hypoth-
esis;
 10 1 >
0;T
1;T
> 10 3=2, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis;
 10 3=2 >
0;T
1;T
> 10 2, there is very strong evidence against the null hypoth-
esis;
 10 2 >
0;T
1;T
, there is decisive evidence against the null hypothesis.
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2.4.2 Choice of Prior
The model represented in the theoretical part of this chapter has 27 endogenous
macro variables and for the empirical estimation I use 9 time series. It is based on
a data sample over the period 1996 to 2012 for Germany and the Czech Republic,
and 1998 to 2012 for Hungary and Poland. The sources of the raw data are
Datastream and the Fred database and the details on each of the particular time
series are given in Appendix 2.A. I use variables that are common in the literature,
such as ination, output growth, interest and exchange rate. Additionally, I follow
Sbordone (2002) and Galí and Gertler (1999), who estimate the NKPC using unit
labour costs as a proxy for real marginal costs. Most of the empirical papers take
the marginal costs as a latent variable and, as Schorfheide (2008) describes, the
estimation results on the NKPC parameters may vary signicantly, however these
authors show that unit labour costs are more appropriate measure for the NKPC
than the output gap. Additionally, it is worth to mention, that the number of time
series is lower than number of shocks to prevent problem of stochastic singularity.
The corresponding measurement equation is given as
Yt =

OBSH;t Y
OBS
t MC
OBS
t i
OBS
t S
OBS
t 
OBS
t Y
OBS
t MC
OBS
t i
OBS
t
T
=

 0 0 R 0  0 0 R
T
+

H;t y^t y^t 1 mct mct 1 it st st 1 

t y^

t y^

t 1 mc

t mc

t 1 i

t
T
Note that for the A1 approach, the value of steady state domestic and foreign
ination  =  is nil.
I choose Bayesian estimation over maximum likelihood estimation because it
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permits me to incorporate a prior distribution. Incorporating priors means intro-
ducing additional general information about subjective beliefs of the parameter
distribution, or information coming from previous econometric and theoretical
studies. In the case that just a small sample of data is available, a prior distri-
bution is additional information that enables more stability in the optimisation
algorithm. However, selecting an appropriate prior is one of the most di¢cult
tasks associated with the use of the Bayesian approach.
I use German data to estimate the parameters for the large economy. The
selection of the prior distribution follows closely Smets andWouters (2003), and are
represented in Table 2.1. For parameters that are restricted to the interval (0; 1),
I use a Beta distribution. Non-negative parameters are then Gamma distributed.
As for the autoregressive parameters of the shocks, I use a Beta distribution with
a mean of 0:8 and a standard deviation of 0:1. The variances of the shocks are
inverse gamma, with prior distribution 2    1(1; 10). The standard errors are
set such that the domain covers a reasonable range of parameter values.
The priors for the interest rate rule coe¢cients have rather wide condence
intervals. They are distributed around a mean given by the Taylor rule, following
Lubik and Schorfheide (2005). Additionally, the prior distribution for the parame-
ter  has a lower bound of one, to satisfy the Taylor principle. Priors for the rest
of the parameters in the monetary policy rule are Gamma distributed, with mean
and standard error as those chosen by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2005).
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Parameter Distribution Mean Standard error
 ("a) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("e) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("v) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("u) Inverse Gamma 1 10
a Beta 0:8 0:1
e Beta 0:8 0:1
v Beta 0:8 0:1
i Beta 0:5 0:2
 Gamma 1:5 0:1
y Gamma 0:125 0:05
1 Gamma 0:3 0:1
2 Gamma 0:3 0:1
y Gamma 0:0625 0:05
f Beta 0:5 0:2
b Beta 0:5 0:2
mc Gamma 0:1 0:05
 Normal 0 0:05
 Gamma 1:005 0:003
Table 2.1: Prior Distribution for Large Economy
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Parameter Distribution Mean Standard error
 ("a) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("e) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("u) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("v) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("vF ) Inverse Gamma 1 10
 ("rs) Inverse Gamma 1 10
a Beta 0:8 0:1
e Beta 0:8 0:1
v Beta 0:8 0:1
vF Beta 0:8 0:1
i Beta 0:5 0:2
 Gamma 1:5 0:1
y Gamma 0:125 0:05
1 Gamma 0:3 0:1
2 Gamma 0:3 0:1
y Gamma 0:0625 0:05
S Gamma 0:3 0:1
f Beta 0:5 0:2
b Beta 0:5 0:2
mc Gamma 0:1 0:05
 Normal 0 0:05
fF Beta 0:5 0:2
bF Beta 0:5 0:2
F Gamma 0:1 0:05
F Normal 0 0:05
 Gamma 1:005 0:003
Table 2.2: Prior Distribution for Small Open Economy
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Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), I estimate the composite structural
coe¢cients of the NKPC rather than the underlying primitives, to avoid identi-
cation issues. The values of the NKPC parameters b, f and mc reported in the
literature are controversial. Therefore, the priors chosen here are consistent with
the middle case, with a standard deviation large enough to ensure that the estimate
is mainly determined by the data. Consistent with Lubik and Schorfheide (2007),
the parameters b, f are beta distributed, and the parameter mc is gamma dis-
tributed. The minimum level of the prior is consistent with the ndings by Galí
and Gertler (1999). The parameter  is normally distributed around a zero mean,
since it might take both positive and negative values. The prior of the ination
trend  is gamma distributed around the average of the trend value, given by the
HP lter, and it is lower-bounded at one. For Germany, the average ination of
the estimated sample corresponds to  = 1:005.
The parameters for the SOE have similar priors as those for the closed economy.
The priors for the importer NKPC parameter are set analogously to the producer
NKPC. The prior for S is gamma distributed, with mean equal to 0:3. The steady
state ination  is the trend ination given the HP lter for the observed period.
It is the same for the Czech Republic and Germany, and for Hungary and Poland,
it corresponds to  = 1:0153 and  = 1:0154, respectively. The degree of openness
 is set to 0:6 for the Czech Republic, corresponding to the average Import/GDP
ratio over the data sample. For Hungary and Poland, it is set to be 0:7 and 0:36,
respectively.
Most of the parameters are not imposed to be the same for all countries, but
it is merely assumed that they have identical priors. This also mirrors the fact
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that the countries have a similar economic history and have undergone similar
structural changes since the end of the Cold War. Some parameters are identical
for all countries. For example, the parameter , which is xed and not estimated.
Instead I follow the convention and set it at 0:99.
2.4.3 Estimation Results
The composite structural parameters are estimated in two steps. The rst step con-
tains the estimation of the model for the closed economy, obtained using German
data. The estimation for Germany can also be seen as the empirical estimation
of the model from Chapter 1. In this part, I focus on three main issues. First, I
generally estimate the NKPC for Germany, and show the importance of the back-
ward looking component. Second, I am interested in whether the estimate for 
is signicant. In other words, if the assumption of non-zero ination in steady
state improves the t to the data. The third issue, which is important for further
estimation and analysis of di¤erent simple rules, is to nd the one rule that ts
best the German data.
In the second part, the model for the SOE is estimated, using the data from
EEC. I use the best tting monetary policy rule for the closed economy, and es-
timate domestic and foreign parameters using EEC and German data together.
Along with the estimates for the SOE Phillips curve, where I analyse the im-
portance of the non-zero ination part of the Phillips curve given by parameters
 and F t, I wish to identify what monetary policy ts the data best. There-
fore, I rst investigate whether the EEC central bank responds to a CPI ination,
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Monetary policy rule Log Data Density Posterior odds
A1 A2
Rule 1 (2.75)  178:15  173:8 0:013
Rule 2 (2.76)  170:67  161:55 0:000
Rule 3 (2.77)  166:39  156:05 0:000
Table 2.3: Posterior Odd Test
Note: the table reports posterior odds test for German data on the hypothesis
H0:  = 0 against the alternative 

 6= 0.
I then show that the data suggests that PPI ination targeting performs better.
I then concentrate on understanding how important are the exchange rate move-
ments in the simple rules for the central bank, and whether the EEC central banks
systematically respond to such changes.
Results for Germany
In this section, I use three di¤erent simple rules for the closed economy, specied
in (2.75), (2.76) and (2.77). I estimate each of them applying two di¤erent ap-
proaches, to assess the importance of the estimation of the non-zero steady state
ination part in the NKPC. The rst approach (A1) assumes that the steady state
ination is zero, as is common in the literature, which leads to a backward look-
ing NKPC with  = 0. The second approach (A2) estimates the parameter 


as well as the steady state ination . The log marginal data densities and the
odds for these two specications are portrayed in Table 2.3. The chains converge
to the target distribution for all estimations. Figure 2.1 reports the convergence
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Figure 2.1: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic for Germany
diagnostic for the estimation using the second approach and rule (2.77). There are
three measures in each gure. Interval refers to an 80 % condence interval around
mean, m2 refers to the variance measure and m3 is based on the third moment of
the aggregate measure. The convergence of the chains to the target distribution
occurs if the between-chain measure (blue line) and the within-chain measure (red
line) are relatively constant and converge.
Two results emerge from the analysis of the log marginal likelihood and pos-
terior odds. First, the estimation of the model with the second approach improves
the t to the data relatively to imposing a steady state rate of ination that is
zero. The posterior odds show that the hypothesis H0 of the steady state zero
137
ination can be rejected. Thus, this approach is used also for the SOE estimation
in step 2. Second, the monetary policy rule (2.77) is clearly the best t for the
data. It follows that the more complex the rule is, the better the performance of
the model. The traditional Taylor rule from (2.75) performs worse, whereas the
"optimal" simple rule ts the data best. This evidence suggests that the central
bank takes into account all the elements following from the welfare maximisation
of the loss function, as derived in presence of backward looking rms, as done
in Chapter 1. Given the log density, it is shown that including ination change
targeting improves the t signicantly.
The Bayesian estimated posterior distribution, based on the second approach
and the monetary rule (2.77), is reported in Table 2.4. The table displays the
mode and standard error resulting from the posterior maximisation. It also details
the estimation results obtained through the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, such
as the posterior mean and the 90% posterior probability interval for both the
estimated parameters and the standard deviation of shocks.
For all values, the highest posterior density intervals suggest that the esti-
mated parameters are not equal to zero. Focusing on the two parameters that
show how important is the non-zero steady state ination, Table 2.4 shows that
my estimation proposes a value around 0:2 for parameter , which is higher than
that assumed in the prior distribution; and a value around 1:005 for the estimated
trend ination , implying a steady state rate of ination of 2% percent per year.
The values are robust and lie in the condence interval using both approaches.
The estimates for the parameter  are lower when assuming the simple Taylor
rule (2.75)  around 0:13 for both approaches. For the remaining two other rules,
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Parameter Mode S.D. 10% Mean 90%
 ("a) 1.0194 0.0790 0.9022 1.0321 1.1597
 ("e) 5.5972 0.6983 3.0235 6.8599 11.2815
 ("v) 0.3324 0.0515 0.28711 0.3526 0.4181
 ("u) 0.5434 0.0417 0.3976 0.5278 0.6536
a 0.9944 0.0052 0.9866 0.9924 0.9985
e 0.9802 0.0064 0.9699 0.9802 0.9937
v 0.8417 0.0128 0.7074 0.8168 0.9313
i 0.9588 0.0256 0.8988 0.9418 0.9892
 1.4353 0.0316 1.3081 1.4642 1.6021
y 0.0199 0.0055 0.0100 0.0232 0.0361
1 0.5348 0.0195 0.2440 0.4504 0.6584
2 0.3584 0.0328 0.1939 0.3845 0.5728
y 0.0716 0.0074 0.0084 0.0995 0.1724
f 0.9452 0.0352 0.8041 0.8970 0.9889
b 0.3026 0.0566 0.1288 0.2717 0.4158
mc 0.4861 0.0110 0.4860 0.6213 0.7924
 0.2709 0.0244 0.1569 0.2248 0.2975
 1.0033 0.0005 1.0006 1.0045 1.0083
Table 2.4: Parameter Estimation Results for Germany
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Log Data Density Czech Rep. Hungary Poland
A2 CPI targeting, S > 0 Rule 1 (2.78)  659:26  630:38  740:57
Rule 2 (2.79)  659:94  633:51  723:96
PPI targeting, S > 0 Rule 1 (2.81)  637:50  603:98  714:12
Rule 2 (2.82)  640:11  595:45  705:25
PPI targeting, S = 0 Rule 1  641:27  602:56  711:64
Rule 2  648:80  594:13  705:05
Pure exchange rate Rule 3 (2.80)  706:85  630:78  842:91
A1 PPI targeting, S > 0 Rule 2 (2.82)  646:27  604:06  721:94
Table 2.5: Marginal Data Densities under Di¤erent Approaches and Monetary Policy
Rules Regimes
the values are surprisingly stable, and lie between 0:22 and 0:26. The result for
the steady state ination  is very similar for all three monetary policy rules in
the second approach.
My estimate suggests a value of lagged ination b of around 0:3, in line with
other empirical ndings such as Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler, and
Lopez-Salido (2001). With the exception of the cost push shock, all the autore-
gressive parameters for the shocks are estimated to be higher than the value of
0:8 assumed in the prior distribution. Surprisingly, the TFP shock is also very
persistent, with the AR parameter around 0:99, a much higher value than the 0:83
estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). Moreover, the monetary policy rules pa-
rameters are very robust and they all lie, independent of the estimation approach
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and rule, in the condence interval given in Table 2.4. These parameters are all
consistent with the values found in the literature.
Results for European Emerging Markets
In this section, I analyse the monetary policy rules for the SOE from Section 2.3.4.
I use di¤erent assumptions to understand the behavior of the central banks in the
EEC. The summary of the marginal data densities from the di¤erent estimations
can be found in Table 2.5. The results of the estimations are explained below.
I report the results obtained using the second approach outlined in the previous
subsection, i.e., assuming that the steady state ination di¤ers from zero, which
provides signicantly better results than those delivered by the rst approach.10 It
is straightforward to demonstrate that a pure exchange rate targeting policy can
be rejected as the policy being implemented by at least two of the three countries,
since this rule performs the worst for both Czech and Polish data. Adolfson et al.
(2008) reach a similar conclusion investigating the Swedish economy.
Finally I test whether the central bank targets CPI or PPI ination. The
results of the posterior odds test, with a null hypothesis that the central bank
is focusing on CPI ination rather the PPI ination, are displayed in Table 2.6.
The null hypothesis can be rejected for both rules and all countries. I can thus
conclude that there is a clear evidence in favor of PPI ination targeting over CPI
ination targeting. This is in line with the theoretical literature, which shows that
responding to the PPI ination rather than the CPI delivers lower welfare losses.
10For comparison purposes, the best t obtained using the rst method is also reported.
141
Rule 1 Rule 2
H0 H1 Post. Odds H0 H1 Post. Odds
Czech Rep  659:26  637:50 0:000  659:94  640:11 0:000
Hungary  630:38  603:98 0:000  633:51  595:45 0:000
Poland  740:57  714:12 0:000  723:96  705:25 0:000
Table 2.6: Posterior Odd Test
Notes: hypothesis H0 that the central bank uses a CPI ination targeting (2.78)
and (2.79) vs hypothesis H1 that the central bank uses (2.81) and (2.82).
I then perform the posterior odds test to show how important it is to include the
non-zero component into the Phillips curve. Similar to what I did for Germany, I
estimate the model for both rules (2.81) and (2.82). On the one hand, I assume
that  = 0. On other hand, my estimations are obtained when assuming that
 6= 0. The marginal data densities displayed in Table 2.7 suggest that including
an estimation of  improves the t to the data. The posterior odds ratio is zero
in all cases, rejecting the null hypothesis that  equals zero for all three countries.
Furthermore, I am interested in whether the central bank responds to changes
in the exchange rate. To answer this question, I follow Lubik and Schorfeide (2007)
and rst estimate both rules (2.81) and (2.82) assuming that S > 0. Second, I
estimate the same rules, but assume that the central bank is not interested in
exchange rate targeting, and set S = 0. The null hypothesis is that the central
bank does not respond to the exchange rate changes. The results for both the
TR2 and TR3 rule are given in Table 2.8. The null hypothesis can be rejected
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H0 H1 Posterior Odds
Czech Rep  646:27  640:11 0:002
Hungary  604:06  595:45 0:000
Poland  721:94  705:25 0:000
Table 2.7: Posterior Odd Test
Note: The table reports posterior odds test for EEC on the
hypothesis H0:  = 0 and F = 0 against the alternative
 6= 0 and F 6= 0.
only for the Czech Republic. This suggests that the Czech National Bank targets
the exchange rate, but the Central Banks of Hungary and Poland do not.
The estimated parameters are similar for all three countries. They can be
found in Tables 2.9 - 2.11. For the estimation using the second approach, with
reference to the Czech Republic, the convergence diagnostic is illustrated in Figure
2.2.11. As the convergence diagnostics suggest, all the chains converge to the target
distribution. The backward looking component for producer ination lies between
0:2 and 0:35 for all countries. Compared to Germany, the non-zero steady state
ination component is lower, but still positive and signicantly di¤erent from
zero. For the retailers Phillips curve, the parameter F is slightly negative for
Czech Republic and Hungary, and all are signicantly di¤erent from zero. The
prior distribution, the posterior distribution and the posterior mode of these two
parameters is visually illustrated in Figure 2.3 and 2.4.
11The remaining diagnostic illustrations are available from the author upon request.
143
H0 H1 Posterior Odds
Czech Rep  641:27  637:50 0:023
Hungary  602:56  603:98 4:161
Poland  711:64  714:12 11:876
Table 2.8: Posterior Odd Test
Note: The table reports posterior odds test for EEC on the
hypothesis H0: S = 0 against the alternative S 6= 0.
Finally, the monetary policy rule parameters are close to those reported in the
literature. The central bank of all three countries respond much more actively to
ination (both to current and past changes) than to output (and its change). The
estimates for exchange rate targeting in the monetary policy rule are higher, for all
the three countries, than the prior values. (czS = 0:14, 
Hun
S = 0:15, 
Pol
S = 0:11).
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Parameter Mode S.D. 10% Mean 90%
 ("a) 0.7227 0.1556 0.5380 0.7714 0.9883
 ("e) 3.0276 0.4826 2.3178 3.1085 3.9074
 ("u) 1.5490 0.1977 1.2970 1.6581 2.0258
 ("v) 1.7389 0.2642 1.3114 1.5946 1.8639
 ("vF ) 10.7510 3.0950 0.2225 10.6040 20.3485
 ("rs) 4.9429 0.4970 4.2216 5.0141 5.7741
a 0.9247 0.0110 0.7732 0.8873 0.9888
e 0.8766 0.0176 0.8282 0.8763 0.9307
v 0.7025 0.0237 0.6174 0.7254 0.8318
vF 0.8752 0.0225 0.7582 0.8508 0.9686
i 0.9256 0.0416 0.8079 0.8948 0.9843
 1.3994 0.0314 1.3291 1.4661 1.6052
y 0.0539 0.0176 0.0229 0.0640 0.1049
1 0.3508 0.0376 0.2291 0.3760 0.5248
2 0.3387 0.0239 0.1735 0.3276 0.4908
y 0.1024 0.0118 0.0013 0.0476 0.0929
S 0.1392 0.0210 0.0871 0.1440 0.2050
f 0.9077 0.0364 0.6890 0.8258 0.9671
b 0.3063 0.0318 0.1148 0.2788 0.4334
mc 0.2922 0.0123 0.3357 0.4149 0.5098
 0.1036 0.0191 0.0130 0.0770 0.1472
fF 0.6355 0.1010 0.2573 0.5403 0.7991
bF 0.1928 0.0260 0.0628 0.2377 0.3873
F 0.0586 0.0104 0.0202 0.0691 0.1214
F 0.0076 0.0080 -0.0989 -0.0126 0.0709
 1.0041 0.0004 1.0007 1.0053 1.0097
Table 2.9: Parameter Estimation Results for the Czech Republic
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Parameter Mode S.D. 10% Mean 90%
 ("a) 0.5770 0.1148 0.5589 0.7989 1.0704
 ("e) 6.5825 0.5749 5.2662 6.6646 8.0768
 ("u) 1.9111 0.2379 1.6213 2.0654 2.4917
 ("v) 1.7238 0.2345 1.3308 1.6808 2.0113
 ("vF ) 10.5052 1.1955 0.2216 1.9184 5.2044
 ("rs) 7.0219 0.4958 5.8129 6.9522 8.0079
a 0.7869 0.0202 0.8477 0.9042 0.9626
e 0.9143 0.0089 0.8872 0.9088 0.9314
v 0.6560 0.0097 0.5739 0.6655 0.7501
vF 0.8515 0.0160 0.7020 0.8312 0.9723
i 0.8868 0.0174 0.7804 0.8709 0.9634
 1.5100 0.0351 1.3622 1.5075 1.6407
y 0.0404 0.0060 0.0185 0.0522 0.0854
1 0.2777 0.0253 0.1725 0.2758 0.3749
2 0.4318 0.0206 0.1201 0.3077 0.4223
y 0.0510 0.0095 0.0004 0.0372 0.0748
S 0.1451 0.0107 0.0772 0.1521 0.2302
f 0.8227 0.0357 0.6184 0.7971 0.9564
b 0.3723 0.0468 0.1998 0.3399 0.4819
mc 0.4320 0.0090 0.4160 0.4889 0.5653
 0.0741 0.0056 -0.0210 0.0565 0.1283
fF 0.4061 0.0358 0.0880 0.4329 0.7770
bF 0.2545 0.0164 0.0394 0.2188 0.3606
F 0.0843 0.0076 0.0105 0.0493 0.0873
F -0.0715 0.0041 -0.1092 -0.0415 0.0235
 1.0097 0.0004 1.0017 1.0062 1.0102
Table 2.10: Parameter Estimation Results for Hungary
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Parameter Mode S.D. 10% Mean 90%
 ("a) 1.1451 0.1256 0.8682 1.0746 1.2679
 ("e) 7.0226 0.7007 5.1819 6.5509 7.8704
 ("u) 1.5254 0.2327 1.3060 1.6315 1.9452
 ("v) 1.3775 0.1799 1.0422 1.2815 1.5081
 ("vF ) 0.4572 0.4848 0.2284 0.8527 1.5687
 ("rs) 6.9759 0.5465 5.9946 7.0510 8.0882
a 0.9627 0.0101 0.9144 0.9471 0.9807
e 0.9128 0.0103 0.8989 0.9181 0.9394
v 0.7359 0.0133 0.4996 0.6548 0.7981
vF 0.8895 0.0180 0.7818 0.8811 0.9770
i 0.8601 0.0267 0.5576 0.7165 0.8671
 1.5237 0.0138 1.3934 1.5019 1.6300
y 0.0599 0.0082 0.0452 0.0866 0.1357
1 0.3017 0.0165 0.1375 0.2259 0.3056
2 0.3714 0.0260 0.1770 0.3229 0.4748
y 0.0939 0.0106 0.0055 0.1105 0.2116
S 0.1120 0.0343 0.0702 0.1127 0.1551
f 0.9221 0.0200 0.6402 0.7843 0.9490
b 0.3732 0.0375 0.1794 0.3276 0.4820
mc 0.4439 0.0137 0.4857 0.5697 0.6630
 0.0665 0.0109 0.0174 0.0800 0.1756
fF 0.3279 0.0369 0.3319 0.5075 0.7006
bF 0.3022 0.0486 0.4359 0.5423 0.6778
F 0.0373 0.0053 0.0010 0.0106 0.0188
F 0.0509 0.0107 -0.0115 0.0415 0.1096
 1.0025 0.0006 1.0006 1.0035 1.0062
Table 2.11: Parameter Estimation Results for Poland
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Figure 2.2: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic for the Czech Republic
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Germany Czech Republic
Hungary Poland
Figure 2.3: Prior and Posterior Distribution and Posterior Mode for the Parameter 
149
Czech Republic Hungary
Poland
Figure 2.4: Prior and Posterior Distribution and Posterior Mode for the Parameter F
Impulse Response Functions Analysis
In this section, I explain how the endogenous variables such as ination, output,
interest rate and real exchange rate respond to each structural shock over next
10 periods (i.e., 2.5 years). The responses are illustrated in Figures 2.5-2.13 and,
because of the similarities in the dynamic behavior of the three EEC, I only report
the results of the estimates relative to the Czech Republic.12 In what follows, I
12The quantitative di¤erence between A1 and A2 approach, i.e., model with zero steady state
ination and with trend ination, can be found in Appendix 2.C.
150
Rule 1, CPI targeting Rule 2, CPI targeting
Rule 1, PPI targeting Rule 2, PPI targeting
Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses to a Domestic TFP shock
compare the monetary policy rules in (2.78)-(2.79) and (2.81)-(2.82) to identify
potential di¤erences between CPI and PPI ination targeting. The solid line is
the median response, and the area within the dashed lines represents the 90% HPD
interval.
Figure 2.5 displays the responses of the domestic variables to a positive domes-
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tic TFP shock. Independently of the monetary policy rule, output reacts positively
to the TFP shock, and stronger than all other variables. This result can be in-
terpreted as follows. An increase in productivity leads to lower marginal costs,
hence to a decrease in producer prices and domestic PPI ination. Therefore, the
relative prices of imported good increase, and the aggregate demand shifts towards
the cheaper domestic goods. This, in turn, implies a rise in domestic aggregate
output. Foreign ination relates positively to a change in LOP gap, which is a
function of the real exchange rate and the foreign (relative) price. A rise in real
exchange rate leads to an increase in LOP gap, whereas a higher ~pFt implies a
lower LOP gap. As a result, the LOP gap increases less than proportionally with
the shock, leading to a modest rise in imported ination. CPI ination, given by
the combination of domestic and foreign ination, decreases overall since the drop
in the producer prices variation entails stronger e¤ects than the higher imported
ination.
In response to lower ination, the central bank opts for an expansionary mon-
etary policy, which implies a fall in the interest rate. Because the interest rate
of the large economy remains constant, but the uncovered interest parity holds,
the nominal and real exchange rate depreciates. These results are in line with the
theoretical ndings in Galí and Monacelli (2005).
It also follows from Figure 2.5 that the overall ination decreases more in the
case of CPI ination targeting than with PPI ination targeting. The reason is
that when producer ination is targeted, it uctuates less and therefore the price
for the domestic good is more stable. The decrease in PPI ination is partly o¤set
by the increase in imported ination and thus, overall ination is less volatile than
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Monetary Shock
in the case of CPI targeting. It may also be noted that output and real exchange
rate vary only marginally, regardless the choice of the policy target.
The responses to a domestic monetary shock are presented in Figure 2.6. An
unexpected increase in the interest rate leads to a lower aggregate output. First, a
higher interest rate implies a higher return on domestic assets, and therefore makes
the domestic currency more attractive. The nominal appreciation, making imports
cheaper, leads to a drop in the demand for domestic goods. In turn, a downward
shift in demand for domestic goods results in lower ination and aggregate output.
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Rule 1, CPI targeting Rule 2, CPI targeting
Rule 1, PPI targeting Rule 2, PPI targeting
Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Producer Cost Push Shock
Figure 2.7 plots the responses to a domestic cost push shock. This shock immedi-
ately increases producer ination. The higher relative domestic price reduces the
overall demand for domestic good, and therefore results in a drop in aggregate
domestic output. Overall ination also increases. Thus, the central bank reacts by
raising the interest rate, which leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate and,
furthermore, depresses the competitiveness of the domestic goods in the interna-
tional markets. Also in the case of a cost push shock, overall ination is less volatile
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Rule 1, CPI targeting Rule 2, CPI targeting
Rule 1, PPI targeting Rule 2, PPI targeting
Figure 2.8: Impulse Responses to an Importer Cost Push Shock
if the central bank directly targets producer ination. The initial response of the
aggregate output, however, is seemingly independent of the policy rule adopted.
In the presence of an importer cost push shock, the di¤erence between the PPI
ination and CPI ination targeting is more obvious than in the previous cases.
Depending on the rule, the very dynamics of the main economic variables change.
The impulse responses are illustrated in Figure 2.8. An importer cost push shock
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Rule 1, CPI targeting Rule 2, CPI targeting
Rule 1, PPI targeting Rule 2, PPI targeting
Figure 2.9: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Preference Shock
increases immediately the ination of the imported goods. Thus, the price of
these goods increases relative to the price of the domestically produced goods.
Imports fall, and overall domestic consumption decreases, increasing the marginal
utility of consumption. However, a rise in domestic production occurs, due to
a higher domestic demand for domestic goods. Given the fact that the agents
desire to diversify risk, the real exchange rate appreciates, which reduces com-
petitive advantage on the international market. Therefore, the resulting e¤ect on
the domestic output is ambiguous. In the case of PPI targeting, the response of the
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Rule 1, CPI targeting Rule 2, CPI targeting
Rule 1, PPI targeting Rule 2, PPI targeting
Figure 2.10: Impulse Responses to a Foreign TFP Shock
central bank to the rising ination is milder. As a result, output slightly increases,
but this also implies a substantial rise in ination. Under CPI targeting, the central
bank intervention is stronger: this entails lower output, but ination growth is very
small.
A domestic demand shock, illustrated in Figure 2.9, increases overall consump-
tion. Since agents share risk internationally, the resulting decrease in the marginal
utility of consumption implies an appreciation in the domestic currency, and there-
fore an increase in relative domestic price. As a consequence, the LOP gap de-
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creases, and so does imported ination. The demand for domestic goods decreases,
whereas demand for foreign goods increases more than proportionally. With the
increase in consumption, the marginal utility of consumption decreases and the
wage increases. This is due to the fact that when agents optimise they equate the
ratio of marginal disutility of labour to the marginal utility of consumption and
also to the real wage. This would imply that whenever consumption increases,
agents tend to lower their labour supply for a given wage. Since in equilibrium
labour does not decrease su¢ciently to keep the ratio constant, the real wage
grows. This leads to an increase in marginal costs which is partly o¤set due to the
increase in the relative domestic price. Finally, an increase in marginal costs leads
to a rise in producer ination. The overall rate of ination increases. Thus, the
central bank tightens its policy by increasing the interest rate.
If a TFP shock hits a foreign large economy, the rate of ination in that country
falls, domestic aggregate output increases, and the central bank lowers the interest
rate. The impact on the domestic variables is shown in Figure 2.10. The domestic
currency appreciates relative to the foreign currency. The relative price for foreign
good decrease, hence demand shifts toward the foreign produced goods. Foreign
ination lowers (decrease in LOP gap) and domestic ination rises (increase in
real wage, real marginal costs). In the case of PPI targeting, the overall ination
may fall, however by CPI targeting, the CPI ination increases initially. After the
initial drop, the output decreases further as a consequence of the rise in the interest
rate, having its trough in the second to third period, and afterwards returning back
to its equilibrium very slowly.
A positive foreign monetary policy shock, illustrated in Figure 2.11, causes an
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Rule 1, CPI targeting Rule 2, CPI targeting
Rule 1, PPI targeting Rule 2, PPI targeting
Figure 2.11: Impulse Responses to a Foreign Monetary Shock
immediate appreciation in the foreign currency. The domestic currency depre-
ciates and, as a consequence, the domestic goods become cheaper relative to the
foreign one. Thus, the demand for domestic good increases and so does aggregate
domestic output. The overall ination rises as well, as a consequence of an in-
crease in domestic ination. Therefore, the central bank opts for a contractionary
monetary policy, which entails a return of the exchange rate quickly - after two
periods - back to its equilibrium.
Figure 2.12 shows that a foreign cost push shock leads to a currency depreci-
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Rule 1, CPI targeting Rule 2, CPI targeting
Rule 1, PPI targeting Rule 2, PPI targeting
Figure 2.12: Impulse Responses to a Foreign Cost Push Shock
ation and a rise in domestic aggregate output. For the large foreign economy, the
shock leads to an increase in ination and a drop in consumption and output.
The central bank increases the interest rate. As a consequence, the domestic cur-
rency depreciates and domestic goods gain a relative price advantage, which results
in a demand shift toward domestic goods. Domestic aggregate output increases,
but overall domestic consumption falls due to higher prices. This leads to a de-
crease in the real wage, and a drop in the real marginal costs. Thus, PPI ination
decreases. Overall ination decreases if it is subject to the central banks targeting.
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Rule 2, PPI targetingRule 1, PPI targeting
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Figure 2.13: Impulse Responses to a Foreign Preference Shock
Nevertheless, if the central bank targets PPI ination, the overall ination may
increase, since the rise in foreign ination outweighs the e¤ect of the decrease in
PPI ination. All in all, the central bank decreases the interest rate in response
to a foreign cost push shock.
Similarly to a foreign cost push shock, the foreign demand shock increases do-
mestic output. Foreign consumption initially increases, leading to a lower marginal
utility of consumption in the large economy and the foreign central bank reacts
with an increase in the interest rate, which has the e¤ect of domestic currency to
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depreciates. The responses to the shock are presented in Figure 2.13. If the do-
mestic central bank targets the PPI, overall ination may increase. By contrast,
targeting CPI leads to a drop in overall ination. As a consequence, the latter
results in an expansionary monetary policy.
To conclude, note that in most of the cases, targeting PPI leads to lower
volatility in CPI ination than with CPI targeting. The e¤ect of di¤erent ination
targets on output is not that strong, hence it causes only limited changes to output.
In line with the typical arguments in the theoretical literature, which maintain that
PPI targeting leads to lower welfare losses, my impulse responses clearly show that
such welfare gains are mainly due to the di¤erent e¤ects on ination generated by
targeting the two alternative price indices.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter considered the performance and characteristics of simple monetary
policy rules using a two-country model. First, I developed a small-scale two-
country DSGE model similar to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), with a micro-
founded Phillips curve. I assumed imperfect pass-through and non-unit intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and log-linear-
ised the model around a steady state with non-zero ination.
I carried out Bayesian inference, using a Metropolis Hastings sampling ap-
proach, to measure the performance of this model against German data. The
novel feature has been the inclusion of real unit labour costs for a better measure-
ment of the Phillips curve. Firstly, using only the part of the model related to
the large economy, which is identical to the one built in Chapter 1, I have tested
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several simple nominal interest rate rules. I have shown that a simple monetary
policy rule mimicking an optimal rule, similar to the one derived in Chapter 1,
gives the best outcome. Additionally, I have shown that the estimation of the
structural parameters of the model are robust to the choice of the monetary policy
rule, and that the non-zero ination part included in the Phillips curve improves
the model t signicantly.
To study the model for the SOE, I have used the data of EEC, such as the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. Using a posterior odds test, I found evidence
that the central banks of all these countries target a PPI ination instead of
CPI ination, contrary to what is usually assumed in the empirical literature. I
have shown that, also in the case of a SOE, the model with a non-zero steady
state ination performs substantially better. If I compare the non-zero steady
state ination component between the three EEC and Germany, I nd that the
magnitude is lower for the latter, though it remains positive and signicantly
di¤erent from zero. Further analysis about the monetary policy rules shows that
a pure exchange rate target can be rejected for all three EEC, and that only the
Czech Republic appears to respond to exchange rate movements.
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2.A Data
All observations are quarterly, seasonally adjusted using the defaults settings of
the X12 lter in Eviews 6. The empirical estimation is based on a data sample
over the period 1996 to 2012 for Germany and the Czech Republic, and 1998 to
2012 for Hungary and Poland.
The FRED database was used as a source for following time series:
 Ination, dened as the log di¤erence of the consumer or producer price
index multiplied by 100
 Consumer Price Index: All Items in Germany (DEUCPIALLQINMEI)
 Consumer Price Index: All Items for Czech Republic (CZECPIALLMIN-
MEI)
 Domestic Producer Prices Index: Manufacturing for Czech Republic
(CZEPPDMQINMEI)
 Consumer Price Index: All Items for Hungary (HUNCPIALLMINMEI)
 Domestic Producer Prices Index: Manufacturing for Hungary (HUNPPDMQIN-
MEI)
 Consumer Price Index: All Items for Poland (POLCPIALLMINMEI)
 Domestic Producer Prices Index: Manufacturing for Poland (POLP-
PDMQINMEI)
 Output growth, constructed as the log di¤erence of real output that is dened
as a nominal output divided by a deator, multiplied by 100
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 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Germany (DEUGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Germany (DEUGDPDEFQISMEI)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Czech Republic(CZEGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Czech Republic (CZEGDPDEFQIS-
MEI)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Hungary (HUNGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Hungary (HUNGDPDEFQISMEI)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Poland (POLGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Poland (POLGDPDEFQISMEI)
 Unit labour cost is dened as the percentage change of the ratio between
total labour costs and real GDP
 Benchmarked Unit Labor Costs - Total for Germany (DEUULCTOTQP-
NMEI)
 Benchmarked Unit Labor Costs - Manufacturing for Czech Republic
(CZEULCMANQPNMEI)
 Benchmarked Unit Labor Costs - Manufacturing for Hungary (HUNUL-
CMANQPNMEI)
 Benchmarked Unit Labor Costs - Manufacturing for Poland (POLUL-
CMANQPNMEI)
 To compute average import/GDP ratio, I use
 Imports of Goods and Services in Czech Republic (CZEIMPORTADSMEI)
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 Imports of Goods and Services in Hungary (HUNIMPORTADSMEI)
 Imports of Goods and Services in Poland (POLIMPORTADSMEI)
For the analysis, Datastream was a source for following data:
 The interest rate is an annualised quarter to quarter interest rate monthly
average, divided by four so as to be expressed in quarterly terms
 German Day to Day money market rate monthly average (BDSU0101R)
 Czech Discount Rate (640015045)
 Hungarian Central Bank Base Rate (870002307)
 Polish Central Bank Rediscount Rate (POOIR037)
 The quarterly change in the exchange rate is computed as a log di¤erence of
the bilateral nominal exchange rate between Euro and EEC currency
 German Mark to US $ (USWGMRK)
 Czech Koruna to US $ (USCZECK)
 Hungarian Forint to US $ (USHUNGF)
 Polish Zloty to US $ (USPOLZL)
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2.B Log-linearisation of the Phillips Curve
The log-linearisation of the equations (2.42), (2.43) and (2.44) straightforwardly
leads respectively to
p^ft = |^t   h^t;
|^t = (1   (H)
") (y^t   c^t + cmct + ~pH;t + vt) +  (H)" ("^H;t+1 + |^t+1) ;
h^t =
 
1   " 1

(y^t   c^t) + () 
" 1

"^H;t+1   ^t+1 + h^t+1

;
from which I can obtain the forward looking price in log-linearised term as
p^ft = 

" 1   "

(y^t   c^t) + (1   ()
") (cmct + ~pH;t + vt)
+ 

""^H;t+1   
" 1"^H;t+1
	
+ () " 1^t+1 + 
h
"|^t+1   
" 1h^t+1
i
:
The log-linearisation of equations (1.20),( 1.22) deliver respectively
~pbt = ~xt 1 + ^H;t 1   ^t;
x^t = (1  !) p^
f
t + !p^
b
t :
The domestic price dynamics in relative terms given in equation (2.47) is log-
linearised as
^t =
1  " 1
" 1
~xt +
" 1~pH;t 1   ~pH;t
" 1
:
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Combining all these equations together delivers a hybrid NKPC of a form
 
" 1 + !
 
1  "
 
 1   

(^t +~pH;t) =  
" (^t+1 +~pH;t+1)
+ ! (^t 1 +~pH;t 1) +
 
1  " 1

(1  !) (1   ()") (cmct + vt)
+
 
1  " 1

(1  !)
 
"   " 1


h
h^t+1 + ("  1) (^t+1 +~pH;t+1) + (c^t   y^t) + ~pH;t+1
i
Using (2.20), which log-linearised delivers
^t +~pH;t = ^H;t;
simplies the hybrid NKPC. After collecting the terms together and using the
denition of h^t above, the Phillips curve with backward looking rms linearising
around a non-zero steady state ination yields
 
" 1 + !
 
1  "
 
 1   

^H;t =  
"^H;t+1 + !^H;t 1
+
 
1  " 1

(1  !) (1   ()") (cmct + vt)

 
1  " 1

(1  !)
 
 1   1

 " 1
h
h^t+1 + "^H;t+1   ^t+1 + c^t   y^t
i
:
Written in terms of parameters
^H;t = 
fEt [^H;t+1] + 
b^H;t 1 + mc (cmct + vt) +  h^t   (y^t   c^t)
168
with parameters
	 = " 1 + !
 
1  "
 
 1   

f =  "=	; b = !=	;
mc =
 
1  " 1

(1  !) (1  ") =	
 =
 
1  " 1

(1  !)
 
 1   1

:
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2.C Quantitative Implications of Positive Trend
Ination
In this appendix I illustrate the quantitative implications of positive trend ination
on the IRFs, e.g., the quantitative di¤erence between the two approaches A1 and
A2. For illustration, I use the estimation results for Czech Republic and PPI
ination targeting.
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Chapter 3
Impact of Foreign Monetary
Policy on Eastern European
Countries
3.1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to show the impact of US monetary policy shocks on real
output and price levels in several Eastern European countries (EEC). Particularly,
I am interested in assessing how much of the movement is generated directly by
the US monetary movements in the policy shock and how much indirectly through
changes in German aggregate demand caused by this shock, under the assumption
that the economic performances in Germany and the EEC are closely related.
My starting point is the presumption that US monetary policy shocks might have
a signicant inuence on these countries. Nonetheless, it can be argued that
Germany is a major trading partner for all the EEC. It attracts between 25 to
30 percent of the total exports from each of these countries and the EEC are
also substantial importers of goods produced in Germany. These relationships are
not reciprocal, which suggest that the EEC can be characterised as SOE relative
to Germany. It follows from the data that the openness of the EEC towards
Germany should be signicantly stronger than the one towards the US market.
An analogous relationship can be found between Germany and the US. Since the
US is an important export partner for Germany, covering a 7 percent export share,
but not vice versa, Germany might be therefore regarded as a small open economy
(SOE) relative to the US.
Because the data suggests that the EEC are more open towards Germany than
the US, one may expect that the e¤ect of the US shock is signicantly weaker than
the one generated by German Bundesbank/ECB. In this paper, I show that this is
not the case: even if I control for the US impact through Germany (by including
German variables), the strength of the e¤ects of both shocks on EEC variables are
comparable.
I choose the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic as
representatives of the EEC, countries that share similar characteristics. They
started their economic transition in the early 1990s and rapidly opened their
economies to Western trade and investment. For these countries the early 90s
were characterised by higher ination especially in Hungary and Poland caused by
price liberalisation. During this period the exchange rate was pegged to a basket of
currencies but during the second half of 1990s, they all adopted exible exchange
rate regime. The main part of the transition was nished and the economy system
of these countries stabilised.
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In this chapter, I run three di¤erent estimations. First, I estimate the di-
rect inuence of the U.S. monetary policy shock on the crucial variables of the
EEC. Second, I repeat this estimation using Germany monetary policy shock in-
stead. Both estimations are in line with the mainstream theory. According to the
Dornbush-Mundell-Fleming model, the unanticipated increase in the large econ-
omy interest rate can have two contradictory e¤ects on the variables of a SOE;
the expenditure switching e¤ect and the income absorption e¤ect.1 The resulting
impact can lead to di¤erent reactions of the domestic output when the interest
rate in the large country changes. The third estimation contains, beside the EEC,
both large countries, Germany and the US, where it is assumed that Germany is
open towards the US and closed towards the EEC. The objective is to investigate
how much of the monetary policy shock generated by the FED is absorbed by
Germany and how much is instead directly transmitted to the EEC.
The analysis is performed using a Bayesian Vector Autoregressive Model (BVAR).
In contrast to the maximum likelihood method, whose estimates are based purely
on the information contained in the data, Bayesian analysis departs from this ap-
proach by allowing me to incorporate prior beliefs about the parameters into the
estimation process. Therefore, I can identify the foreign monetary shock using sign
contemporaneous restrictions and also threat all foreign variables as exogenous us-
ing zero restrictions in a long run. Following Banbura et al. (2008), I implement
the natural conjugate prior via articial observation. This involves generating ar-
ticial data from the model assumed under the prior and mixing this with the
actual data. The weight placed on the articial data regulates how tightly the
prior is imposed and I explain the all procedure in more details later.
1This mechanism is described in more details in Section 3.4.
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The dataset available for the EEC is not very rich. To allow for a cross coun-
try comparison, I am forced to opt for relatively short time series. As a result,
I use data starting in 1994. Therefore, the number of observations is limited,
hence I restrain the number of variables too, by focusing on the movement in key
macroeconomic variables such as CPI ination and GDP growth.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses the relevant
literature. Section 3.2 gives more details about the VAR model adopted for the
estimations. Section 3.3 describes the structural analysis for each country, includ-
ing the impulse response functions, forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
and historical decomposition. Section 3.4 compares results of this chapter with
the ones of Chapter 2. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1.1 Literature Review
A vast recent literature analyses exogenous disturbances generated at home or
abroad and their impact on other macroeconomic variables. Several studies, in-
cluding Gordon and Leeper (1994), Uhlig (2005) and Canova and Gambetti (2003),
investigate the US monetary policy shock and its impact on the US macroeconomic
variables. Similarly, Kim (1999) studies the e¤ects of domestic monetary policy
shocks in individual G-7 countries and Kim (2001a) shows the e¤ect of the (do-
mestic) monetary policy shock on the trade balance in small European countries
such as France, UK and Italy, using German and US interest rate as a proxy for
a world-wide short term interest rate. Furthermore, various authors study the
impact of foreign shocks on SOE. Kim (2001b) analyses the e¤ect of US monetary
policy on the exchange rate and foreign trade balances on other G-6 countries. He
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shows that an expansionary US monetary policy shock generates positive spillover
e¤ects. Canova (2005) studies the transmission of US shocks on Latin countries
and nds that the foreign monetary policy shock produces more uctuations than
real demand and supply shocks generated abroad. Additionally, Mackowiak (2007)
nds that US monetary shocks are an important source of macroeconomic uctu-
ations for small emerging markets in South East Asia and Latin America. These
shocks explain more of the variation of real aggregate output and the price level
in those countries than the domestic monetary shocks.
Some authors also investigate the e¤ect of monetary policy shocks on EEC.
For example, Anzuini and Levy (2007) examine the e¤ects of an EEC domestic
monetary policy shock in a given EEC on its own key macroeconomic variables.
Mackowiak (2006) studies the e¤ect of ECB monetary policy shocks on those
variables. My work is closely related to these two papers; I am investigating
a new channel of foreign monetary policy inuence. Using a method similar to
Kim (2001b) and Canova (2005), I am interested in the impact of US monetary
policy shocks on macroeconomic variables on the EEC. I use Mackowiaks (2006)
argument that these countries are open to exogenous disturbances and show that
a monetary shock that originates in the US can explain at least the same amount
of EEC macroeconomic uctuations as a shock generated by the European Central
Bank (and previously by the Deutsche Bundesbank).
There are several possibilities for how to dene a monetary policy shock. In
most papers, including Mackowiak (2007), authors use interest rates set by central
banks, whereas in other contributions, including Canova (2005), economists use
the slope of the term structure of nominal interest rate and real balances. In this
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work, I follow the mainstream and use the quarterly change in the Federal Reserve
funds rate as a source of the monetary policy shock.
In this paper, the BVARmethodology adopted relates to the methodology used
by Kim (2001 and 2001b), Canova (2005) and Mackowiak (2006, 2007). The long-
run zero restrictions for SOE are based on di¤erent ndings from Cushman and
Zha (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000) and Kim (1999). The sign restrictions are
generated in a similar fashion as in Canova (2005) and Scholl and Uhlig (2005),
using an algorithm developed by Ramirez et al. (2010). Finally, I impose the prior
in my model using articial observations following the work from Banbura et al.
(2008).
The eld of VAR econometrics is wide and several alternative approaches can
be found in the literature. A number of papers raise some concerns about small
scale SVAR and develop alternative methods. For example, Factor-augmented
VARs (FAVARs), developed by Bernanke et al. (2005) incorporate more infor-
mation so that the monetary policy shock can be better identied. Mumtaz and
Surico (2007) use this approach to analyse the e¤ect of world wide monetary policy
shocks on a SOE. They show that an expansionary monetary policy shock causes
a domestic nominal exchange rate appreciation and an increase in prices and in
GDP (a prosper thy-neighbor situation). The Global VAR (GVAR) approach,
proposed by Pesaran et al. (2002) and di Mauro et al. (2007), employs a vector
error correction model for individual countries and combines the result to gen-
erate an estimate for all the variables simultaneously. Yet another methodology
can be found in Canova and Ciccarelli (2006). Using a multi-country panel VAR
model with time varying coe¢cients and cross unit interdependencies, these au-
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thors study the transmission of di¤erent shocks on G7 countries focusing on GDP
growth and CPI ination, and emphasise that this model is suitable for the study
of the transmission of monetary policy shocks across economic areas and sectors.
3.2 Methodology
Testing the impact of monetary and scal policy is not a new idea. For example,
Anderson and Jordan (1964) investigate the impact of a change in the monetary
base on real GNP using a simple autoregressive model. However, their approach
was criticized by Sims (1980) because of the missing feedback between GNP and
the monetary base. This author went on proposing a vector autoregressive (VAR)
model to analyse the monetary policy shock and its impact on endogenous vari-
ables. Since then, VAR models have been frequently used to identify the channels
of monetary policy transmission. During the following twenty years, VAR models
became very popular as an econometric technique for analysing the relationships
between di¤erent endogenous variables. Ever since, the VAR approach has mainly
been used to analyse the e¤ects of a shock on macroeconomic variables using tools
such as impulse response functions, FEVD and historical decomposition.
The literature generally distinguishes between reduced-form and structural
VARmodels, depending on whether the shocks are correlated or orthogonal to each
other. Furthermore, putting some restrictions into the model leads to a restricted
VAR, otherwise the model is described as unrestricted VAR. Orthogonalising the
shocks can either follow directly from a Cholesky decomposition of the error terms
covariance matrix, or from using restrictions derived from an economic interpre-
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tation of the model. The rst is also known in the literature as recursive VAR.2
At the moment, it appears that no clear consensus has formed in the literature
regarding whether restrictions following from the Cholesky decomposition should
be based on theory. On the one hand, Stock and Watson (2001) p.18 emphasise,
"It is tempting to develop economic theories that, conveniently, lead to a par-
ticular recursive ordering of the variables. Rarely does it add value to repackage
a recursive VAR and sell it as structural." On the other hand, there are authors,
e.g. Gottschalk (2001), stating that when using a Cholesky decomposition, the
restrictions need to be supported by theoretical interpretation. Canova (2007) ar-
gues that a Cholesky decomposition without any economic interpretations may be
misleading.
To explore my research question in this chapter, I follow Canova (2007) and use
a structural VAR with sign restrictions. I aim to apply a model that is consistent
with the economic theory, mainly to avoid a misspecication of the monetary policy
shock that, if positive, should lead to a contemporaneous increase in interest rate
and a contemporaneous fall in output and ination and not a contemporaneous
zero response of output and ination as implied by Cholesky decomposition, for
example.
3.2.1 The reduced-form VAR
The reduced-form VAR model is the most general formulation within the VAR
family and can be described as follows. Consider T observations of m variables.
Take a VAR(p) process, where p is the number of lags of the process with linear
2C.f. Stock and Watson (2005).
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structure, to estimate the relationship among a set of endogenous variables as
follows
Yt = BXt + t (3.1)
with Xt = (Yt 1; :::Yt p; 1)
0 and B = (B1;:::Bp; C), where Yt is a m  1 vector
of endogenous variables in period t. The intercept term C is a m  1 vector,
which allows for the possibility of a nonzero E[Yt], B (j), for j = 1; ::; p, is a
m m matrix of regressors. The residual t is a Gaussian white noise with zero
mean (i.e. E[t] = 0) and variance-covariance matrix  exhibiting the following
characteristics
E[t
0
s] =  if t = s, (3.2)
E[t
0
s] = 0 if t 6= s.
It is possible to incorporate some restrictions that have an economic interpre-
tation into this model. However, as long as the number of restriction is insu¢cient,
there is a lack of structure in this model. That means the error terms are correlated
with each other and the identication of the individual shocks is di¢cult.
3.2.2 The Structural VAR
Several techniques can be adopted to impose structure on the VAR model. All aim
to obtain consistent estimators, which means that the shocks must be orthogono-
lised and identied uniquely. Shocks can be orthogonalized by using a Cholesky
decomposition of the covariance matrix.3 This recursive VAR approach can lead
3This technique is used by many authors, e.g., Mackowiak (2006).
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to restrictions that are not consistent with the theory.4 For this reason, many au-
thors prefer to use a structural VAR (SVAR) approach, developed by Sims (1986),
which includes restrictions that are in line with economic theory. However, the
high number of restrictions needed to properly specify the model complicates its
implementation. Therefore, the version of SVAR most frequently used in the lit-
erature is a hybrid approach, which uses a Cholesky decomposition together with
economically meaningful restrictions. The model presented here belongs to this
hybrid approach. Along with a Cholesky decomposition, I restrict the model by
imposing specic signs and zero values.
To obtain an orthogonolised error term from equation (3.1), I can use anmm
matrix A such as
Yt = BXt + Aet;
where et is an orthogonal white noise vector following from t = Aet with an
identity variance-covariance matrix given by
E[ete
0
s] = Im if t = s, (3.3)
E[ete
0
s] = 0 if t 6= s.
It follows from equation (3.2) that
E[Aete
0
tA
0] = AA0 = :
In the contemporaneous period, the sign restrictions are implemented in such
a way that the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock are consistent with
4C.f. Krolzig (2003), Lütkepohl (2005).
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the theory. In this respect, I follow Ramirez et al. (2010), who provide an e¢cient
algorithm to nd the structural impact matrix ~A, which is consistent with impulse
responses of certain signs.
To compute the structural impact matrix ~A, I draw some matrix J  N (0; 1),
and take the QR decomposition J = QR to nd an orthonormal matrix Q such
that it holds QQ0 = Im and ~A = AQ. Therefore, I can write
 = AQQ0A0 (3.4)
 = ~A ~A0.
It is important that the matrix ~A satises the sign restrictions set out below and
it still holds that
t = ~Aet: (3.5)
If it does not, I draw another matrix J from the normal distribution and repeat
the procedure.
Assume that the identication scheme takes the following form
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 fIRg
 fGDP g
 fCPIg


GDPEEC
	


CPIEEC
	


XREEC
	
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
+ : : 0 0 0
  : : 0 0 0
  : : 0 0 0
: : : : 0 0
: : : : : 0
: : : : : :
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
e fIRg
e fGDP g
e fCPIg
e

GDPEEC
	
e

CPIEEC
	
e

XREEC
	
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
The vector aj 2 R
m is called an impulse vector if there is some matrix ~A
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such that ~A ~A0 =  holds and aj is the jth column of ~A. The impulse vector
yields the instantaneous impulse response of all variables to the structural shock
associated with that vector and, in my specication needs to have the following
signs: a11 > 0, a21 < 0, and a31 < 0. In other words, the sign restrictions on large
economy variables ensure that positive shocks in the interest rate implies a fall in
GDP growth and ination in the US. The impulse responses for the rest of the
variables remain unrestricted on sign.
The identication is completed by using zero restrictions on contemporaneous
structural parameters so as to ensure that the SOE does not inuence the large
economy contemporaneously. The dots correspond to freely estimated parame-
ters.5
Beside the contemporaneous restrictions, I impose restrictions on lags. Note
that the model can be divided into two parts, a rst part with a m1  1 vector
of the foreign large economy variables (Y t ), and a complementary (m m1)  1
vector of domestic SOE variables (Y EECt )
6
Yt =
0@ Y t
Y EECt
1A ; t =
0@ t
EECt
1A : (3.6)
Therefore, the matrix B (j), j = 1; :::; p, can be rewritten as
B (j) =
0@ B11(j) B12(j)
B21(j) B22(j)
1A ; (3.7)
5For a critical survey on contemporanous restrictions, see Fry and Pagan (2011).
6In this paper, I assume that Y  includes interest rate, foreign output, price level, while
Y EEC includes domestic output, price level and exchange rate.
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where B11(j) is them1m1matrix of coe¢cients between foreign variables. B12(j)
is (m m1)m1 matrix of coe¢cients which demonstrate the impact of domestic
SOE variables on the variables in the large economy. Following Cushman and
Zha (1995), I impose zero restrictions on the prior beliefs that domestic economies
are small and cannot inuence the US economy with their action at any time, so
that B12(j) = 0. Analogously, the m1  (m m1) matrix B21(j) includes coe¢-
cients that measure the impact of the foreign large economy on the domestic SOE
variables. The matrix B22(j) is a matrix of coe¢cients showing the relationship
between domestic variables.
Assume that the vector Y t includes three variables of the large economy with
the following ordering: the interest rate IR, the GDP growth GDP  and the
CPI ination CPI, formally
Y t =
0BBBB@
IR
GDP 
CPI
1CCCCA . (3.8)
The rst line of the system (3.1) represents the monetary policy rule of the large
economy with parameters in the rst row of B11(j), having the form of a Taylor
rule with an interest rate smoothing component.
In the whole system, I identify only the foreign monetary policy shock. Beside
the impulse-response functions, the matrix ~A is used to calculate the FEVD as
well as the historical decomposition. As emphasised in the literature, it is not
customary to report the estimated VAR coe¢cients. The reasons are that there is
a large number of them, and more importantly, many are not signicant, especially
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for further lags. Therefore it is usual to report the results of the estimations in
a summarised way. The most powerful tools in this case are impulse response
functions, FEVD and the historical decomposition.
Impulse Response Functions
To isolate the e¤ect of a monetary policy shock, I consider the VAR(p) model in
companion form7
Zt = ~BZt 1 + vt
with Zt = Xt+1 = (Yt; :::Yt p+1; 1)
0 and vt = (t; 0; :::; 0)
0 are ((m p) + 1)  1
vectors of endogenous variables and error terms respectively, where the rst row
of this is identical to equation (3.1) and the remain rows are trivial. ~B is a
((m p) + 1) ((m p) + 1) matrix given as
~B =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
B1 B2 ::: Bp 1 Bp C
Im 0 ::: 0 0
. . .
...
0 0 Im 0 0
0 0 ::: 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCA
:
I then solve backwards to obtain a moving average (MA) representation, which
by ignoring deterministic terms delivers
Zt = ~B
tZ0 +
t 1X
j=0
~Bjvt j: (3.9)
7The companion form transforms a VAR(p) into a VAR(1) model, see e.g. Canova (2007),
chapter 4.
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The required impulse response functions are represented in the rst m rows
of matrix ~Bj. Therefore, I can ignore deterministic terms because they are not
important for the impulse responses and rewrite the equation (3.9) in terms of
the reduced-form VAR form. Writing the rst m m part of matrix ~Bj given as
~Bj1 = 	j, I obtain
Yt =
t 1X
j=0
	jt j: (3.10)
Together with (3.5), this equation can be rewritten in terms of orthogonolised
shocks as
Yt =
t 1X
j=0
jet j; (3.11)
where j = 	j ~A. The equation (3.11) says that as one shock hits the economy
(e.g., interest rate increases by one standard deviation point in period zero), one
can see the e¤ect to the system for the next s periods when no further shocks hit
the economy. The generic (k; l) element of matrix j given by kl;j represents the
reaction of variable k (in period t + j) to a unit shock experienced by variable l,
in period t.
Historical Decomposition
Following Lütkepohl (2011), the historical decomposition of the time series de-
scribes the contribution of the structural shock to the observed series. Using equa-
tion 3.11 , the variable k in period t can be represented as a sum of the structural
shocks l = 1; :::L
yk;t =
t 1X
j=0
(k1;je1;t j + k2;je2;t j + :::kL;jeL;t j) :
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Therefore, it can be shown that the variable yk;t can be decomposed into the
sum of the structural shocks. Thus,
ylk;t =
t 1X
j=0
kl;jel;t j
is the contribution of a specic structural shock l to the time series of variable yk.
Forecasting Error Variance Decomposition8
Using equation 3.10, I can identify the error in forecasting the VAR s periods into
the future as
Yt+s   yt+sjt = t+s +	1t+s 1 +	2t+s 2 + :::+	s 1t+1. (3.12)
The FEVD is given as a mean square error (MSE) of this s-period ahead
forecast, expressed as
MSE
 
yt+sjt

= E
h 
Yt+s   yt+sjt
  
Yt+s   yt+sjt
0i
(3.13)
= +	1	
0
1 +	2	
0
2 + :::+	s 1	
0
s 1;
where  = E [t
0
t]. The FEVD shows how each of the orthogonolised distur-
bances (e1t; :::; emt) contributes to this MSE. In terms of structural shocks, I can
8For more details, see Hamilton (1994) chapter 11 and Canova (2007) chapter 4.
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equivalently write
MSE
 
yt+sjt

= +	1	
0
1 +	2	
0
2 + :::+	s 1	
0
s 1
= ~A ~A0 +	1 ~A ~A
0	01 +	2 ~A ~A
0	02 + :::+	s 1 ~A ~A
0	0s 1
= 0
0
0 + 1
0
1 + 2
0
2 + :::+ s 1
0
s 1
with 0 = ~A. The kth diagonal element of j
0
j is the sum of the squares of the
elements in the kth row of j. Moreover, the sum of the kth diagonal elements of
0
0
0; :::;s 1
0
s 1 is the MSE of forecast error variance of the s-step forecast of
variable Yj. Hence, the fraction of the variance in yk;t+sjt due to l;t is
V Dk:l =
2kl;0 + 
2
kl;1 + :::+ 
2
kl;s 1
MSE
 
yk;t+sjt
 ;
where 2kl;j is the (k; l) element of j.
3.2.3 BVAR with Gibbs Sampling Estimation
In the early stages of the VAR literature, econometric models were usually esti-
mated by using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods. Recently, Bayesian meth-
ods have attracted increased attention, because they are generally more precise
than standard estimation approaches. Compared to the standard methodology,
Bayesian estimations incorporate subjective beliefs or theoretical restrictions about
the state of the coe¢cients. Bayesian methods were introduced by Zellner (1971)
and have become more popular in the last twenty years, when the computer soft-
ware and hardware developed and techniques such as Gibbs sampler were intro-
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duced.9 In this work, I follow the contemporary literature and apply Bayesian
estimation methods using Gibbs sampling to estimate the parameters of the SVAR
model presented above.
The Bayesian estimation combines a subjective prior together with sample
information. It is based on the Bayes theorem, which states that
posterior distribution / likelihood prior distribution.
The likelihood function is taken from the OLS estimation of the data sample.10
Equivalently, it can be written as
R (vec (B) n; Yt) / F (Ytnvec (B) ;) P (vec (B) ;) ;
the posterior distribution R (vec (B) n; Yt) is proportional to the product of the
prior distribution P (vec (B) ;) and distribution of the sample as given by the
likelihood function F (Ytnvec (B) ;). The vector vec (B) is a matrix of regressors
B in vector form and  the variance-covariance matrix. The prior density and the
likelihood function are both very important for the correct estimation of the model
and therefore it is necessary to specify them fully. There exist several approaches
to set the prior. Many authors use the Minnesota prior, developed by Litterman
(1986), because of its simplicity, but since I incorporate a prior belief with zero
9C.f. Greene (2003), chapter 18 for more details.
10The likelihood function for B and  given the data can be expressed as
F (Y nvec (B) ;) = (2)
 Tm=2  1T=2 exp  1
2
 
y   vec (B)
0
X
0
 1
 
y   vec (B)
0
X

:
For more details, see e.g. Hamilton (1994), chapter 11.
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restrictions, as discussed in Section 3.2, I opt for an independent normal inverse
Wishart prior. Technically, I impose this prior by following Banbura et al. (2008)
and incorporate additional articial data.
It can be assumed, given the nature of the data, that the matrix of coe¢cients
B is normally distributed
P (vec (B))  N (vec (B0) ; H) ; (3.14)
where vec (B0) is the ((m (m p+ 1)) 1) vector of prior means for the ele-
ments of matrix B. The matrix H is a ((m (m p+ 1)) (m (m p+ 1)))
diagonal matrix, whose elements are the prior variances for each corresponding
coe¢cient from matrix B0. As discussed earlier, I impose the strong prior belief
that the elements of matrices B12(j), B13(j) and B23(j) equal zero. Therefore, the
prior variances of the corresponding elements in matrix H are set to be very low.
Following Zellner (1971), the conjugate prior for a positive denite variance-
covariance matrix  is an Inverse Wishart prior
P ()  IW
 
S; 

(3.15)
with the prior scale matrix S and prior degrees of freedom .
Given the fact that conjugate prior on B is normal distributed, it can be
shown that the posterior distribution of the coe¢cients conditional on the variance-
covariance matrix  is given by
R (vec (B) n; Yt)  N (M
; V ) ;
193
where M and V  are the mean and the variance of this normal distribution,
respectively. As shown in Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997), the mean and the variance
of the conditional posterior distribution are respectively given by
M =
 
H 1 +  1 
X 0tXt
 1  
H 1vec (B0) + 
 1 
X 0tYt

(3.16)
V  =
 
H 1 +  1 
X 0tXt
 1
:
Note that M is a weighted average of the prior mean vec (B0) and the OLS
estimator, given byX 0tYt, weighted by the reciprocal of the corresponding variance-
covariance matrices. The smaller the values of matrix H elements, the higher the
weight on the prior relative to the conditional posterior estimates. In the case
where there are no beliefs about the prior, i.e. the value of matrix H elements are
very large, then the posterior estimates are identical to the maximum likelihood
estimator.
Given the prior in equation (3.15), the posterior distribution for  conditional
on B is Inverse Wishart
R (nvec (B) ; Yt)  IW
 
; T + 

;
where  = S + (Yt  XtB)
0 (Yt  XtB), with T observations and  degrees of
freedom.
Returning to the issue of how to incorporate prior beliefs into the estimation of
my VAR model, I follow Banbura et al. (2008) and implement prior information
by adding articial data to the system. The articial data YD and XD are formed
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by four independent blocks as follows
YD=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
diag(11:::mm)

0((m(p 1))m)
_____________
diag (1:::m)
_____________
0(1m)
_____________
diag(11:::mm)

1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
, XD=
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
Jp
diag(1:::m)

0(mp1)
_______________ ______
0(mmp) 0(m1)
_______________ ______
0(1mp) c
_______________ ______
Jp
diag(11:::mm)

0(m1)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
(3.17)
The rst block in each matrix imposes the prior beliefs on the autoregressive
coe¢cients. The second block implements the prior for the variance-covariance
matrix and the third block reects the uninformative prior for the intercept. By
adding articial data in the last row, I incorporate the prior that incorporates
the belief that the sum of the coe¢cients on lags of the dependent variable in
each equation sum to 1, i.e. that each variable has a unit root. The matrix Jp is
given as Jp = diag (1:::p). As in Banbura et al. (2008), the variance of the prior
distribution is dened by hyperparameters that regulate the variation around the
prior. The hyper-parameter  > 0 controls the overall tightness of the prior so
that as ! 0, the prior is implement more tightly, whereas the larger the value of
this parameter the more the posterior approaches an OLS estimation of the VAR
model. The hyperparameter  controls for the degree of shrinkage. If  is large,
the prior is imposed loosely. I set  = 10 and  = 10, implying that the prior on
these data is not very informative. The parameter i measures the persistence of
variable i, and follows from the OLS estimation of AR(1). Literally, it is a prior
mean for the coe¢cient on the rst lag of dependent variable i. The parameter
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i is a sample mean of the variable i, and i is a sample standard deviation of
error terms. They can both be calculated as sample averages of the time series
yi from the OLS estimation. The matrix YD is the (m (p+ 2) + 1)  m matrix
and XD is a (m (p+ 2) + 1)  (mp+ 1) matrix adding (m (p+ 2) + 1) dummies
to each time series. These articial data are mixing with the actual data and the
hyperparameters placed on them determine how tightly the prior is imposed. This
approach also helps to alleviate the curse of dimensionality in the VAR model.
Following (3.7), some prior coe¢cients B0 are restricted to zero on lags. The
prior for coe¢cient matrix B0 (j) has therefore the form given as
B0 (j) =
0@ B011(j) 0
B021(j) B
0
22(j)
1A ;
and incorporates the belief that the coe¢cients of matrix B012(j) for all j = 1; :::; p
are close to zero. To ensure that these restrictions are also fullled for the posterior,
so that the appropriate parameters stay close to zero, it is necessary to set the
elements of the prior variance H matrix belonging to these coe¢cients very close
to zero. For the remaining coe¢cients, regarding the rst lag j = 1, the prior mean
on its own lag is set equal to 0:95, e.g., the diagonals of matrices B11(1), B22(1)
and B33(1) equals 0:95. For all other elements of matrix B (1), the elements are
set to be zero. The vector ~C is a zero vector and matrix B (j), j = 2; :::p, is a zero
matrix. The elements of the prior variance H correspond to all the coe¢cients
except those for B12(j), B13(j) and B23(j), which are set to be su¢ciently large
that these coe¢cients are mainly determined within the model. To summarise,
H is a ((m (m p+ 1)) (m (m p+ 1))) diagonal matrix, with near-zero
elements for coe¢cients which are believed to be zero, and large elements for the
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remaining coe¢cients. The details for a model with three countries are given in
Appendix 3.B.
Gibbs Sampling
To carry out the Bayesian inference, I use a Gibbs sampling procedure, which is
a posterior Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation mechanism. Gibbs
sampling is a numerical method that uses a great many draws from a conditional
distribution to approximate joint and marginal posterior distribution for B and
. The reason for using Gibbs sampling to calculate the marginal density is that
analytical methods are either unavailable or very complicated.11
The Gibbs algorithm iterates M times and produces draws for B and . Each
iteration requires sampling from the conditional posterior distribution, which after
the burn-in draws are discarded converges to the marginal distribution. Samples
from the beginning of the chain, the rst J draws are discarded to remove the
inuence of starting values. Once draws from the posterior distribution are ob-
tained, I implement a structural analysis to ensure that the sign restrictions hold.
Appendix 3.C shows the convergence of the algorithm via recursive mean plots.
The Gibbs algorithm is given as follows.
1. Set the priors for coe¢cient matrix p (vec (B))  N (vec (B0) ; H) and for
the variance - covariance matrix p ()  IW
 
S; 

as described above, and
the starting values obtained from OLS estimation.
11Another option to approximate marginal distribution is by using LaPlace Approximation,
see e.g. by Mackowiak (2006).
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2. Sample conditional posterior distribution of B, the rst coe¢cient vector
vec (B1), with variance V
 and mean M as given in (3.16).
3. Given vec (B1), draw variance-covariance matrix 1 from Inverse Wishart
distribution.
4. Compute a matrix ~A, such that ~A ~A0 =  using a Cholesky and QR decom-
position according to (3.4).
5. Identify the signs on ~A. If they satisfy the sign conditions, matrix ~A will be
used for further analysis, if not this step is repeated.
6. Repeat 1-6 M times to obtain vec (B1) ; :::; vec (BM), 1; ::::M and burnt
the rst J iterations. Use the remaining lastM J iterations to approximate
the marginal posterior distribution, the posterior mean and variance.
I setM = 50000 iterations of which the rst J = 45000 are discarded and keep
M   J draws to use for further inference. First, it is worth mentioning that the ~A
matrix is not unique. That is, it is possible to nd di¤erent ~A matrices that satisfy
the sign restrictions. One of the options to deal with this is to draw ~A matrix 100
times and choose the one closest to the median. This is the matrix, which I use
for analysing the impulse response functions, FEVD and historical decomposition.
3.3 Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section, I describe the results of my analysis. As representatives of the
EEC, I selected the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic.
These countries have similar characteristics and underwent similar development
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paths after the their Soviet-imposed regimes collapsed. During the 1990s, their
economies were characterised by a period of privatisation and adopted oating
exchange rates regimes. As they undertook market reforms they also competed
with each other for foreign direct and indirect investments. They all initially
experienced rapid GDP growth and in the last two decades, developed from being
classied as emerging markets to fully industrialised parts of the European Union.
An important question is how many variables should be included in the VAR
model. As in Mackowiak (2007), I use a small scale model with three domestic
variables for each country. Regressions are run for the period 1995 - 2012 for
Hungary and Poland, from 1996 to 2012 for the Czech Republic and from 1997
to 2012 for the Slovak Republic. Because of the limited number of observations,
I restrict the analysis only to the most important macroeconomic data such as
GDP growth, CPI ination and the nominal exchange rate for each country, and
run a constant, rather than time varying, BVAR. Similar to the data chosen in
Chapter 2, the source of the data is Datastream and the details on each of the
particular time series are given in Appendix 3.A. All data, except of the interest
rate, are either in logarithms or log di¤erences and aggregated to quarterly values;
furthermore, GDP and the price index data series are in seasonally adjusted.
Following Canova (2005) and Mackowiak (2006), I use the VAR model de-
scribed in Section 3.2 for each EEC separately, in combination with either US or
German variables, or both. The literature generally opts for two lags for quar-
terly data, which ts well with Mackowiak (2006), who estimates the model using
monthly data with six lags as an optimum. Given my quarterly data, both criteria,
the Akaike and Swarz conrm that VAR(2) estimation ts best.
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I run three groups of estimations. First, I estimate the impact of a US monetary
shock directly on the EEC macroeconomic variables. The goal here is to assess the
direct impact of US monetary policy shocks on EEC markets. This estimation is
analogous to the one from Kim (2001), who shows the impact of this shock on G6
countries. Second, I compare this impact with the direct impact of the Deutsche
Bundesbanks interest rate (after 2001, the ECBs). This estimation is parallel
to that from Mackowiak (2006), who claims that, since Germany is by far the
most important trade partner for all of the countries included in the estimation
(with export shares ranging from 25 to 30 percent), the innovation in German
monetary policy should play a major rule for EEC. Finally, the third group of
estimations analyse the impact of a US monetary shock on EEC controlling for
Germany. Henceforth, the three estimations are in short referred to as: 1) direct
US monetary shock (US_EEC); 2) direct German monetary shock (GER_EEC);
and 3) US monetary shock with control for German variables (US_GER_EEC).
The impulse responses for the three groups of estimations are given by the
median response function for the domestic variables for 12 periods, due to an
increase in the interest rate of the large economy by one standard deviation point,
and are displayed in a posterior 68% band extracting the 16th and 84th percentile
of the simulated impulse response distribution. The impulse response functions for
the estimations are presented in Figures 3.1-3.3. It is signicant that the pattern
of the impulse responses are similar for all the three groups of estimations: the
monetary shock generated abroad is followed by a decrease in the GDP growth and
a depreciation of the domestic currency in all EEC. The impact on CPI ination
is, however, ambiguous.
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Figure 3.1: Dynamic E¤ect of a US monetary shock on EEC
macroeconomic variables
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the direct impact of the US monetary policy shock on the
EEC. In my sample, the income absorption e¤ect is the weakest in Poland (the
largest of the EEC), where the GDP growth recovers fully after only three periods
(less than one year). Conversely, the biggest e¤ect is on the Slovak Republic (the
smallest of the EEC), where the impact is as big as on the US GDP rate of growth
itself. A contractionary monetary policy leads unambiguously to the appreciation
of the dollar relative to all the other currencies in the model. This is in line with
the theoretical predictions, and due to the fact that the investors are willing to
invest more in US bonds, thereby causing an increase in demand for US dollars.
The e¤ect on CPI ination is ambiguous for two reasons. On the one hand, the
slow down in the domestic activity causes the prices to decrease. On the other
hand, the depreciation of the domestic currency increases import prices, which
generate an increase in the domestic CPI ination. In my impulse responses, the
second e¤ect is clearly stronger in Hungary, but may also dominate in Poland.
The impulse responses in Figure 3.2 show the direct impact of German (later,
European) monetary shock on EEC variables. Similar to the rst estimation, here
the e¤ect on GDP growth in Poland is lowest and in the Slovak Republic it is
strongest. On the contrary, in all countries, except for the Slovak Republic, GDP
growth may increase after a short period (half a year), showing that after a while
the income absorption e¤ect may be dominated by the expenditure switching e¤ect.
There is no such a positive e¤ect on Slovak output, which is consistent with the
fact that the exchange rate is not allowed to depreciate since Slovakia is a member
of the Eurozone and therefore only the income absorption e¤ect takes place.
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Figure 3.2: Dynamic e¤ect of a ECB monetary shock on EEC
macroeconomic variables.
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Figure 3.3: Dynamic e¤ect of a US monetary shock on German
and EEC macroeconomic variables
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the impact of US monetary shock and its e¤ect on Ger-
many as well as on other countries (though Germany is considered a large economy
relative to the EEC). The model is detailed in Appendix 3.B. The relevant impulse
responses show that an unanticipated increase in the Federal Funds rate leads to
a contraction in US macroeconomic variables as well as in those of all other coun-
tries. However, adding German macroeconomic variables into the model does not
alter the reaction of the EEC variables to the innovation in the Federal Funds
rate. Furthermore, comparing the result with the one from second estimation, it is
clear that German GDP growth and ination react similarly to the unanticipated
increase in Federal Funds rate than to its own shock.
To summarise, three ndings can be identied from my analysis. First, an
exogenous contractionary monetary shock reduces output growth in all EEC sig-
nicantly (except for Poland), regardless the origin of the shock. Second, the e¤ect
of the German (later, ECBs) shock on EEC GDP growths is smaller and dies out
quicker than the one generated in the United States. Third, both exogenous mone-
tary shocks induce a depreciation in the domestic currency and have an ambiguous
e¤ect on domestic ination.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the median share of the FEVD for forecast horizons
of 1 quarter (refer to as the short-run), 4 quarters (1 year, the medium run) and
12 quarters (3 years, the long-run). Although the contribution of the German
shock is higher in the short run, after three years, the contribution of US shocks
and German shocks are of similar size for both the EEC output growth as well as
ination.
Table 3.1 compares the FEVD for the CPI ination for all three groups of
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US_EEC
CZ CPI Hun CPI Pol CPI SK CPI
1 0:75 0:83 0:60 0:63
4 3:59 1:97 1:41 3:10
12 6:98 5:97 3:14 4:38
Ger_EEC
CZ CPI Hun CPI Pol CPI SK CPI
1 5:60 1:37 0:91 0:65
4 9:60 2:40 2:00 2:91
12 12:93 7:41 4:63 4:59
US_Ger_EEC
CZ CPI Hun CPI Pol CPI SK CPI
1 1:33 0:64 0:52 0:60
4 6:20 1:75 1:31 2:96
12 10:98 5:68 3:23 4:38
Table 3.1: Forecasting Error Variance Decompositions
(FEVDs) for CPI ination
estimations, and shows that the German monetary policy shock explains more of
the CPI ination for all countries than its US counterpart, especially in the short
run. The di¤erence is large, especially for the Czech Republic (although, when
controlling for Germany, the di¤erence dies out in the long run). Generally, in the
long run, the US monetary shock accounts for 3 to 7 percent of the variability of
the CPI ination and when I control for the e¤ect from for Germany, it explains
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US_EEC
CZ CPI Hun CPI Pol CPI SK CPI
1 13:77 7:20 7:05 0:76
4 22:48 14:58 8:12 10:48
12 22:88 16:29 8:78 11:09
Ger_EEC
CZ CPI Hun CPI Pol CPI SK CPI
1 21:28 11:40 4:30 12:57
4 19:56 10:42 5:55 17:20
12 24:18 13:16 6:74 18:10
US_Ger_ECC
CZ CPI Hun CPI Pol CPI SK CPI
1 12:91 6:12 8:40 0:77
4 19:78 12:12 9:26 10:14
12 19:80 12:94 9:94 10:61
Table 3.2: Forecasting Error Variance Decompositions
(FEVDs) for GDP growth
up to 11 percent. The German (later, ECBs) shock explains mostly the Czech
ination, in the long run up to 13 percent. Generally, the exogenous monetary
policy shocks explains more of the ination in the Czech Republic and less of it
in Poland. Table 3.2 shows that a sizeable fraction of the variation in real GDP
growth can be attributed to external monetary policy shocks. The US generates
higher variation in Hungarian and Polish GDP, even when controlled for Germany,
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whereas the Czech and the Slovak Republic are the countries most exposed to
the German (later, ECBs) monetary shock. In general, the exogenous monetary
shocks explain more of the GDP the variation than of the CPI ination in a 12-
period horizon.
What would it happen in the absence of any shock but those generated by
monetary policy? The historical decomposition shows the contribution of the
monetary policy shock to the endogenous variables, and therefore the overall e¤ects
of the exogenous monetary policy shock in specic periods. Figures 3.4-3.6 show
the detrended variables (represented by the blue line) and its decomposition in the
structural shocks to the data, where the red (dark) bars measure the contribution
of the monetary policy shock for the estimated model for the period 2005-2012
for all the three groups of estimations. By looking at the specic period, the US
monetary shock plays a signicant role in explaining the GDP growth in the Czech
Republic and Hungary, and less in Poland and the Slovak Republic. The Slovak
GDP growth is better explained by the German (later, ECBs) shock. Again, this
is consistent with the Slovak Republic joining the Eurozone in 2009. Although the
contribution of the exogenous monetary policy shock is relatively small, there are
some sub-periods, i.e. during the recession, in which these shocks are signicant.
For example, the bottom-left panel of Figure 3.4 shows clearly that the recession
in Poland was driven by the US shock. Similar but weaker results are found for
the other countries as well.
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Figure 3.4: Contribution of a US monetary policy shock to the EEC GDP Growth
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Figure 3.5: Contribution of a ECB monetary policy shock to the EEC GDP Growth
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Figure 3.6: Contribution of a US monetary policy shock to the German and EEC GDP Growth
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3.4 Reconciling the DSGE and VAR Responses
The results in the form of impulse response functions discussed in the last section,
which follow from my VAR estimation, can be compared with those from Chapter
2. There, using a DSGE estimation, I demonstrated that a foreign contractionary
policy shock leads to an increase in domestic output and ination. On the contrary,
the VAR estimation suggests that a foreign contractionary shock leads to a decrease
in output, with an ambiguous e¤ect on ination.
According to the mainstream theory, represented by the Dornbush-Mundell-
Fleming (DMF) model, under a exible exchange rate regime, a monetary con-
traction in a large economy, represented by an increase in the interest rate, has
two contradictory e¤ects on the variables of a small open economy (SOE): the
expenditure switching e¤ect and the income absorption e¤ect.
The expenditure switching e¤ect leads to a depreciation of the SOE currency.
This is caused by the appreciation of the large countrys currency, which leads to a
worsening in its current account due to the fall in exports and the rise in imports.
The e¤ect on the small open economy trade balance is positive, since its exports
increase and imports decrease as its currency depreciates. As a result, SOE output
increases.
By contrast, the income absorption e¤ect leads to a decrease in SOE output.
According to this e¤ect, a monetary contraction in the large economy leads to lower
output, due to a drop in its domestic consumption and investment. This leads to a
decrease in imports, and thereby to an improvement in the large economys trade
balance. Since these imports represents the small open economys exports, the
trade balance of the latter worsens, leading to a decline in its GDP.
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The ndings described in the previous section point out that the income ab-
sorption e¤ect dominates. This is consistent with the results in Kim (2001), who
shows that an expansion in the US monetary policy leads to a boom in G6 coun-
tries. The ndings are also in line with the theory of Betts and Devereux (1999).
These authors argue that, if exports are priced in the foreign currency (and im-
ports in the domestic one), then no expenditure switching e¤ect happens, thus the
income absorption e¤ect naturally drives the economic dynamics. The apprecia-
tion in the domestic currency worsens the terms of trade in both the small and
the large economy, and outputs of both countries decrease proportionally.
The results of DSGE estimation discussed in Chapter 2 are suggestive of the ex-
penditure switching e¤ect overweighting the income absorption e¤ect. The reason
is twofold. On the one hand, currency invoicing is neglected, hence the expenditure
switching e¤ect plays a role in the determination of the equilibrium dynamics. On
the other hand, my estimations suggest that the small open economy central bank
is at most mildly concerned with exchange rate targeting. In this latter case, the
SOE currency is bound to depreciate, and this leads to an increase in SOE output.
For the ndings of my VAR analysis to hold, by contrast, the SOE central bank
must be strictly targeting the exchange rate, or committed to a peg with the large
economys currency. In this case, the income absorption e¤ect would dominate its
expenditure switching counterpart.12
Further investigation of the dichotomy between the two results may become
an interesting topic for further research. All the more so if one considers this
12To assess whether the DMF theory could rationalise the model developed in chapter 2, I
have also run the relevant estimations using a higher and tighter prior on parameter S . In this
case, the estimated output decreases (i.e., in the opposite direction relative to the benchmark
estimation). It should be stressed, however, that comparing the marginal data densities of the
two models suggest that lower value of S ts the data better.
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issue in conjuction with the central claim raised by Betts and Devereux, i.e.,
that the currency invoicing becomes a critical point in explaining the dynamics of
the macroeconomic variables. In this respect, investigating the e¤ect of currency
invoicing on the monetary policy transmission mechanism from the US to the EEC,
with particular regard to the degree of exchange rate tightening, appears to be a
promising subject for future research.
My line of reasoning also appears to nd indirect support elsewhere in the lit-
erature. Benati and Surico (2009), for instance, argue that structural VAR models
impose minimal restrictions on the data and may not account for expectations. As
such, these models may thus not be able to pick up the monetary policy reaction
functions very accurately. In particular, they may be unable to correctly pin down
the targets of the central bank, such as the exchange rates in the case at hand.
This argument may explain the di¤erence, between VAR and DSGE estimation,
in the response by the SOE central bank to the large economy monetary policy
shock.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter investigated the impact of US monetary policy shock on four Eastern
European Countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak
Republic, using a SVAR methodology. The structural VAR process is identied
using two types of restrictions. First, I introduce sign restrictions to ensure that
a contractionary monetary policy shock in the large economy causes a decrease
both in its ination and output. Second, I impose zero restrictions on the chan-
nels feeding back from the small open economy to the large economy, in order to
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guarantee that the economic variables of the former has no inuence on those of
the latter.
I nd that a contractionary monetary policy in the large economy signicantly
reduces output growth in all EEC, independently of whether the large economy
is represented by the US or Germany. In particular, US monetary policy appears
to inuence EEC macroeconomic variables at least as much as its German (later,
ECBs) counterpart, even after controlling for the indirect e¤ect of the former
through German macroeconomic variables.
For future research, it would be interesting to extend the analysis by including
more endogenous variables, such as the real exchange rate, the current account
balance and other trade data. When dealing with these extensions, it would be
preferable to use a FAVAR method, which is more suitable for large scale models
with small numbers of observations.
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3.A Data
For the analysis, Datastream was a source for following data:
 As an indicator of monetary policy shock:
 US Money market rate - federal funds rate (USI60B..)
 Day to Day money market rate monthly average (BDSU0101R)
 Exchange rate, used in percentage logarithm values
 German Mark to US $ (USWGMRK)
 Czech Koruna to US $ (USCZECK)
 Hungarian Forint to US $ (USHUNGF)
 Polish Zloty to US $ (USPOLZL)
 Slovak Koruna to US $ (SXUSDSP)
The FRED database was used as a source for following time series:
 As a measure of aggregate price level, seasonally adjusted and in the rst
di¤erence of the logarithm values
 Consumer Price Index of All Items in United States (USACPIALLQIN-
MEI)
 Consumer Price Index of All Items in Germany (DEUCPIALLQINMEI)
 Consumer Price Index: All Items for the Czech Republic (CZECPI-
ALLMINMEI)
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 Consumer Price Index: All Items for Hungary (HUNCPIALLMINMEI)
 Consumer Price Index: All Items for Poland (POLCPIALLMINMEI)
 Consumer Price Index: All Items for the Slovak Republic (SVKCPIAL-
LQINMEI)
 As a measure of real GDP activity, seasonally adjusted and in the rst dif-
ference of the logarithm values
 Real Gross Domestic Product for US (GDPC96)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Germany (DEUGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Germany (DEUGDPDEFQISMEI)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Czech Republic(CZEGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Czech Republic (CZEGDPDEFQIS-
MEI)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Hungary (HUNGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Hungary (HUNGDPDEFQISMEI)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Poland (POLGDPNQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Poland (POLGDPDEFQISMEI)
 Current Price Gross Domestic Product in Slovak Republic (SVKGDP-
NQDSMEI)
 GDP Implicit Price Deator in Slovak Republic (SVKGDPDEFQIS-
MEI)
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3.B Model with US, German and EEC data
In the particular case of three countries, e.g., the US, Germany and a (domestic)
EEC like the Czech Republic, the matrix B (j) can be written as
B (j) =
0BBBB@
B11(j) 0 0
B21(j) B22(j) 0
B31(j) B32(j) B33(j)
1CCCCA ; (3.18)
where B12(j), B13(j) and B23(j) are zero matrices with m  (m p+ 1) para-
meters, meaning that EEC variables have impact on neither German nor the US
economy, and where B31(j) and B32(j) respectively give the direct impact of US
and German variables on the EEC. The rst line represents US economy.
The identication scheme has the following form
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@


FFRUS
	


GDPUS
	


CPIUS
	


GDPG
	


CPIG
	


XRG
	


GDPEEC
	


CPIEEC
	


XREEC
	
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
+ : : 0 0 0 0 0 0
  : : 0 0 0 0 0 0
  : : 0 0 0 0 0 0
: : : : 0 0 0 0 0
: : : : : 0 0 0 0
: : : : : : 0 0 0
: : : : : : : 0 0
: : : : : : : : 0
: : : : : : : : :
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
e

FFRUS
	
e

GDPUS
	
e

CPIUS
	
e

GDPG
	
e

CPIG
	
e

XRG
	
e

GDPEEC
	
e

CPIEEC
	
e

XREEC
	
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
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For VAR(2), the model has the following form
Yt = B1Yt 1 +B2Yt 2 + C + t:
The prior mean for vec (B0) is set to be equal 0.95 for coe¢cients on own rst lags
and equal zero on all other remaining coe¢cients. The VAR(2) model under the
prior can be written as
0BBBB@
Y USt
Y Gt
Y EECt
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
diag(0:95) 0 0
0 diag(0:95) 0
0 0 diag(0:95)
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
Y USt 1
Y Gt 1
Y EECt 1
1CCCCA
+
0BBBB@
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
Y USt 2
Y Gt 2
Y EECt 2
1CCCCA+
0BBBB@
0
0
0
1CCCCA+
0BBBB@
1t
2t
3t
1CCCCA ;
where Y USt is a 3  3 matrix of US variables, the interest rate, GDP growth and
CPI ination, Y Gt and Y
EEC
t are 3  3 matrices of German and EEC variables
respectively, namely the GDP growth, CPI ination and nominal exchange rate.
Assuming 9 endogenous variables, the prior variance matrix H is a 171 
171 diagonal matrix, where diagonal elements are set close to zero for coe¢cients
restricted to zero and large for the remaining coe¢cients. In particular, with
reference to the part of the matrix H corresponding to either matrix B (j), j = 1; 2
as given by (3.18), the elements are all given a very high value (10 000) except for
those corresponding toB12(j), B13(j) andB23(j), which are set very low (1=10:000)
to impose the prior strictly.
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3.C Convergence of the Gibbs Sampler
This appendix illustrates the convergence of the Gibbs sampling algorithm for the
direct US monetary shock model forM = 50000 and J = 45000. Following Canova
(2007) and Blake and Mumtaz (2012), I examine the recursive mean of the retained
M   J draws. The draws from the conditional posterior distributions converge to
the marginal posterior distribution if the recursive mean of the retained draws is
stationary without any trend.
Figures 3.7 to 3.9 display the recursive means for the variance-covariance matrix
 and the matrix of regressor B for the Czech Republic for all three models.
It is easy to see that the recursive mean for each variance and covariance in 
uctuates around its mean with no trend. Similarly, for each version of the model,
all regression coe¢cients from matrix B are stable for the retained iterations,
which implies that the number of iterations and retained draws is su¢cient to
approximate the marginal posterior distribution
For the remaining countries, the gures look similar and are available from the
author upon request.
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Figure 3.7: Recursive means of the retained Gibbs draws for  matrix (above)
and B matrix (below) for (US_Czech Republic) model.
221
Figure 3.8: Recursive means of the retained Gibbs draws for  matrix (above)
and B matrix (below) for (Ger_Czech Republic) model.
222
Figure 3.9: Recursive means of the retained Gibbs draws for  matrix (above)
and B matrix (below) for (US_Ger_Czech Republic) model.
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Conclusion
This thesis represents a contribution to the eld of monetary policy. The theoret-
ical contribution is illustrated in Chapter 1. I show that a non-zero steady state
ination may have a positive impact on a social welfare. Analysing simple and
optimal monetary policy rules in a model that considers backward looking as well
as forward looking agents. I nd that the welfare loss that a Hamiltonian social
planner obtains in the steady state depends on the level of ination. In particular,
a positive (and su¢ciently low) ination may be benecial for the economy, as the
negative e¤ect due to a rise in the price dispersion may be more than o¤set by the
positive e¤ect that nominal rigidities generate on labour supply.
In the second chapter, I studied the performance and characteristics of simple
monetary policy rules using a two-countries model. I performed Bayesian inference,
where the novel feature was the inclusion of real unit labour costs for a better
measurement of the Phillips curve. I demonstrated that a simple monetary policy
rule mimicking an optimal rule generates the best outcome and that the non-zero
ination part included in the Phillips curve improves the model t signicantly.
To analyse how the model performs in the context of a small open economy, I used
data for three Eastern European Countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland. Using a posterior odds test, I nd evidence that the central banks of all
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these countries target a PPI ination instead of CPI ination, contrary to what is
usually assumed in the empirical literature. I also nd that in the case of a SOE,
the model with a non-zero steady state ination performs substantially better.
The third chapter investigated the impact of a US monetary policy shocks on
four Eastern European Countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the
Slovak Republic, using a SVAR methodology with economic interpretable restric-
tions. I nd that US monetary policy inuences EEC macroeconomic variables at
least as much as its German (later, ECBs) counterpart, even when controlling for
the indirect e¤ect of the former through German macroeconomic variables.
My research might be extended in a number of directions. For instance, in
the rst chapter, the analysis has been conducted with reference to a stochastic
environment that is generated by a single shock to TFP. An obvious extension of
the model would consider a cost push shock as an alternative to the stochastic
TFP. A preliminary study of this case, however, leads to results very similar to
those discussed in this chapter, with the exception that ination inertia appears
to have a relatively higher impact on the dynamics of the endogenous variables.
Chapter 1 analysed an economy that is closed. It is natural to pose the question of
how the results would change if the economy were allowed to trade in international
markets.
A natural extension to the second chapter would be to investigate the e¤ect of
currency invoicing on the monetary policy transmission mechanism from Germany
to the EEC, with particular regard to the degree of exchange rate tightening. Fi-
nally, with regard to the third chapter, it would be interesting to extend my
analysis by including more endogenous variables, such as real exchange rate, cur-
225
rent account and trade data. In this case, it is preferable to use a FAVAR method,
which is more suitable for large scale models with small numbers of observations.
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